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OUTLINES 



LECTURES ON THE 



HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 



JOHN J. ELMENDORF, S. T. D., 

UNIVERSITY PROF. OF PHILOSOPHY AND ENGLISH LITERATURE IN 
RACINE COLLEGE. 






NEW YORK: 
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

182 Fifth Avenue. 
1876. 







Copyright. 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS. 

1876. 



COL. COLL., NOV. EB., 

MAGISTRAE DILECTISS. ADOLESC. MEAE, 

HAS PRIMITIAS AET. MATUR. 

REVERENTER ATQ. OBSEQUENTER 

DEDICO, 

ALMAE MATRI 

SALUT. ET FELICIT. 

IMPRECANS. 



PREFACE. 



The object of this manual is sufficiently indicated by 
its title, " Outlines of lectures on the History of Philos- 
ophy." It aims at no more than to present, in condensed 
form, a syllabus of the course, for review and recitation. 
For education, the learning to philosophize, what can be 
a substitute for the living guide, elucidating the student's 
confused thought, and making him to grow in mind as he 
traces the development of human thought ? It is surely 
enough to rest this on the pregnant words of the master ; 
" nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician who 
finds a congenial soul, and then with knowledge ingrafts 
and sows words which — are not unfruitful, but have in 
Iftiem seeds which may bear fruit in other natures, nurtured 
in other ways, — making the seed everlasting, and the pos- 
essors happy to the utmost extent of human happiness." 
(Phaedr., p. 276.) 

Text-books, surely, will not do this. In the history of 
philosophy, the lecturer will have a principle, a clue by 
which to guide his scholar. It may be a different one 
from what the best text books supply. The most scien- 
tific of these, if brief, will be the driest and most divorce 
philosophy from that out of which it springs, and on 
which it most powerfully re-acts, the progress of civiliza- 
tion, literature, art, politics, religion. If, on the other 
hand, extensive enough to be both clear and attractive, 
such works are ill adapted to the brief period which an 



Vi PREFACE. 

under-graduate course allows for this study, though the 
student must soon come face to face with those problems 
of the age whose answer must be based on some phi- 
losophy, true or false. Only the living teacher can direct 
every lecture towards those practical ends ; books will not 
answer the purpose. 

Also, there are some leading principles, some cardinal 
thoughts of the world's master-thinkers which the writer 
thinks that the student should have the opportunity of 
examining for himself, and his experience has shown him 
that, under favorable circumstances, a fair proportion of 
American youth will gladly avail themselves of the oppor- 
tunity of doing so. 

These outlines, then, are intended, first, to save the 
delay caused by much writing in the lecture-room, 
secondly, to aid a free use by lecturer and scholar of 
original sources ; and, thirdly, to provide help in review 
and recitation ; if interleaved, the manual may prove still 
more serviceable. 

The extreme condensation sometimes needful may 
render the statement here given unsatisfactory, as indeed 
no two persons would find in an original thinker the same 
salient points ; the lecturer will remedy that defect. 

The writer is aware that he lays himself open to criti- 
cism in not infrequent changes of terms, and also in 
referring much of peripatetic principle to S. Thom. Aq. 
But practical considerations into which he will not enter, 
guided him in both respects. 

It is perhaps due to himself that the writer should add 
that the completion of his work has been rendered far 
more difficult, and to himself less satisfactory than it 
otherwise might have been, through loss by fire of a not 



PREFACE. Vii 

insufficient supply of materials, as well as through such 
hindrances as a thousand miles' distance from publishers 
must needs create. 

Thanks and special acknowledgments are due to his 
friend, Mr. H, H. Martin, for valuable assistance in revisal. 

Racine Coll., Sept., 1876. 



CONTENTS. 



Chapter i. 
I NTROD TACTION. 
I. Terms and Definitions — 2. Subjects — 3. Origin and Progress — 

4. Systems, ....... i 

Chapter 2. 

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
I. General Characteristics — 2. Literary Sources— 3. Philosophical 

Schools, ........ 7 

Chapter 3. 

GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 
I. Introduction-^2. Ionic School — 3, Dorian School — 4. Eleatic 

School — 5. Sophists, . . . . . .16 

Chapter 4. 
Socrates ; Plato ; Aristotle, . . . . .31 

Chapter 5. 

SOCRATIC, PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN SCHOOLS. 

I. Socratic Schools — 2. The Academy — 3. Peripatetic Schools, . 56 

Chapter 6. 

DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

I. Stoicism — 2. Epicurianism — 3. Pyrrhonism — 4. Neo-Platonism, 61 

Chapter 7. 
RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
I. Introduction — 2. Opponents — 3, Apologists — 4. Anti-Nicene Pat- 
ristic Philosophy — 5. Post-Nicene Patristic Philosophy, . 84 

Chapter 8. 

SCHOLASTICISM. 
I. Introduction — 2. Period of Growth — 3. Full Development — 

4. Decline, ....... 102 

Chapter 9. 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 
I. Introduction— 2. Platonists, Cabalists, Mystics — 3. Peripatetics — 

4. Independent Philosophy and Scepticism, . . . 14^ 



x contents. 

Chapter io. 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 
I, Philosophical Character of the 17th Century — 2, Bacon — 

3. Hobbes — 4. Locke, . . , . .154 

Chapter ii. 
DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 
I. Descartes — 2. Cartesian School — 3. Spinoza — 4. Leibnitz — 
5. Idealism in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, ....... 172 

Chapter 12. 

SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES. 

I. Continental Skeptics — 2. English Skeptics before Hume — 3. Hume 

— 4. Mysticism, ...... 201 

Chapter 13. 

FRENCH SENSUALISTIC SCHOOL OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 
I. Empirical Political Philosophy — 2. Condillac — 3. Materialism, „ 214 

Chapter 14, 

SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

I. Period of Development — 2. Reid — 3. Period of Criticism, . 222 

Chapter 15. 

GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
I. Kant — 2, Fichte — 3. Schelling — 4. Plegel — 5. Opponents of Pure 

Idealism, ....... 241 

Chapter 16. 

ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY. 

I. Utilitarian Ethics — 2. Speculative Empiricism in England — 

3. French Ideology and Positivism, , . . . 276 

Chapter 17. 

ENGLISH and FRENCH PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUALISTIC 
SCHOOL OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 

I. Psychological Spiritualism in England and the United States — 

2. French Eclecticism, . . . . . . 287 



CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION. 

I. Terms and Definitions. — 2. Subjects. — 3. Origin 
AND Progress. — 4. Systems. 

[References: — Sir William Hamilton's Metaphysics, First Seven Lectures : Fleming's 
Vocab. of Phil., Ed. Krauth.] 

I. — Terms and Definitions. 

Philosophy, i. e., Truth-seeking, a term said to have 
originated with Pythagoras. (.?) Cic. Tusc. Quaest. v. 3. 
Plato's Phaedrus, p. 2"]^. 

Its aim is the conditions, Hmits and ultimate principles 
of all knowledge concerning God, man, or the universe. > 

Distinguish {a) empirical, or historical, knowledge, i. e., 
of facts or phenomena : 

(^) Scientific, classifying these phenomena, and deter- 
mining their relations, and laws or uniformities : 

(c) Philosophical, e. g. of effects in their causes, back 
to a First Cause ; of qualities as inherent in substance, 
etc. 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

(See further, § 4.) 

Tho, possibility of a solution of philosophical questions 
may be denied, yet the attempt is an historical fact of the 
utmost importance and widest influence, instructive even 
in its failure. 

Relations of reason to faith, the one seeking truth by 
the aid of that " true Light which lighteth every man that 
Cometh into the world ; " the other finding it revealed, and 
" supernatural truth " grounded upon it. 

(On the failures of Phil., see Cic. Tusc. Quaest. i. 11, 
etc. ; De Nat. Deorum. iii. 39. S. Aug. Confess, iv. 4 ; 
vii. 9, 20, 21.) 

2. — Subjects* 

A. Logic is the theory of the laws of thought ; of the 
instrumentality by which all knowledge is possessed, dis- 
covered or developed. 

B. Metaphysics, " Philosophia prima," sometimes iden- 
tified with philosophy, may be defined as the ultimate 
principles of necessary truth ("transcendental") common 
to all sciences, apart from all phenomena, or partial mani- 
festations of them. (Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysics ; 
Introd.) 

(i.) Ontology, Aitiology : the theory of true being, ab- 
solute existence. 

(2.) Epistemology : the theory of knowing, and of its 
limits. 

(3.) " Agnaiology " (Ferrier) : the theory of ignorance. 

C. Theology. " Theosophy," is the theory of God, the 
Infinite, the Absolute, the First Cause, the One, etc. 
(Arist. Met. x. 7) ; may be included in (B.). 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

Theodicea (Leibnitz) : The relations of God to man. 

D. Anthropology is the theory of man in every relation, 
(i.) PsycJiology,{fioQ\.Qvi\\x^^ the science of the mind. 

{a) Empirical. 

ip) Rational ; (may include Logic, Esthetics, 
Ethics.) 
(2.) Ethics, the theory of the good ; (as such may be 
referred to (B.) or (C.) ; " Moral Philosophy," the obliga- 
tions of man to God, his neighbor, and himself. 

Politics and (Economics : the science of man in society. 

Sociology, 

Internafional Rights. 

E. Cosmology is the theory of nature, of the Universe. 
Esthetics is the theory of the beautiful ; (may be re- 
ferred to (B.). 



3. — Origin and Progress. 

A. Philosophy may be founded on sacred books, re- 
ligious traditions, etc. ; for these give the first answers to 
many of the questions raised. 

B. But reason, reflects, systematizes, eventually criti- 
cises ; hence commentators, and scientific theology. 

C. Reason finally emancipates itself, and attempts to 
arrive at independent conclusions, and may even be antag- 
onistic, as — 

(i.) Pyrrhonism. 

(2.) Mysticism. 

(Comte's three eras of progress. 

(i.) Theological. 

(2.) Metaphysical. 



4 INTRODUCTION. 

(3.) Positive, /. e.^ reason confined to phenomena and 
their laws. 

Note. — Does one of these exclude the others ?) 

4, — Philosophical Systems. 

I. 

A. Empiricism bases all knowledge on experience, 
i. e., remembrance of repeated phenomena, 

(i.) Of external sensible objects, 

(2.) Of internal operations of the mind. 

It rejects a priori sources of knowledge. Hence : 

(i.) Sensualism, deriving all knowledge from sensation. 
Truth is individual, relative. Ideology is the science of 
" ideas,'' i. e., remembered and generalized sensations. 

(2.) Materialism, the theory of one substance, which 
is matter. 

Hylozoism. 

(3.) Philosophical ^^?/2^/i"M/ no designing and direct- 
ing mind can be known. 

Teleology is impossible. 

B. Rationalism. Some elernents of knowledge, at 
least, are furnished by piLre reason. — (Bacon's Apoph- 
thegms : 19.) 

II. 

A. Dogmatism asserts that knowledge is attainable by 
a right use of our faculties. 

B. Scepticism, Pyrrhonis^n, asserts that knowledge is 
unattainable by reason; opinion is our only ground of 
assertion. 

(Note. — Distinguish from religious skepticism. — Mansel.) 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

Probabilism. Hence : 

(i.) Nihilism, the denial of all existence. 

(2.) Positivis7n, knowlQdgQ limited to phenomena. 

(3.) Critical School in which reason and understand- 
ing supply only the subjective forms of knowledge; e. g., 
space and time. Phenomena are the only things objec- 
tively known. Pure metaphysics of God, the Soul, and 
the Universe, have no objective validity. 

C. Mysticism, which makes truth attainable by imme- 
diate union with God, 

(i.) Mysticism of sentiment, in which love is the only 
source of truth: Hence Quietism. 

(2.) Pure mysticism, in which ecstasy is the union of 
the soul with God. Hence Theurgy. (Cousin: Hist. 
Gen. Phil., Sect. I. See also app. xi. to Henry's Cousin's 
El em. Psychol.) 



HI. 



A. Realism asserts intuitive cognition of the external 
object, or non-ego. 

B. Idealism asserts that ideas are the only objects 
/Imown. 

(i.) vS2/<^V<:^2V^ Idealism ; the ego and the non-ego a.rQ 
one thing. (Fichte.) 

(2.) Objective, Pantheistic Idealism ; the ego and the 
non-ego are manifestations of the Absolute. (Schelling.) 

(3.) Absolute Idealism ; relations are the only objects 
of knowledge. (Lewes' Hist. Phil. loth Epoch, cc. i., 
ii., iii. 



6 INTRODUCTION. 

IV. 

A. [Monism.] The theory that one principle is the 
ground of all being. 

(i.) Materialism, 

(a) Evohition. 

(b) Plurality of elements, 
(2.) Idealism. 

(3.) Pantheism, ; hence, Emanation. 

B. Dualism asserts two principles : e. g., mind and 
matter. 



CHAPTER II. 

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

1. General Characteristics. — 2. Literary Sources. — 
3. Philosophical Schools. 

[References : Sir Wm. Jones' Works, especially, Transl. Inst, of Menu ; Transact, of 
the As. Soc, (Colebrooke, etc.,) ; F. Von Schlegel ; H. H. Wilson's translations and pre- 
faces ; Miiller's Chips, etc., vol. I; Cousin, Hist. Phil. Mod., 2d Sen, vol. 2, Sect. 6; 
Ritter II. 2 ; Contemp. Rev., June, 1872.] 

I. — General Characteristics. 

A. Valuey for us, is found in the fact that, though inde- 
pendent of more famiHar systems, e. g., modern pantheism, 
Ind. Phil, is yet one with ours in methods and conclusions. 
Some tendencies of the present age very fully and philo- 
sophically developed. . 

B. Underlying Unity, (i.) In origin, from the theory 
of Emanation, which must not be confounded with (2.) 
Pantheisjn ; in the latter, evil is non-existent, or is one of 
the qualities of the Divine Essence ; in the former, evil 
is the result of decay, of degradation. Instit. Menu, i. 
49~57 ; Schlegel, ii. 2 ; H. H. Wilson's trans. Vishnu — 
Purana, I. 19 et seq. 

" All the kings who have been, and all who shall be, are but 
parts of the Universal Vishnu. The rulers of the gods . . 



8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

and of the malignant spirits . . . the chief among beasts . . 
. men, etc., the best of trees, mountains, planets . . . are but 
portions of the Universal Vishnu." 

The king's son at the end of his prayer says : " Glory to hnii 
whom I also am ... I am all things ; all things are in me. 
Brahma is my name," etc. " Thus meditating upon Vishnu as 
identical with his own spirit he became as one with him ... he 
was freed from the consequences of moral merit and demerit, and 
obtained final exemption from existence." 

(3.) In means to be employed. 

(a) Abstraction from passions, cares, etc. 

(b) Science ; hence the need of philosophy. 



2.— Literary Sources. 

A. The Vedas (four). Each is of two parts ; 
(i ) Mantras, or prayers. 

(2.) Brahmanas, or precepts. 

Especially noteworthy is the Rig- Veda ; (circ. 1500, 
B. C. ?) 

All systems profess submission to them, for they were 
revealed by Brahma, and preserved by tradition until ar- 
ranged by Vyasa {i. e., compiler), (Colebrooke, in As. 
Trans., vol. 8.) 

They are based on a pure monotheism ; in them no 
idolatry, but a symbolic worship of the elements : e. g. 
Agni=fire, Indra=sky, Varuna^water, Soma==moon. 
(See Hymn to the Paramatma, Rig-V. vii. 10 ; see also 
the Gayatri, or, "hohest verse," which lifts man up to 
Brahma ; Sir Wm. Jones, vol. xiii.) 

B, The Upanichads. Theological Commentaries. 



INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 9 

D. Brahmd-Soutras, and others of the Uttara (second) 
Mimansa, or Vedanta, (vid. inf.) 

E. Institutes of Menu, a son of Brahma. They give 
a comprehensive system of Indian legislation, etc., based 
on the prevailing philosophy. They are of uncertain, prob- 
ably, of various, dates. (Sir Wm. Jones, B. C. 800 ; cf. 
Ritter.) 

F. Bhagavat-Gita is an episode of the great Indian 
epic, Mahabharata. (Trans. 16 vols,, 8vo., 1600 pp., by 
Fauche, i860; B-G. trans, by Chas. Wilkins, 1785; 
Latin trans, by A. W. Schlegel. Vid. et. Cousin ; Hist 
Phil. Lect. 2, Ed. 1863.) 

G. Pui'dnds (eighteen) fully develop pantheism. (H. 
H. Wilson's Pref. to Vishnu-P.) 

" Vishnu is the world ; " " cause and effect " ; " creator and the 
thing to be created," etc. 

The chief P. is Bi^ahmd Picrdnd. The universe is from 
the indiscrete cause, which is one with matter and spirit. 
From Pradhana, the chief principle, proceed, 

(i.) J/^^^/^^^' ^Intelligence ; from M., 

(2.) Ahankdra ^Consciousness, or the ego, (cf. Hegel, 
and Cont. Rev. July, 1874) ; from A., 

(3.) The five elements ; from these, 

(4.) The divine Q,gg, the abode of Brahma, the Creator, 
who is also Vishnu the preserver, until the end of a kal- 
pa, (Brahma's day), when, in the form of Siva, he swallows 
up the universe, and reposes. After a season, awaking 
again, he renews the universe. 

As the universe proceeds from prakriti, i. e. eternal 
nature, without sensible qualities, so at the end of the 



lO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

series of kalpas, i. e. Brahma's life, all the gods and other 
forms of being will be annihilated, and the elements merg- 
ed into primary being again. 

3. Philosophical Schools. 

A. Veddntay i. e. end of the Vedas, otherwise known as 
the tittara Mimansa, has for its author, Vyasa. 

(i.) //i- i'/^^r////^/^//^^? is orthodox interpretation of the 
Vedas. 

(2.) Its method is deduction from the Vedas. 

(3,) Its principle is emanation ; Brahm is manifested 
as 

{a) Brahma. 

{b) Vishnu. 

{c) Siva. 

From {a) emanate gods, rishis, kings, etc. and the uni- 
verse. He continually transforms and diversifies himself ; 
" as the spider spins and gathers back again its web." 

On this is based a system of Idealism. 

(4) Psychology ; individual souls are sparks from the 
one infinite light. Besides these there is the one supreme 
soul in all, which is not individual nor free. (As. Res. v. 
8, p. 421, seq.) 

'• He who sees all things in the Atman (supreme soul) and the 
Atinan in all beings, he will not despise anything." " They go on in 
thick darkness who adore prakritij but they go on in thicker dark- 
ness, who delight in created and perishable nature." (Isa Oupan. 
6-12). 

Hence, trmtsmigration of souls ; and, for the wise at 
last, Nirvana, absorption in Brahm. 



INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. II 

(5.) Conclusion, Mysticism. Transmigration is to be 
remedied by virtues, especially the ceremonial, and ascetic 
contemplation. 

B. Sdnkkya, (judgment, wisdom) of Kapila. 

(i.) Th.Q fozmder, Kapila, is, perhaps, a mythologic per- 
sonage. The best text is a treatise in verse called Kari- 
ka. (See trans, with comment by H. H. Wilson, and also 
As. Trans, vv. i, 3.) 

(2.) The starting point is not strictly orthodox, and call- 
ed nir-Isva7^a, (atheistic) though K. professes to receive 
revelation. 

Its object is to remedy the pains of existence by final 
freedom from individuality ; (Karika, I ; and Wilson, p. 

178.) 

(3.) Method. Observation of phenomena, induction, 
revelation. 

(4.) Principley a doctrine of development. 

A dualism of mind and matter exists, but both are from 
prakriti, nature, eternal matter, productive, not a produc- 
tion. Moula prakriti is inferred, by induction, from its 
effects ; it is the material cause of all, and there is no need 
of any other cause. It precedes buddhi (mind), the anima 
mundi. 

Buddhi is the source of the three manifestations of 
god, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, or of the three qualities, 
goodness, foulness, and darkness. Brahma is only the in- 
strumental cause of things created. Substance becomes 
perceptible according to its inherent powers. 

Cause and effect are one in nature. (Wilson's Kari- 
ka, pp. 33 seq.) 

The third of Kapila' s twenty-four principles is con- 



12 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sciousness, or egoism ; the last is dtman, individual, im- 
material, multitudinous souls. 

Many of the Puranas are based on this Sankhya, and in some of 
them nature is Maya (illusion.) " You must conceive mountains, 
oceans, etc., as the illusions of the apprehension. When knowledge 
is pure, (real, universal, etc.) then the varieties of substance cease 
to exist in matter. . . . For what is substance ? Where is the 
thing that is devoid of beginning, middle, and end, of one uniform 
nature ? How can reahty be predicated of that which is subject to 
change, and reassumes no more its original character? (^. ^. a jar 
made of clay, broken and reduced to dust.) (Vish.-Pur. ii. 12.) 

(5.) Tendency. Sensualism, materialism, atheism. K. 
denies an Iswara, a ruler of the world. There is no proof 
of his existence. 

{a) Not perceived by the senses ; 

ib) Not inferrible by induction ; 

{c) Nor revealed. 

K.'s a prioid refutation of theism is, 

{a) Unaffected by consciousness he could have no in- 
ducement to create ; 

{b) If fettered by Nature, he would not be capable of 
creation. 

Hence Buddhism (600-1000 B. C.) 

(i.) i^d?2/;2<^^r is Sakhya, or Bouddha Mouni ; a reform- 
er and propagandist. 

(2.) B. contains various systems of philosophy under 
the common anthropomorphic polytheism, but all aim at the 
Nirvana, loss of individuality ; with some it appears to be 
Nihilism. 

C. Sankhya, of Patandjali. 

(i.) The Founder IS Patandjali, an eclectic, stoic, mys- 
tic; there are four books of Yoga-Sontras, (union pre- 



INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1 3 

cepts) ; {a) On contemplation ; (b') How to arrive at it ; 
(c) The exercise of higher powers ; ((^) ecstasy. 

(2.) Principle^ mysticism. . The Vedas are useless 
when their source is attained. 

" Ouot usibus inservit puteus, aquis imdique confluentibus, tot usi- 
bus praestant universi libri sacri theologo prudenti." 

(3.) Psychology : above sense is soul ; above soul, in- 
telligence ; above that, pure being. Hence, 
(4.) Ethics, of contemplation, inaction. 

" Naturse qualitatibus peraguntur omni modo opera." (cf. Spinoza.) 
"Mente devotus m hoc cevo utraque dimittit, bene et male facta." 
(See Bhag.-Gita § 4, on forsaking works; i. e., religious duties). 
" The worship of spiritual wisdom is far better than the worship with 
the offering of things." " Be thou free from a three-fold nature ; (the 
three qualities : vid. supra.) — When thy understanding, brought by 
study to maturity shall be fixed immoveably in contemplation, then shall 
it obtain true wisdom ; (Krishna) ; a man is confirmed in wisdom when 
he forsaketh every desire which entereth into his heart. He is called 
a Moimi — in all things he is without affection. (Bhag.-Gita § 2). 
The Yogui constantly exerciseth the spirit in private. He is recluse, 
of a subdued mind and spirit, free from hope, free from perception. 
He planteth his seat firmly on a spot that is undefiled, neither too 
high nor too low, and sitteth upon the sacred grass covered with a 
skin and a cloth. There he whose business is the restraining of his 
passions should sit, with his mind fixed on one object alone, in the 
exercise of his devotion, for the purification of his soul, keeping his 
head, his neck, his body, steady without motion, his eyes fixed on the 
point of his nose, looking at no other place around . . . When 
he hath abaqdoned any desire that ariseth from the imagination, and 
subdued with his mind any inclination of the senses, he may, by de- 
grees, find rest;\nd having, by a steady resolution, fixed his mind 
within himself, he should think of nothing else. He is united with 
Brahm the supreme. He looketh on all things alike. He beholdeth 
the supreme soul in all things, and all things in the supreme soul." 
(Bhag.-Gita. § 6.) 



14 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

" The Yogjd seeks for wisdom, the supreme condition of Vishnu, 
which requires no exercise, not to be taught, internally diffused, un- 
modified by accidents of, happiness, etc., not to be defined, void of 
passion, unagitated by thoughts of duality, pure (z. e., not sensuous, 
nor logical), etc." " The Yogui who attains Brahm returns not to 
life again — then he is freed from the distinctions of vice and virtue," 
etc. (Vish.-Pur. i., 22.) (For development of Pantheism, see Krishna's 
account of himself in Bhag.-Gita, quoted in Cousin, Hist. Phil.) 

D. Nyaya (reasoning.) (See Miiller's App. to Thom- 
son's Laws of Thought.) 

(i.) The Founder is Gotama, whose dialectics, in the 
form of Soutras, should be compared with those of the 
Peripatetic school, and give proof of the high culture of 
his age. (Cousin, in loc.) 

(2.) Method, is chiefly logical. The syllogism is ex- 
plained by G. in a precise and severe way, but he views 
principles concretely. Like Kanada, (vid. inf.) he dis- 
tinguishes the categories. The inductive process also is 
fully developed. 

(3.) Analysis of ratiocination. For demonstration (rhe- 
torical) there are five steps : 

{a) The proposition ; e. g., " This mountain is' hot ; " 
{b) The reason; " for it smokes ; " 
{c) The major premise, with example ; " What smokes 
is hot ; e. g., The fire in the kitchen ; " 

{d) The application; "this is true of the mountain; " 
{e) The conclusion ; " Therefore, etc," 
(4.) Pr/V^a//^, Spiritualism. Substance is the intimate 
cause of an aggregated result or product, (cf. Leib- 
nitz.) 

The soul is distinct from the body, infinite in principle ; 
a special substance different in each individual, with de- 



INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1 5 

termined attributes, as knowledge and will, which do not 
belong to other substances. 

(5.) End, as in other schools, by science to obtain de- 
liverance from evils, emancipation of the soul from the 
body, etc. 

E. Vaiseschika. 

(i.) The Founder \'$> Kanada, who treats of logic and 
physics (see Miiller, ubi supr., and cf. Ionic schools.) 

(2.) Method, induction : there are only two sources of 
knowledge, perception and inference. 

K. distinguishes six or seven predicamenta ; (cf . Aris- 
totle's ten,) viz., substance, quality, action, genus, indi- 
viduality, relation, privation. 

(3.) P^dnciple ; atoms compose the universe, both 
spiritual and material. There are nine substances, eternal 
as atoms, transient as aggregates. 

(4.) Conclnsion ; materialism, atheism. 

(5.) End ; as with other schools. Nirvana, though, 
possibly, in a different sense, profound calm, perfect apathy 
or ecstasy. 

(On Nirvana, see Miiller s Chips., etc., i. ii.) 



1 6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 



CHAPTER III. 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 

I. Introduction. 2. Ionic School. 3. Dorian School. 
4. Eleatic School. 5. The Sophists. 

[References : — Diog. Laert. de Vit., etc. (traditional); Arist. Met., i. i-8 ; Ritter, iii.- 
vi. ; Ueberweg, i., §§ 7-33 ; Enfield, ii. cc. 1-3 ; Archer Butler,- i. (ist Ser.) 4-6 ; Lewes, i. 
ist-3rd Ep. ; Blakey, i. cc. 2-6 ; Cousin, Hist. Gen. Phil. (Ed. 1S63) Lect. iii. ; Cudworth, 
Int. Syst. V. I ; For special ref. vid. infra,] 

I. Introduction. 

A. Character. The first philosophic thought of the 
Aryan race in Europe, anticipating the latest questions of 
the nineteenth century ; the Greeks the most restless, in- 
tellectually active and curious of nations. 

The purely religious period very short ; and, unlike 
India, religion of very little permanent influence on philos- 
ophy. The former soon becomes anthropomorphic, ar- 
tistic, not symbolic ; the latter, {e. g., Xenophanes) in- 
different to popular religion or deriding it. (Ritter, ii. 3.) 
There is no religious caste ; each tribe or city has its own 
worship. 

Sacred books also, {e. g., Orphic Hymns, Hesiod's 
Theogony) of little influence on phil. ; (note Homer's 
Anthropomorphism.) 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 1/ 

(Query ; Influence of Egypt ? Of the mysteries ?) 
Early Phil, in Greece is eminently practical ; its philoso- 
phers are statesmen, lawgivers ; e. g., the " seven wise 
men." See their ethical gnomes. 

B. Date and Place. The sixth cent. B.C. is a. brilliant 
intellectual period of most rapid development. (Cf. the 
fine arts, and consider the influence of phil. upon them : 
Kugler, i. 2.2 ; and note that Greek art does not confirm 
the "positive" theory of progress ; there is no fetichism 
in Homer.) 

Philosophy appears first in the Greek colonies, Asia 
M., Mag. Graecia, and Sicily : why 1 The consequence 
is isolation of the different schools. 

Their subsequent meeting is at Athens ; then came a migration to Alexandria and 
Rome ; then revival at Athens, and final closing of the school by Justinian (A. D. 529.) 

C. Subjects and Schools. All schools study nature 
rather than man ; for the objective precedes the subjec- 
tive. All are cosmological, devoted to physics and meta- 
physics, not to psychology. 

There are four schools, each crude but consistent, in- 
dependently working, and embracing the principal direc- 
tions of human thought in all ages. 

(i.) Ionian; based on phenomena; devoted to physi- 
cal science. 

(2.) Dorian ; based on relations ; devoted to mathema- 
tics and ethics. 

(3.) Eleatic ; based on pure being ; devoted to meta- 
physics and dialectics. 

(4.) Sophistical ; antiphilosophical or sceptical, and 
devoted to the practical or subjective. 



1 8 greek philosophy before socrates. 

2. The Ionian School. 

[References. — Arist. de Anima, i. 2-3 ; Physics, i. 2-6 ; Ritter makes this school a special 
study.] 

A. Character and Divisions. 

(i.) The lonians were a sensuous, lively and impres- 
sible race ; (authors of history and the epos). In politics, 
they show a marked democratic tendency. 

(2.) Their Method is inductive, in rude attempts to 
generalize phenomena, 

(3.) Principle, in early phil. is Hylozoizm, the insepar- 
able connection of matter and life. 

Later philosophers add to their materialism, from the 
Eleatic School, the immutability of being, but affirm its 
plurality, and explain apparent changes by the combination 
and separation of immutable primitive elements. 

(4.) Two viezvs of nature, {a.) Dynamical ; {b.) me- 
chanical. 

(a) The spontaneous development and alteration of 
primitive matter. 

(b) Permanent elements, moved from without or self- 
moving, separating and combining. 

(5.) Philosophical Order. (Ritter.) 

{a) Dynamical. {b) Mechanical. 

Thales, 

Anaximenes, Anaximander, 

Diogenes of ApoUonia, Anaxagoras, 

Heraclitus (b. before Diog. Empedocles, (Eleatic.) 

but not so purely Ionian.) 
(Some would add,) 
Democritus, (with sophistical 

tendency.) 



THE IONIAN SCHOOL. 1 9 

B. Dynamical School. 
. (i.) Thales. 

{a.) Life. b. at Miletus, (circ. 640 B. C). ; said to 
have been contemporary with Croesus and Solon ; to have 
travelled in Egypt ; to have predicted an eclipse ; a prac- 
tical mathematician and statesman. There are no authentic 
remains, and, perhaps, he wrote nothing. 

ib.) Principle is inductive hylozoism. From water all 
things are derived, but water full of vital energy. (Arist. 
Met. i. 3.) 

Hence the later view of his teaching (as in Cic. Nat. 
De. i. 10) that ^' God is the Intelligence who, from water, 
formed all things." (Anaxagoras.) This dualism is incon- 
sistent with the earlier Hylozoism. 

(2.) Anaximenes^ (a.) of Miletus ; date uncertain ; 
(flourished 556,-529, B, C.) is said to have discovered the 
obliquity of the ecliptic. 

(b.) By induction A. infers that air is the primary 
infinite substance, manifest through the qualities which it 
assumes. The cause of sensible, finite forms is the eternal 
motion of air in condensation and rarefaction. (Arist. 
Met. i. 3 ; Cic. de Nat. De. i. 10; Quaest. Acad. iv. 37.) 

Diogenes, {a) of ApoUonia in Crete ; (flour, circ. 550 B, 
C.) He taught first at Miletus, then at Athens ; author of 
a work ^'Ihp\ (poa^ujq.'' 

(b.) All things are one in essence, otherwise there 
could be no reciprocal action of things, (Simplicius in Rit- 
ter, iii. 5 ). The principle of life and being is air ; individual 
beings are special manifestations of the universal being. 

D. may have been more pantheistic than (i) and (2); 
he says that the primary air has intelligence. 

(4.) Heraclitiis, (a) of Ephesus ; (flour, circ. 500 B. C.) 



20 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 

the " weeping philosopher," d'/AoXoCdopoq^ he renounced 
political life. Fragments of his works remain, but he is 
exceedingly obscure, " o (rxorsr^oq"" 

{b.) H. is less empirical than his predecessors ; in- 
duction is less strictly adhered to, and he shows the greatest 
advance of his school towards spiritualism, yet still is Ionian 
in holding to the validity of a rational use of the senses. 

He sees the universal in the individual and variable, 
and the individual in a universal and unchangeable princi- 
ple, Niz.fij'e. From fire, ~op dti Zihir^^ in perpetual movement, 
an intelligent principle, proceed all things. It is the prin- 
ciple even of thought. (Berkeley's Siris, §. 175, seq.) It 
has illimitable force, universal life ; eternal motion is an 
inherent tendency in this primal fire ; " The demiurgos 
sports in m.aking worlds." 

Plurality proceeds from unity, the fire, and is absorbed 
into it again, and so all things return to the primal fire ; 
(anticipates the Stoics.) 

All is composed of contraries ; " The strife of all, 
[perpetual flux and reflux] is the parent of all ; " " -«>-« 
ycopti xai ubdh //^vet." " In idem flumen bis descendimus et 
non descendimus;" (Sen. Ep. 58,) (cf. Hegel.) 

(c) Psychology ; reason in man, common to all, is a 
higher emanation of the infinite fire, which becomes con- 
scious in man. The senses are deceptive and earthly, and 
earth is the primal fire's lowest degradation. 

{d) Ethics. H. is more ethical than his predeces- 
sors, (Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 3), though he seems to termi- 
nate in pantheism ; " enter, for here too are gods." (Plato, 
Theaet. p. 179 seq. ; Crat. p. 401. Arist. Met. iii. 7; 
Phys. I, i ; Nic. Eth. viii. i, 2.) 

(5.) Democj'itus, (a) of Abdera, (490-460, B. C.) "the 



THE IONIAN SCHOOL. 21 

laughing philosopher," was a man of wealth, and trav- 
elled extensively. He was the author of voluminous 
works (most not extant) on ethics, physics, and various 
branches of natural science. 

{b) By reflection on induction, D. is a thorough ma- 
terialist. The only true is something extended in space. 
Its units are of unchangeable figure, and indivisible; 
hence, " atoms." They are manifold, of various forms, 
separated 271 vaaio. Their phenomena, i. e. bodily forms, 
are infinite ; therefore, in variety and number they are 
infinite. 

Their only property is motion or force ; sensations are 
subjective. 

Bodies are generated and destroyed by the aggregation 
and separation of these atoms ; they are moveable by force 
from without, but D. does not assign a first cause of their 
motion. (Arist. Met. i. 4 ; iii. 4, 5 ; viii. 2 ; Phys. 
iv. 6.) 

{c) The soul is a combination of atoms of a finer 
sort, spherical, like fire. (Arist. De An. i. 2, 3, 5.) It 
is set in motion from without ; effluxes, a-oppotac^ sldwXa, 
sent off from objects, enter it through the organs of sense, 
but give only obscure, imperfect knowledge of the objects. 

The gods are visions, stdtoXa ; (cf . the Sankhya of Kapila.) 
(d.) His ethics consist of good, practical precepts, 
based on a prudential egoism. True pleasure is not cor- 
poreal, but mental ; even the latter, however, is to be 
regulated by moderation ; (Epicurus.) As the eidola are 
the causes of desires, etc., a man's moral character de- 
pends on them. 

D. has no place for any theory of God. (Cic. de Nat, 
De. i. 12, 43.) 



22 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 

With this Ionic school, compare scientific conclusions in the 
19th cent, and see Tyndall's Address before Brit. Assoc. 1874; "I 
discern in matter — the promise and potency of every form and quality 
of life." Reprinted Littell, Liv. Age, 1581. 

C. Mechanical School. 

(i.) Anaximander, {a) of Miletus ; b. circ. 610. B. C. ; 
author of a work ~zp\ cpoaewq. He is said to have in- 
vented the gnomon or to have introduced it among the 
Greeks. 

{b) The perpetual movement, naturally inherent, of 
primary material elements produces all. A. recognizes no 
God, but simply undefined, undetermined (Jl-Bcp<») matter. 
All bodies are undergoing continual transmutations 
through their inherent energy ; z. e. from the mixture of 
elements, by separation, bodies are perpetually formed ; 
dissolving to be formed anew. (Ritter, iii. 7 ; Arist. 
Phys. i. 4; iii. 4 ; S. Aug. De Civ. Dei, viii. 2.) 

(2.) Anaxagoi^as, {a) of Clazomenae, b. circ. 500 B. C. ; 
devoted much attention to mathematics and astronomy ; 
at Athens, set. 45, the friend of Pericles, Euripides, etc., 
was accused of impiety, imprisoned, exiled. 

A. was a profound and cautious thinker, and, though an 
Ionian, not satisfied with empirical induction or material- 
ism. (Plato Apol. p. 26 ; Crat. p. 409.) 

{b) Principle, a dualism of matter and intelligence, of 
elements of various kinds and God, (>'>;)?) ; the first record- 
ed philosophical theist of Greece, -dyza eyvuj v>oD?. (Arist. 
Met. i. 3). 

By a sort of chemical theory, A. sets out from a chaos of 
various elements ; the universe is a plejium of hoinceomeria, 
different material particles ; (Lucretius, i. 834, seq. ; 875, 
seq.). Intelligence is not the cause of them, though they 



THE IONIAN SCHOOL. 23 

must have it to guide them ; it arranges and disposes 
them by motion. (Ritter iii. 8 ; Arist. Met. i. 3, 4 ; iii. 7 ; 
X. 6; xi. 6; Cic. Acad. Quaest. i. 12 ; ii. 31 ; Plato's 
Phaed. p. 97, seq.) 

(3.) Empedocles, (a) of Agrigentum, (circ. 444 B. C.) 

travelled in Italy and Sicily, a physician, priest, thauma- 

turgist. His life is traditional, full of fables and marvels. 

Like the Eleatics, he stated his doctrine in the form of 

an epic poem, --f)\ (pontuj-. 

{b) Apparently, E. was a syncretist, and is differently 
placed by different historians of phil. ; (in Ritter, an 
Eleatic.) 

There are four elements : fire, air, earth and water ; 
but the " sphere " is the original of things containing the 
four elements, and two coequal forces, love and hate ; 
love unites the elements, hate separates them ; birth and 
death are a mingling and a separation of the elements. 
Love seems to be identical with the unity of the Eleatics, 
and is the source of all beings. (Arist. Met. i. 4; ii. i, 
4; De An. i. 4, 5.) 

Aristotle's objections to the Ionian physicists. 

{a.) They have recognized the existence of bodies only, not of in- 
corporeals. 

{b.) Merely giving elements, they have neglected the formal cause^ 
or the essence of things. 

(c.) If they took one element,^. ^. water, they did not show how 
the other elements could come from it. 

(d.) Even by Anaxagoras, no account is rendered of the why, or 
final cause. (Cf. Plato's Phaed. p. 98 ) 

3. Italic or Dorian School. 

The Dorians were a deeper, more quiet, more conser- 
vative race than the lonians ; hence the ethical and specu- 



24 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 

lative character of their phil., inquiring into the "where- 
fore " of nature, and its inward meaning, unity and moral 
ends. 

Note. — The term ^/Aoo-oc&Za is referred to this school by Plato, 
(Pkied. p. 22 : Crat. p. 400.) 

A school of great influence, but with no prominent 
names, except Pythagoras. 

(Porphyrii Vit. Pyth. ; Jamblichi Vit. Pyth. ; Plato, de 
Rep. X. p. 600.) 

A. Life. P. was born inSamos, (circ. 582, B. C.) Little 
is known of his life, though many remarkable legends are 
connected with it. 

A contemporary of Thales, he travelled in Egypt, per- 
haps in India; (did he thence derive metempsychosis.?); 
he settled in Crotona, circ. 529, B. C:, and founded a 
secret institute, religious, scientific, moral and political, 
with common morals, customs, symbolical aphorisms, etc. 
Esoteric teaching distinguishes his school, which was soon 
bitterly persecuted. (Enfield, ii. xii. i.) 

P. was a man of great and varied attainments, a scien- 
tific mathematician, etc. (Cic. de Nat. De. iii. 36.) 

Neither he nor his first disciples left any writings ; his 
school was eminently mathematical ; symbolic in its ex- 
oteric teaching. (Comte. Pos. Phil. tr. Martineau ; i. 
p. 42.) 

B. Method, is not empirical, but a pure rationalism. 

C. Principle. Of his philosophy little is known, but he 
evidently founds the concrete upon the abstract, and is, so far, 
ideal. Instead of things, their relations appear to be in- 
vestigated, i. e. number, which is applied to music, astron- 
omy, even to morals. " Number is the essence (^nhauj) or 



ELEATIC SCHOOL. 25 

first principle (f^pyjj) of all things." ''rohq dptd-iiodq alriuuq 

ilvac r7]g 0U(j{aq "j" '^ fj.c/j.rjasc El>ac zd o'^za raJ'^ dptd-ixw'^r 

(Arist. Met. i. 5, 6; xiii. 6. Nic. Eth. i. 6; Phys. iii. 
5 ; iv. 6. Cf. Wisdom of S. xi. 20, and S. Aug. Civ. 
Dei, xii. 18.) 

D. Cosmology {Koaixoc) is a term due to this school, ex. 
pressing the harmony of contraries in the universe. The 
primary elements of nature are arranged in a table of con- 
traries. (Arist. ubi sup.) Even corporeal magnitude is 
reduced to the ideal, the limit or unit, with the unlimited, 
or interval. 

The earth moves ; a proposition which shows inde- 
pendence of sensation. 

E. Psychology. The soul is immortal ; a self-moving 
monad of two parts, (i) rational, '^ooq, and (2) irrational, 
■&otj.6q ; (Cic. Tusc. Quaest. iv. 5.); voDg is a portion of the 
universal soul. (Cic. de Senect. xxi. yS ; De Nat. De. 

i. II.) 

Metempsychosis. At death the soul passes to the re- 
gions of the dead, and thence to some other body ; thus it 
is gradually purified, till fit to return to its eternal source. 
(Ovid Metam. xv. 3 ; Horace, Carm. i. 28.) 

F. Ethics. A highly moral system ; (see the life of Ar- 
chytas) ; God is unity ; " all is from the original one "= 
God. Good is unity and harmony, evil is diversity or 
duality, rb a-tipwj^ the unlimited, or want of harmony. 

4. Eleatic School. 

An idealistic pantheism, (cf. Indian Phil., and see 
Cousin, Fragm. Phil. v. i.) a metaphysical school, wholly 
disregarding the sensible, preeminently dialectic, e. g. 



26 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 

Zeno, (Euseb. Praep. Ev., quoted in Ritter v. i ; Plato, 
Soph., p. 242 seq. ; Arist. Met. i, 5.) 

A. Xenophanes, (i.) of Elea; b. 617-556 B. C, at 
Colophon ; expelled ; after travelling, settled at Elea, an 
Ionian colony ; but X. is very unlike an Ionian in phil. 
He transports Ionian physics to Magna Graecia, and unites 
them with Pythag. idealism. A poet, he wrote a poem 
7:-p\ ipuGtuyq. His phil. is theological in form. 

(2.) God is unity, infinity, intelligence, all-powerful, 
all-good. " One sole God, superior to gods and men, and 
who resembles not mortals in form or mind ;" " unwearied, 
he directs all by the power of intelligence." 

He attacks polytheism and the popular anthropomor- 
phism. 

The true existence is eternal, immutable. 

Experience gives only appearances. 

Evil is diversity. 

(Arist. Rhet. ii. 23; Ueberweg, v. i, p. 52, Am. Ed.) 

B. Parnienides, (i.)b. at Elea, (510-532, B. C. ;) was a 
disciple of X. ; he also wrote a poem -^[n (forrtojc. 

(2.) He renders the system of X. metaphysical. He be- 
gins with the idea of pure being. Thought and being are 
necessarily connected ; ro abzo- voz~.v -s y.ai zl^ru. Becoming 
and decay are non-existence ; the truly existent is one, eter- 
nal, complete, hke a sphere. (Arist. Met. i. 5 ; iv. 5 ; Plato, 
Sophist, p. 242 seq. ; Ueberweg, § 19.) (Cf. language ; 
e. g. lv>a.i^ yiy^^zGOai ; werden, sein ; is, be, etc.) 

P. neglects plurality, which is a change in appearance, 
and thinks only of unity. 

Reason gives true knowledge ; the senses, only ap- 
parent. The world of sense is only phenomenal, non-ens ; 
i. e.y he distinguishes sensuous presentations from rational 
cognitions. 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 2/ 

C. Zeno, of E lea, (i.) b. atElea, (505-490 B. C.,) is said 
to have taught at Athens, aet. 40, but he devoted himself 
chiefly to politics at Elea, and was put to death (?) for 
conspiracy against the tyrant of Elea. Z. was the first 
Eleatic who employed prose for his written teachings. 

(2.) Z. reduced the Eleatic system to dialectic forms, 
proving it, negatively, by showing the contradictions in- 
volved in the theory of plurality. (See («) argument 
concerning motion ; (<5) Achilles and the tortoise ; (Arist. 
Phys. vi. 9 ;) {c) the sound of a measure of falling grain ; 
cf. answer in Arist. Phys. vi. 2, attacked by Bayle, Hist. 
Diet., Zeno.) 

Z. probably used many subtle distinctions to confound 
his adversaries ; (Arist. Phys. vii. 5 ; Plato, Parmen. p. 
127-9; Phaedr. p. 261.) 

The senses, he said, do not represent truth ; and Z. 
according denies the reality of existence in space and 
time, and of motion ; the ancients thought he denied the 
existence of the world. 

On the hypothesis of multiplicity, each individual is both 
finite and infinite, in motion and at rest, like and unlike 
itself, etc. He probably held all things to be mere phe- 
nomena. (Kant Crit. P. Reason, Transc. Dial, of Rea- 
son, ii. ii. § 7.) 

Finally, the Eleatics denied matter and the world, and 
offered, in the 5th cent., a pantheistic opposition to the 
atheism and materialism of the lonians. 

(Cousin, Fragm. Philos. v. i. ; Ueberweg, § 20.) 



28 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 



5. — The Sophists. 

{.References : — Grote's Hist. Greece, v. vlii., c. xlvli, ; Plato, Gorgias, Protagoras,' 
Aristoph. Clouds, v. 886, seq.] 

The meeting of different schools at Athens, through 
the rise of that city in power, civihzation and the arts, 
(Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, etc.), led to doubt of all 
schools. 

The sophists began, indeed, the work of abandoning 
the objective, and considering the subjective, perception, 
opinion, desire, will, and of aiming at universal culture, 
but with a ruling individualism which soon terminated in 
sophisms and frivolity. (See Callicles' contempt of phil. 
in Plato's Gorgias.) 

They were great in logical sophisms, and the art of 
persuasion, and reputed to excel in oratory. Tw rixxova 
loyov xpzCzTova ttocsIv was the boast of Protag. 

They were sceptical in phil., though of various charac- 
ters and principles ; skilled in rhetoric, dialectics, politics, 
as a class they were without earnestness or moral convic- 
tions. 

Nothing was true, nothing false ; (PL Euthyd. p 285, 
seq.), nothing good or evil, for the just and base were not 
by nature, but by convention. (PI. Gorg. p. 482, seq. ; De 
Leg. X. p. 889 ; Theaet. p. 167, 172 ; Rep. vi., p. 492, seq. ; 
Arist. Rhet. ii., 24.) 

A. Gorgias, {i) born at Leontini, was envoy to Athens, 
for aid against Syracuse, (427, b. c.) A disciple of Empe- 
docles, he became famous for rhetoric and oratory ; the 
art of persuasion was regarded by him as the highest of 
all arts. 



GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 29 

(2.) He sophistically applied Eleatic dijctrine to show 
(a) nothing truly is, neither negatively nor positively, nor 
both at once ; nothing can be shown to be derived, noth- 
ing to be eternal. 

{b) Even if anything is, it cannot be the object of 
thought. If thought is real, what is not real cannot be 
thought ; therefore, everything that is thought is equally 
real : if thoughts are not real, tHen the real cannot be in 
thought. 

{c) If anything is real and cognizable, it cannot be 
imparted to others. Thoughts are expressed in words, 
and words represent different things to different men. 
(PI. Gorg. passim ; Meno, pp. 70-6; Phileb. p. 58;Phsedr. 
p. 261.J 

B. Protagoras, (i.) circ. 490, taught rhetoric in Sicily 
and Greece. He calls himself a Sophist. (Meno, p. 91.) 
At Athens he was accused of impiety, being unable to say 
whether there be any gods or not, and expelled from the 
city. 

(2.) P. sophistically develops the " flux " of Heraclitus. 
All objects of knowledge are relative ; objective existence, 
if there be such a thing, cannot be represented in thought : 

" iari p.kv yap oudiTzor oudh, as} dk yrp^srac.^^ (See thorough 

discussion in Theaet. p. 151, seq., though it is questionable 
how far Plato strictly follows Protag.) 

No position therefore can be contradicted ; (Euthyd, 
p. 286) ; ^^ TiWJTiov '/pTjiJ-d-cwv fj.irpo'^ zl'^at wA^pio-o^jr Thought is 
identical with sensation, and knowledge is individual. 

The soul is the sum of the different moments of 

thinking. 

See, particularly, Arist.'s careful refutation, (Met. x. 6), 
who regards Protag. as a disciple of the physicists : 



30 GREEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES. 

(a) His stand point involves the truth of contradic- 
tories. 

{b) Though sensations are subjective, the subject, 
the ego, is permanent. 

{c) The ego has power to distinguish dreams from 
the objectively real, etc. 

Distinguish also aU^fftc from (pp6vrj(jtq. 

(Protag. passim; Hipp. Maj. p. 28; Meno,p. 91; Crat. 
p. 383 seq. ; Arist. Met. ii. 2 ; iii. 8.) 

C. Other Sophists of the first period are Hippias of 
Elis, (Hipp. Maj. and Min.) ; Prodicus of Ceos, (Crat. p. 
383) a lecturer on grammar and language, (see the Choice 
of Hercules ; Xen. Mem.) ; Critias, the most able of the 
Thirty Tyrants, an opponent of Socrates, who based relig- 
ion on political considerations ; the soul is material and 
resides in the blood. 



SOCRATES. 31 



CHAPTER IV. 

SOCRATES; PLATO; ARISTOTLE. 

I. Socrates. 2. Plato. 3. Aristotle. 

I. Socrates. 

\_Reference : — Plato ; Xenophon ; Aristophanes. Distinguish the historical Soc. from 
P.'s dialectics under the name of his master.] 

A. Life. S. was born, 469, B. C, the son of Sophron- 
iscus a sculptor and Phaenarete a midwife ; a soldier at 
Potidaea, etc. ; he resisted the Thirty Tyrants and the 
democracy. (Xen. Mem. i. i. 18 ; iv. 4. i, etc. ; Plato's 
Apol.) 

His personal appearance is described by Alcibiades, in 
the Syinposiimt, of Plato, ugly as Silenus or a satyr. 

S. was constantly in public, conversing with all classes 
in the agora or gymnasia ; (Mem. i. i. 10) ai^d at first 
was confounded with the Sophists ; (Aristoph. Clouds.) 
For the astonishing power of his words, note the language 
of Alcib. in the Sympos., who also bears testimony to his 
prudence, temperance, fortitude and self-control. 

His condemnation, inscribed in the temple of Cybele : 
" Soc, Son of Sophron., is guilty of not recognizing the 
gods whom the state recognizes, and of introducing un- 



32 SOCRATES. 

known divinities. He is guilty also of corrupting the 
youth. Penalty, death." 

A change of thirty (three ?) votes would have acquit- 
ted him. (Apol.) He might perhaps have escaped from 
prison, but was too loyal to do so. (Crito.) 

" Either death is a sleep, and so not to be feared ; or it is life, 
and so to be desired." " But it is now time to depart; forme to die, 
for you to live ; but which of us is going to a better state is unknown 
to any one but God." 

Examine his injunction to sacrifice, when at the point 
of death. (Phaed.) S. died 399 B. C. 

B. Mission of Socrates ; (i) to establish the objective 
reality of truth, goodness and beauty against the subject- 
ivity of the Sophists, who made man the measure of all 
things. 

(2.) To add to the "Nous" of Anaxagoras the doc- 
trine of final causes. (Phaed. p. 97 ; Mem. i. 4, 6 ; iv. 3, 
3., etc.) 

(3.) " Maieiiticy' to lead men to know their ignorance, 
and search for truth. 

" I am wiser than this man ; for neither of us appears to know 
an3^thing great and good ; but he fancies that he knows something, al- 
though he knows nothing; whereas, I, as I do not know anything, 
so I do not fancy that I do." (Apol. p. 21.) 

(4.) To turn thought from unpractical speculation to 
self-knowledge, the ■• ^^^y'/.' ^^^'>c'J 70 ." (Mem. i., i, 11-16; iii. 
ix.) The sciences of nature are of little value in compari- 
son with this. (Mem. iv. 7; Rep. vii. p. 529.) 

C. Method, (i.) Erotetic, undogmatic, leading to con- 
fession of ignorance. Note a skeptical tendency in some 
of his school. 



SOCRATES. 33 

(2.) If Plato give the historical Soc, by induction, di- 
vision and definition. (Arist. Met. xii. 4.) 

(3.) With the same qualification, the true founder of a 
scientific method, investigating the connection between 
the thought and the reality, even in the most trivial 
things, and seeking for the scientific ground of harmony 
of ideas in accurate definitions of the essence of things, 
(e. g. Phaedr. p. 237; Mem. iv. v. 12 ; i. i, 16 ; andcf. def. 
of science in Dr. Porter's Human Intellect, p. 438.) 

D. Pj'ijiciples ; are ethical. 
(I.) There is, a God, (Mem. iv. 3), an immortal soul, a 
future responsibility (Crito ; Phaed. p. 80 seq., p. 113 seq.) 
and an absolute good. (Phaed.) 

(2.) Virtue and happiness are one, ro yaXaya{^o^^. Virtue 
is founded on wisdom and knowledge, for no one wilfully 
injures himself. (Mem. iv. vi, 6.) Happiness, eudac/xoyta, 
is not pleasure, but right views of all things carried out 
in the life. (Philebus.) Pleasure is not the good; for 
the good is one, and pleasures are manifold, and contrary 
to one another. 

The study of physics is worthless, unless we find the 
spiritual basis of all science. (Mem. iv. 7 ; Phaed. p. 97.) 

Note S 's ddc/icov] how to be explained.? 

2. Plato. 

l^Referetices : — Jowett's and Stallbaum's Notes ; Aristotle; Diog. Laert., Cicero.] 

A. Life. P. was born at yEgina, 430, B. C. ; (d. 349, 
B. C.) He was of illustrious descent, by his father from 
Cadmus, by his mother from Solon. His Nomen was Aris- 
tocles ; he was called Plato from his personal appearance. 
Wealthy, of superior education, a poet, etc., when twenty 
years of age he became a disciple of Socrates. After the 



34 PLATO. 

death of his master he travelled in Italy, Cyrene, and 
Egypt. He then established his school at Athens, the 
Academy. He visited Sicily twice, called thither to give 
political counsels to Dionysius ; but he incurred the 
tyrant's displeasure, and by some, is said to have been 
sold as a slave. 

B. Difficulty in the study of his system. His works 
are dialogue in form, dialectic in method, often figurative, 
mythical in expression, and frequently undogmatic. 

P. also is many-sided, the " myriad-minded " Shaks- 
peare of Phil. ; " Deus ille noster." (Cic.) Socrates may 
be his best representative. 

Various classifications of the dialogues ; (see Diog. 
Laert. de Vit. etc., c. 48.) Theaet. may be a serviceable 
introduction to his principles in opposition to the relativity 
of Protag. 

(On the value of P. in mental training, see J. S. Mill's 
Autob. p. 21.) 

C. Method. (See Socrates' method ; (2,) (3.) 

(i.) Not empirical like the lonians ; this only applicable 
to phenomena. 

(2.) Nor the moderate realism of Aristotle, founding the 
ideal on the concrete, the universal on the individual ; but, 

(3.) Basing absolute truth on the cognitions of pure 
reason. (Rep. vi. p, 508 ; vii. p. 517, 533.) The a priori 
method, but to be tested by experience. 

(4.) Dialectic, (note his development of dialectics), 
apprehending ideas by rising to the universal, i.e., division 
and definition, or finding the essence, and then returning 
from the universal to the particular, (Phaedr. pp. 265, 6 : 
Euthyph. p. 6.) 

D. Divisions of hiowledge. Fourfold, corresponding 



PLATO. 35 

with the four faculties of the soul, and based on the funda- 
mental antithesis of the senses and the intelligible, pure 
being and the becoming, the universal and the particular. 

(i.) Euaaia^ the sensuous perception of phenomena as 
mere shadows, by aU^atq^ the faculty adapted to the per- 
petually changing x6<Tfj.oq ai(T^37]-dc, 

(2.) TZiffTcg, the imperfect knowledge of bodies obtained 
through sense-perception. 

(i.) and (2.) Joca, opinion based on the collected results 
of experience, but not true knowledge. 

(3.) Jcdvoca^ the discursive reason, the understanding, 
making use of sensible representations, sl'dwAa, hypotheses, 
etc., as in mathematics. 

(4.) iVoDq-, pure reason, gives true knowledge, i7rc(TT-/jfj.7j^ of 
pure ideas, idiac, of principles, seen intuitively in their 
eternal source. (Rep. vi. ad. fin. ; vii. pp. 507-534. Crat. 
440 ; Tim. p. 27.) On this is based the division of all 
knowledge. 

(i.) Dialectics; (2.) Physics; (3.) Ethics. 

E. Dialectics, in the narrowest sense, the instruments 
of investigation, analytics, logic ; but used by P. in a wider 
sense, the art of reducing the manifold to unity of con- 
cept, of arranging concepts, by analysis or synthesis, by 
division and definition. (Phaedr. p. 265, seq. ; Rep. vii. 533.) 

(i.) Theoiy of ideas. These are the only real exist- 
ences, perfect, unchangeable, eternal ; seen by pure 
reason, they are its concepts. Distinguish them from elbwXa^ 
changeable, and having only a resemblance to true being ; 
the former are «/>Z^^5 ruipadtCyfiara^ eternal types impressed 
by the eternal Architect on crude matter, dpxiroTtov x6aiJ.ou 
ala^Too^ and recognized by reason in all concrete forms, 
actions, words, etc. 



36 PLATO. 

Endless being, then, the only reality, apprehended by 
vooq^ must, always and in all things, be clearly distinguished 
from the becoming, which is the object of sense and 
opinion. (Tim. p. 28-30, p. 51. Phaed. p. 65.) 

The sensible world, on the other hand, is the region of 
the imperfect, the changeable, the becoming, the subject 
to time. The individual is what it is, by partaking of the 
ideal ; (Phaed. p. lOi seq.) Proper being, and the differ- 
ence of individuals, are through and in the ideas. This is 
equally true of the good and the beautiful. Sensible things 
are only imperfect e^^dwXa of true being ; they are limited 
by matter, by their changefulness. 

(2.) Theosophy. God is the one, absolute, infinite, the 
good. This idea is transcendent, " above essence ; " (Rep. 
vi. p. 508; vii. p. 517 etc.); as the sun, it lends to all 
other ideas, being, essence, even the power of being known 
by pure reason. P. seems to regard God as '0 Aoyoz the 
source and seat of ideas ; as voD?-, perfect intelligence, 
omniscient, omnipresent, willing good to all. 

But notice the different view of his phil. in Aristotle, 
the figurative style, the uncertain and, jDOssibly, the vary- 
ing views of Plato. (Tim. p. 37, 6Z\ Rep. ii. 379 seq.; x. 
597 ; Phil. p. 30.) 

Aristotle's objections (Met. i. 9.) 
{a) Ideas are not causes; 
{b) What is their source and unity ? 

Note also the influence of the Platonic idea on subsequent thought. 
(See S. Aug. quoted in Ueberweg, i. p. 340 ; Roman de la Rose, 1. 17, 
644 ; Spenser's Hymn of Beauty ; Davies, Nosce Teipsum, etc., etc., 

F. Physics, (i.) Cosmology. Distinguish the xuaiw^ 
voriToq from xoV//f;c aKrfirjToq -^ the latter is the object of belief, 
TziffTtq^ not knowledge, the "shadows in the cave" of un- 
seen realities. (Rep. vii.; Tim. p. 28). The ever-exist- 



PLATO. 37 

ing, ungenerated, is apprehended by 'Mwg. Three principles 
are needed to explain the world ; 

(a) ever-existing matter, in itself undefined, orderless 

chaos, blind rhdy/.-rj ; 

(l?) God, the Demiurgos, who gave order, goodness, 
and beauty to this primitive chaos, as the good making 
all things good, and, as far as possible, after his similitude ; 
(c.) The ideal world the pattern of whatever is gen- 
erated, and in a state of becoming, yi'^sffcq, in the material 
world. The order of origin was, (a) the world-soul, com- 
municated bytHimself from that which could be com- 
municated : (d) the bodily cosmos, a perfect sphere, of the 
four material elements. From these premises follows, 

(a) The world is not eternal ; as it had a beginning, 
so will it also have an end. Time is a creation, and that 
which is, is not subject to time. 

(d) This world is the only possible, and the best 
possible v/orld. Its limitation is in matter. In this latter 
is found the ground of evil. From God comes only the 
good, but matter opposes itself, the principle of disorder. 

(2) PsycJiology. The soul is not a mere " harmony " of 
the body. It is a simple, spiritual essence. 

\d) This ratio7zal soiilis, {a) ^odg, the seat of ideas, and 
seeks for the true, the beautiful, the good, z. e., God. It 
is placed in the head. 

(jS) dtdvoia, discursive reason, understanding, arguing 
from hypotheses, sensible representations, etc. 

(y) atm^<Tcg, giving perceptions of the sensible world, 
but these sensuous cognitions suggest the ideas which 
they resemble. 

This rational soul is the governing principle ; the 
governed, the irrational is. 



38 PLATO. 

{b) ^%/jJ^, the seat of emotions, situated in the breast, 
found also in beasts, it mediates between (a) and 

(c) zu i-'.Oofxrj-Uir,^ the Seat of appetites, the desire of what 
preserves and continues the perpetually changing bod}^ 
Its seat is the belly ; is found also in plants, {b) and {c) 
perish with the body ; but the rational soul simply uses 
the body as its temporary organ by which it is brought 
into relation with the world of the becommg, of sensuous 
phenomena. 

Proof of {a), {b), (c), as distinct divisions of the soul is 
the conflict of (a) and (c), (b) siding with the former though 
itself irrational, seen in children and brutes, and some- 
times overmastering reason. 

(Phaedr. p. 246 ; Rep. iv. 436, seq.) 

Immortality of the soid ; i. e.,oi the rational soul. 

Proofs, (i) knowledge is reminiscence of ideas possessed 
before the soul's union with the body : the existence of 
the former, therefore, does not depend on the latter. 
(Phaed., p. 72 seq.) 

(2.) From the idea of the soul, a self-moving, self-sub- 
sisting essence, to which, as such, life is essential. A 
dead soul is a contradiction. 

(Phaed., p. 65, seq. Phaedr., p. 245 seq.) 

(3.) An essence can only be destroyed by some ill ne- 
cessarily attending it, in this case, moral ill. This is im- 
possible. (Rep. X., p. 608 seq.) 

Metempsychosis. To search and learn is the re- 
calhng of ideas which the soul brings with it into the-body. 
After death, it will migrate into other bodies, according 
to its life here, whether of subjection to corporeal appe- 
tites, or of philosophical emancipation, as far as possible, 
from the body. 



PLATO. 39 

(Meno, p. 8 1 seq. ; Phaedr., p. 247-9 5 Phaed., p. 81, 
seq.) 

Note. The world cycle of ten thousand years ; but in this whole 
subject, it is difficult to separate P.'s scientific thought from poetic 
speculation. 

Plato distinguishes {a) the representative faculty, ima- 
gination, bringing up former impressions of objects, 
(Phileb., p. 33, seq.) ; {b) !jyrii):q^ preservation of sensations ; 
{c) a-^dijyr^aiz^ recollection, which, independently of sensa- 
tion, recalls ideas or cognitions. 

G. Ethics. {i^ Pleasure. P. takes an intermediate posi- 
tion between Hedonism and Cynicism ; distinguishes be- 
tween true and false pleasures, the pure and the impure, 
those which are of the rational nature, and those which 
are of the irrational. Pleasures, then, are not the highest 
good, nor its test or measure, since they are various and 
contrary to one another. (Phil, passim.) 

(2.) Stcmnium boimm ; is the idea of the good, i. e.^ 
God, towards which as ultimate end the aims of the wise 
will be directed in all things. But this idea, which can- 
not be embraced in its unity, will be sought in the mani- 
fold, in science, i-iazr^ixr^^ in truth and reason, in beauty, in 
virtue. (Rep. vi. p. 505 seq.) 

(3.) ' Eodatjiovia^ Subjectively, man's highest good, is 
found in resemblance to God ; as the phenomenal and be- 
coming are to be conformed to the divine and eternal ; 
(Theaet., p. 176; Rep., x. p. 613.) The soul then pos- 
sesses truth and goodness. Other goods are relative, e.g.^ 
special sciences and arts, health, riches, sensual plea- 
sures. 

(4.) Viftue, then, is harmony of soul ; so far as pos- 
sible, it is attained by aiming at the Sum. Bon. (ist. Ale.) 



40 PLATO.. 

It is identified with wisdom, with reason, as the essence 
of the soul. Whatever is in conflict with this is ahen to the 
soul ; and vice, therefore, is founded in ignorance, for no 
one is willingly and consciously evil. All aim at some 
seeming good, agreeable because it seems a good, though 
many err involuntarily. (Meno, p. 77, seq. ; Gorg., p. 466, 
seq. ; Protag., p. 360 ; Tim., p. 86.) 

(5.) Divisions. Virtue is in essence one; four-fold ac- 
cording to the three parts of the soul. 

{a) (^povriaiq^ wisdom, prudence, is the virtue of the 
reason ; 

ib) 'Avdpsia^ courage, is that of the ^'^u/j.og, the spirit, 
the passions, when reason directs them ; 

(c) lojcppoabvri^ temperance, moderation, is that of 
the appetites, when reason controls them ; 

{d) AcxauxTW'/], justice, is the harmony or due regula- 
tion and mutual adjustment of all. 

These are the four " cardinal virtues " of Christian Phil. (S. Aug. 
Civ. Dei., iv. 20.) 

(Note. This, like the rest of Phil, for the few. (Sympos. p. 204 ; 
Rep., vi. p. 500 ; Protag., p. 352; Phaed., p. 82.) Evil is grounded 
in the corporeal or becoming, faintly accounted for, and remediless.) 
(6) Politics. The state is . founded on nature, not on 
compact ; it is ethical, its rule is the welfare of the whole 
as a unit, and the idea of the good, which does not depend 
on actual, positive laws. (Leg., vii. p. 817.) 

The ideal state is found in the Republic, after the ana- 
logy of man's soul. 

{a) Reason=the wise, philosophers ; for the right of 
governing is not in man as man, but in the wise and good. 
The state will not be freed from its evils, until philoso- 
phers be kings, or its kings be philosophers. (Rep., v. 
473.) 



PLATO. 41 

{b) Passions:=the army, for defence, and execution 
of laws. 

{c) The appetites=laborers and tradesmen, who are 
m absolute subjection. 

Socialism. Under the direction of {a) a communism in 
all things is established, property, children, women ; chil- 
dren are the wards of the commonwealth from their birth ; 
the State educates them. (See De Quincey on the Rep., 
and cf. the ideal of the Cath. Ch.) 

In the Laws, a less theoretical, more practical view of 
the State. But from these principles results that mon- 
archy, if founded on reason, or aristocracy under the 
same conditions, is preferable to a democracy, for justice 
will assign honor and power to each in proportion to his 
merit. (Laws, iv. p. 711, seq. ; Polit, p. 300, seq. ; Rep., 
viii. init.) 

H. Esthetics, (i) BeatUy is one, subsisting in itself, 
i. e.^ the good. Objects are beautiful through their par- 
ticipating in this. It is seen on earth by the reason, 
through the senses, in types and changeable forms which 
suggest it. If the types are ravishing, how much more 
the reality. (Sympos., p. 210-2.) 

(2.) Love is the soul's longing for union with the beau- 
tiful. " They that are followers of Zeus, seek for some one 
who resembles Z. in his soul to be the object of love." 
(Phaedr., p. 250.) 

(3.) Beauty is {ci) spiritual ; therefore {b) in truth, 
derived to {c) the soul, {d) the body, {e) arts, (/) sci- 
ences. 

In Hippias Major (Platonic) beauty is not; 

{a) The becoming, which is relative, phenomenal ; 

ip) The useful, which may be turned to evil ; 



42 ARISTOTLE. 

{c) The advantageous, which produces the good, but 
is not the good ; 

{d) The pleasurable, for pleasures are manifold, and 
subjective. 

(4) Art, when it copies the phenomenal is the lowest ; 
the highest seeks to embody the spiritual. (See art topics 
in Rep., ii. p. 376 to middle of iii. ; and trace the influence 
of P.'s aesthetics in art and literature, e. g.y in the Eliz. 
age.) 

I. Mathematics, in special sciences, are intermedi- 
ate between the sensual and the ideal ; they are not philo- 
sophy, because they begin with hypotheses, and employ 
visible figures, etc. ; (hence didvoia) These, however, are not 
the true objects of investigation, but that which is seen 
by intellect alone. They are a guide to higher phil. 

(iibdeiq ayzoi iJ.tr p-qxoq dairm showS the Spirit of this School.) 

(Rep., v., 475, seq. ; vi. 510, seq. ; vii., p. 523, seq.) 

The ideal numbers may be seen by higher reason, in 
the harmony of the universe. (Tim., p. 53, etc.) 

2. Aristotle. 

{.References: — Diog. Laert., Ritter, Grote, etc. Reviews, Edin., Oct , 1S72 ; Br. Quarterly., 

Ap., 1873.] 

A. Life. A. was born at Stagira, 384, B.C. ; his father 
was Nicomachus, a physician, and his son bears the same 
name: he was a disciple of Plato, aet. 17-37. By Philip 
he was made Alexander's tutor, and was afterwards aided 
by the latter in his scientific researches. In Alex.'s ab- 
sence he taught at the Lyceum ; and from the shady 
walks, Tzerjc-aroc^ his school was named Peripatetic. He 



ARISTOTLE. 43 

taught thirteen years, was accused of impiety, (?) and 
retired to Euboea, where he died 322, B.C. 

Pure intellect and analysis were never carried further ; 
he seeks absolute precision of conclusions, but is most 
unspiritual, unsympathetic, wanting the intuition of genius 
and the ability to unite the multiplicity of experiences. 

Works. — He is universally learned. Variation of style, 
how accounted for .? Often condensed to obscurity, abrupt 
and wanting in connection. (Acroamatic ?) 

Singular history of his works ; bequeathed to Theophras- 
tus, they were finally concealed under ground to hide them 
from the King of Pergamos, and so damaged : finally Sylla 
obtained them. When edited, the lacunae conjecturally 
filled? 

(i .) Dialectics : (a) Treatise on the " prima philosophia," 

ra. jizzd zd (foar/.d. 

{b) Organon, collected logical treatises ; ( i .) Categories ; 
(2.) -sfH kp;j.rive(aq ; (3.) Prior and Posterior Analytics ; (4.) 
Topics ; (5.) Sophistical Elenchi. 

(2.) Physics : (a) (puaivSq d-/.p6a^'.q ; {b) ntp\ ubpa^joo ; {f) 

MtztwpoAoyud ; (d) Natural History of Animals, etc., etc. 

Physiology : {a) LUp\(l>oyjjq ; {p) On sensation and the 
sensible; {c) lhp\ ixvqirqq xaL wmpyqatoiq \ (d) ou slccp J {e) 
on divination, etc., etc. 

(3.) Ethics: (<a;) Nicomachean Ethics; {b) Eudemian; 
{c) Magna Moralia ; {d) Politics; {e) Economics (incom- 
plete), etc., (/) Poetics (incomplete), {g) Rhetoric. 

(B.) Method, and Theory of knowledge, (i.) A.'s method 
always is a posteriori, to begin with the sensible, the indi- 
vidual, the many, in order to proceed to the intelligi- 
ble, the one ; from rd xaif ly.aara to Ttt y.aJio/jiu. 

He agrees with Plato in the principle that there is no 



44 ARISTOTLE. 

science except of the general, but insists that that is found 
only in the individual ; but he is averse to the ideal, 
and he continually denies the existence of ideas apart from 
actual things. (Met. i. 9 : xii. 4, 7.) 

The universal is that which is common to many, and 
can be predicated of them all ; it is not objectively real. 

(2.) All knowledge is grounded on sensuous perception, 
but this is the foundation for higher knowledge, of which 
intellect only is cognizable. But this does not exist in and 
by itself ; without sensation no one could know anything. 
(De An. iii. 8.) 

All concepts are derived from, accompanied by, de- 
finite images, without which the soul does not think. (De 
An. iii. 7.) 

The order is {a) sensation (of . individuals) ; (^) 
sensuous presentation; (6) Memory; (d) comparison; 
(^) distinction ; (/) experience ; (^g) knowledge. (Post. 
An. ii. 19.) But the last is obtained by, and is in, the 
vovq only. Experience tells us " that it is," not why any- 
thing is. 

The universal, according to its nature, is prior and bet- 
ter known ; but, for us, the individual is such. (Phys. i., 

2, 3-) 

(3.) Active and Passive Intellect. The sensible is con- 
tingent phenomena, but being is known by intellect alone, 
though it exists only in the sensible, and is known at the 
same time. (Post. An. i. 31.) 

(<2.) The reason in man, the seat of ideas, is at 
first as a writing-tablet on which nothing is written ; 
ideas exist in it only potentially, tv dovdij-t ; this (like mat- 
ter, vlri, in beings), is the passive intellect. 

(^.) The active intellect, to alnov xai ttoctjtcxovj 



ARISTOTLE. 45 

an eternal activity, incorporeal, simple, passionless, 
awakens, enlightens the other, and ideas pass into actual- 
ity, ivzpjtia^ hrskiytia. 

(4.) Truth is the correspondence of the combination 
of mental representations, with a combination of things. 
(Met. v., 4.) Sensation is always true ; error, if any, is in 
the judgment. (De. An. iii. 3.) 

Phil, may be divided, as {a) theoretical ; {b) practical, 
ethics. 

{a) is {o) theology ; {p) physics ; (r) mathematics 
(pure) ; (</) is (i) Analytics ; (ii.) PJiil. prima. 

(C.) Principle, (i) Substance is that which is in no 
other, but in which all other is ; it can be predicated of no 
other, but all other is predicated of it. This, individual, is 
ohaia r.pvjzri ; species is a " second essence," the quiddity, rd 
r\ ri\> £Tva:, common to many individuals. 

(2.) The two constitutive principles are {a) matter, vl-q^ 
{b) form, eldoc^ iMpcp-q ; {d) is the principle of potentiality, of 
individuality, the determined, the v-oy.ziiJ.zvov ; {b) is the de- 
termining, the idea, seen by the mind only, the essence 
whereby the individual is what it is ; abstracted from the in- 
dividual, it is the universal, predicable of many individuals. 
There is no truth apart from the individual ; yet three 
classes of truth are to be distinguished : 

{a) Particular, obtained empirically, by induction. 
(Post. An. i., 1-31 ; Topics L, i.) 

{b) Deductive, obtained by demonstration ; 
if) Principles of pure reason, apyai^ intuitive ; when 
their terms are understood, the basis of demonstration. 
(Nic. Eth. vi. 6.) A. fails, however, to give unity to his 
system by an analysis of these. 

(D.) Analytics : the forms of thought, of science. 



46 SOCRATES, PLATO, -ARISTOTLE. 

(i.) The concept is the essence, obaia^ of the individual ab- 
stracted'; it is expressed in the definition. Distinguish in 
the concept the universal, the species, common to many in- 
viduals, and the limiting, the differentia, related as matter 
and form. These specific concepts are again, by abstrac- 
tion, subsumed under higher concepts, the generic ; thus 
by continued abstraction we reach 

(2.) The Categories, modes of being and thought, the 
various species of mental representations, of concepts, of 
predicamenta ; they are (Categ. 4 ; arbitrarily) ten ; (a) 
essence, rh t\ -qv elvat ; (^) quantity ; (<;) quality ; (<3f) rela- 
tion ; (^) the where ; (/) the when ; (^) position ; (/?) 
habit ; (?) action ; (/^) passion. 

(3.) Propositions^ Xoyot. Truth or falsehood is possible 
in these only ; the principle of contradiction is the ground 
of demonstration. A. distinguishes contingent from ne- 
cessary truths, not separating forms of being from forms of 
thought ; the former are based on the possible ; the contra- 
dictory of which is not the possible-not-to-be, but the im- 
possible ; as the necessary is contradicted by the not- 
necessary. (De Interp. xii.) The necessary is that 
which is in actuality ; the possible, that which may be 
moved in opposite directions. 

(4.) Syllogism, is " a discourse in which from certain 
propositions another necessarily results by means of those 
laid down." (Top. i., i.) 

The three figures are pointed out, but only the Categ. 
Syll. discussed. 

(^) The demonstrative syll., deductive, by means of 
the middle concept, connecting the higher with the lower, 
sets out from some general principle, prior in its na- 
ture, better known in itself. 



ARISTOTLE. 47 

(^) The inductive, i^ eTzaywyy^g, proceeds from the 
lower, from particulars, better known to us as more nearly 
allied to sensation. (Pr. An. ii. 23 ; Post. An. i, 12.) 

(5.} Proof is by means of the syllogism ; (^) apodeictic 
from a necessarily true principle ; 

(^) Dialectic, from a probable principle to a probable 
conclusion ; 

(^) Eristic, fallacy. 
Hence, science is knowing phenom. in their ground and 
causes ; it unites experience of phenom. with knowledge 
of the principles of pure reason, (^. £-. the principle of 
contradiction,' Met. iv.): it has for its object the necessary 
and unchangeable ; scientia est de necessariis. 

(E.) Metaphysics^lhQ "first philosophy," the princi- 
ples and ultimate causes of all being. (Met. ii. 2.) 

The Four principles of being, «/>/«£', cdnat^ are (i) matter, 

DAfj ; (2) form, !J'Op<f'q^ icdog ; (3) efficient cause, rd y.C'^rjTr/.6v, 

(4) end, final cause, 'd ov s'^exa. (Met. i. 3.) 

(i.) Matter \s the indeterminate, the becoming, poten- 
tially, b> duvdij.st^ whatever is produced, in itself unknowable, 
without predicates, underlying all change or becoming, 
materia prima ; (Met. vi. lO ; De An. iii. 4.) 

Purely passive, an eternal principle of necessity limits 
the essences formed of it ; thus God, though not limited in 
Himself, is so in His relation to what is produced ; for He 
does not give the potentiality, which is eternal as He. 

(2.) Form, the inner, immanent principle of deter- 
mination, constitutes the actuality, hzpytia^ the essence of 
the thing, inseparable from matter ; too do^diitt ovroq Uyoq -q 
k.Tskiyjuj. : (Met. vi. 10 ; vii. 2, etc.; De An. ii. i ; Phys. 
ii. i.)^ 

■ (3.) Substajice is the unity of matter and form, which 



48 ARISTOTLE. 

are always co-existent, the one potentially, the other 

actually, hspyzia. 

Matter is the ground of multiplicity; form is limited by 
it ; different forms are actualized in different matters. 
The ground-matter exists, as opposed to form, as privation, 
f>Tiprj<7tq, which may make a third principle of substance. 

The one, then, not existing apart from the many, is 
present in the many. (Ueberweg, § 48.) 

(4.) Motion, in general, is the combining of form and 
matter, the transition from the potential to the actual. 
Its ground is not in matter, for it is an hepyda^ though 
imperfect. (Met. x. 9.) Form or actuality is prior to mat- 
ter, at least in thought. But, on the other hand, matter 
is an eternal principle of things, and motion is eternal 
(Met. xi. 7.) 

(5.) Final cause, is the good, the end of motion, to oL 
£v£xa ; every becoming has a design, and this is the first 
cause, and knowledge of it is the highest aim of phil. It 
is, at least in generation, the form, a perfect ivreXixeta^ 
(Met. vii, 6), having its end and completion in itself. 
Divide ends, however, into energies and works. (Nic. 
Eth. i. I.) 

Essence and end, then, are "the same ; and often, also, 
the moving cause, since like begets like, and the form is 
one, though the individuals are many. Matter is the con- 
trary of these, a necessary means, on which acts the mov- 
ing force already existing in some other matter. 

(6.) God is the first mqving cause, -poirov x^voDv axiv-q- 
Tov^ acting on the materia prima. (Phys. viii. 5.) He 
is one, devoid of matter the ground of multiplicity, an 
eternal entelechy, not in time or space, pure reason, per- 
fect and happy. He is at once efficient cause, end, and 



ARISTOTLE. 49 

form of the world, anhna nitmdi. The object of thought 
in Him is identified with the thought itself, intelligence 
and the intelligible ; rJ^q, vo-qGtio:; voVy^;-. (Met. x. 7.) 

A. does not recognize a special Providence, nor moral 
attributes in God, (Nic. Eth. x, 8) ; He is not cognizant 
of the world. 

A. does not distinguish the infinite from the indeter- 
minate, TO a-etfxr^ ; it is that bcyond which something more 
may always be taken. (Phys. iii, 7.) 

(F.) Physics 3XQ concerned with that which has motion 
or change ; they proceed from phenomena to probable 
conclusions. (Met. vi. i ; x. 7 ; Post. An. i. 33,) 

(i.) Cosmdogy. The world is an eternally self-mov- 
ing, limited, sphere, possessing an anima immdi, its form ; 
it has continuous, uniform, circular, motion, proceeding 
from the imperishable heaven, which is moved by the 
First Cause as its end. 

Nature, then, a living being, consists of matter and 
form, (Phys. ii. i), both eternal. The former is the ground 
of imperfection. The distinction between the natural and 
the rational is that the latter has choice of determina- 
tions, while the former is determined to one definite 
activity. (Met. ix. 2) All phenomena are produced by 
the living force in nature which works towards this one 
end, the perfect form of things ; but not consciously, -q yap 
<po(7tq djLiiKrHa^ aXX" ou i'}eta ; and this energy, from imperfect 
matter, may produce monsters and abortions.' 

Local Motion, being the transition from the potential 
to the actual, and, consequently, continuous, presupposes 
{a) space and {b) time. 

{a) is relative, the limit of the containing body so 
far as the contained body is capable of local motion. Al] 

4 



50 ARISTOTLE. 

things, then, are in heaven, which is not in space, and 
space does not exist without contents, (denies a vacuum.) 
(a) is infinitely divisible potentially ; i. e., all that has 
magnitude is capable of infinite division ; it is, potentially, 
infinite in extent ; actually, the world's limit ; ip) is an ac- 
cident of motion, the number of motion, (Phys. iv. 
10-13), and would not be if there were not a soul. Now 
is the principle of its continuity, as the point in space ; 
{b) is, potentially, not actually, divisible to infinity. 

Of the four changes, /j-sra/SJ/ar, (first, generation and 
decay) the three motions in {a) magnitude, (/3) quality, (r) 
place, are founded in (r) local motion, which also precedes 
generation and decay (non-being to being, being to non- 
being.) 

The earth, in the centre, far removed from the prime 
mover, is exposed to generation and decay. 

The elements, fire, air, earth, and water, (matter 
warm and moist, or the contraries,) — are not permanent. 
The fifth element, ether, of the heavens, is perfect, per- 
manent. 

(2.) Psychology. All things being animated, there is 
a continuous progression from the lowest up to man. 

{a) The Soul is hrsXiyzta ij ~p(hz-q (iU)i}jj-o- (fOfjr/.oo 

du>dfj.£i Cw^y k'x<r^T<>z ; (de An. ii. i) ; it is the end, the es- 
sence of the body, its formal, final, moving cause ; it is 
the " vital principle," and the organic body is essential to 
its existence. It has not extension, and is not moved 
in space ; the man is moved, not his soul. It has its end 
in itself, while each bodily organ is for some soul func- 
tion. 

It is («) I'^ps-zi/.o'^, as in plants, the principle of genera- 
tion, Dutriment, growth and decay. 



ARISTOTLE. 5 1 

(,'?) aladr^riy.ov^ With pleasure and pain ; affected by the 
sensible, the particular, the phenomenal, by which the 
soul is impressed with sensible forms, as the wax of a 
seal. In the more perfect animal are five possible senses, 
with a coinmu7iis sensus combining them. 

Memory is part of the communis sensus, but joins to 
the sensuous representation, the perception of time, (dis- 
tinguish fhdjjyrjdtq^ Voluntary, peculiar to man.) 

Imagination^ (pavraGia^ is a weaker, continued sensation. 

(j) oi>ty.rr/.6v, dcsirc following pleasure, and aversion 
shunning pain, as motions of the soul ; these two are irra- 
tional, found with(a)in brutes ; in man to be ruled by rea- 
son, and, with relation to it, passive. 

(r5) y.fyr,7iy.6y, locomotiou in the higher animals, resulting 
from (r). The higher soul is evolved from the lower ; 
its seat, the heart. 

(/) (J.-avoTjruov, the rational soul, in man only, contain- 
ing the other four as powers, of which («) only is not sub- 
ject to the rational. 

(^) Reason^ yooc, is related to the soul, (poxij, as God 
to nature ; it distinguishes man. 

(a) '^odg -adrjrr/.o^, the potentiality, capacity of receiving 
concepts through sensible forms. (Trendelenburg.) 

(/5) voug -acrj-r/.dq^ discerns universal principles, neces- 
sary truths, eternal, imperishable, the universal reason, 
God; (Nic. Eth. vi, 6); it makes sensible objects, through 
abstraction, intelligible. (^eldTj vo^y'-a.) 

A. distinguishes («) the practical reason, deliberate 
preference, intelligent will, from irrational desire, but not 
clearly ; reason is related to desire, as sensation is ; both 
presenting the object, the good. 

(/5) Theoretical, speculative ; here distinguish (hdvoca 



52 SOCRATES ; PLATO ; ARISTOTLE. 

ratiocination, dealing with contingent principles, with par- 
ticulars, in prudence, deliberation, etc., (Nic. Eth. vi.) 
it proceeds from principles by deduction. 

(G) Ethics. A. prefers the general name of politics : 
(Greek thought.) 

Its divisions are (i) Ethics; (2) Economics; (3) 
Politics (modern). 

(i.) Principle', not the absolute good (God), but the 
good for man (Nic. Eth. i. 6) ; he is by nature a Cw«v 
r^olinxov^ and morals are grounded on his nature and end, 
which is his highest good. 

The good, in particular, is, {a) moral, rb xdXov ; (F) the 
convenient, to avixipipov ; {c) the agreeable, to y]d6. 

(2.) Virtue, since nature always tends to the highest 
good, is grounded in Qd) natural sentiments, Tzddri ; its 
seat may be in the sensitive and appetitive souls, e. g. 
dvdpeLa and awippoGuvq^ though rationality makes these good 
in man. Ud^'^ri, in themselves not moral, become so in 
their rational government. 

{b) habits, el^sf?, dispositions of passions whose re- 
sult is //'^f>c-, moral character; (Nic. Eth. ii, i, 5) hence 
arise 

(a) Moral virtues, ry^ual^ acquired by acts, which 
form habits ; (A. opposes the Socratic union of science 
with virtue; (Nic. Eth. vii. 3); their seat is in the appeti- 
tive soul, (ops^cq) ; 

(d) Intellectual virtues, dta^^oyjTuai, founded on (a) 
and perfecting them. (Nic. Eth. vi. 3-13; Pol. vii. 13). 
These are . («) practical, viz. (l) art, and (n.) prudence ; (;3) 
speculative, viz. (l) science, i-cffTrjpy] • (n.) intelligence, vuDc, 
intuition of principles ; (in.) wisdom, right view of things to 
be done, embracing (i.) and (11.) is the perfect activity of the 



SOCRATES ; PLATO ; ARISTOTLE. 53 

most perfect part of the soul, the chief end, the highest 
felicity. 

(3.) SuininiLin Bonum, is pursued not as a means but 
as an end ; it is happiness. What is that ? " a perfect, 
practical activity of soul in a perfect life." (Nic. Eth. i., 
X. 6-% ; Mag. Mor. i.) The highest is '^-w^^a ; yet it is 
partially dependent also on {a) the body; {b) external 
things, as wealth, friends, etc., (man's end limited to an 
earthly existence.) 

Pleasitre, as such, is neither good nor evil ; it follows all 
energies ; on the good follow good pleasures ; on the evil, 
evil pleasures. (Nic. Eth. x. 1-5.) 

(4.) Practical ethics, of moderation. Virtue, being the 
habit of good actions, is a mean between extremes in 
action and the conduct of passions ; " in medio tutissimus 
ibis." (Nic. Eth. ii. 6.) 

Rashness — Courage — Cowardice. 

Intemperance — Temperance. 

Extravagance — Liberality — Meanness, etc. 

(An arbitrary law ; who shall determine ro pAirov .? A. 
makes virtue relative, and limited by the imperfections of 
nature ; e.g.y woman and the slave.) 

(5.) Politics, (a) The state exists by nature, since 
man is C^^^v Tro/^rjzJv ; it arises from love and natural 
needs, (Pol. i. 2 ; iii. i, 9) ; apart from it man is a savage, 

d(ppy]ffrwp^ aJHiuazittq^ dviurioc. (Hom. II. ix. 62.) Utility is 

its rule, for necessaries, good order, and virtue ; and the 
inquiry must be, not the absolutely good, but what is 
attainable. Hence the moral standard is for the most 
part, based on the latter, and on positive law. By dis- 
position of nature, some are to think and govern, others 
to do manual labor and be governed. Slavery therefore 



54 ARISTOTLE. 

justified, and, in some cases, tyranny. (Pol. i. 2, 5, 
etc.) 

ip) Virtue in a state is justice, the highest poUtical 
virtue, a habit having relation to others in the common- 
wealth, leading to acts according to law, whose object is 
common good. It gives to every one his own. 

It is (a) dismbutivey dividing honors and property 
according to merit, in geometrical proportion ; A's merit : 
B's merit : : A's share : B's share. 

(,5) Retributive, commutative, equality in exchange, 
correcting encroachments of one upon another, in arith- 
metical proportion. 

This is also corrective in involuntary transactions be- 
tween man and man (criminal offences.) (Nic. Eth. v. i. 4.) 

Political justice is (^v.) jus, natural, valid everywhere, 
independent of positive law ; (,^) legal, the naturally in- 
different when enacted by the state, (v. 7). 

{c) Divisions. The number of free, equal citizens is, 
necessarily, limited ; sovereign authority is in three forms ; 
i^i) monarchy ; (/5) aristocracy ; (r) republic, -oliTeia ; when 
the rulers consult their own interest, caprice, or passions, 
we have (a) tyranny ; (/5) oligarchy ; (j) democracy ; 
(Pol. iii. 6, 7); («) is the best or the worst ; and next (/5), 
as tending, under proper hmitations, to the supremacy of 
the wisest and best, but (j) to the rule of military force. 
(Pol. iii. 7.) But the character and circumstances of the 
people must be considered. 

A. distinguishes in the state three powers, (a) deliber- 
ative; (/5) elective to office; (r) judiciary. 

A.'s ethics, as a whole, are eminently un spiritual ; he 
knows no conscience in which the Divine law testifies to 
duty, no remorse, no reconciliation with that law ; (cf . the 



ARISTOTLE. 55 

Beatitudes, and Buddhism, B. St. Hilaire, Buddha, p. 
173), but he has suppUedthe forms of thought in ethics, 
as in higher phiL, to the thinkers of the world. 

{6.) Aesthetics. Art is imitation , luij-fiffcq] but it 
reaches after the essence of things, ideaUzing ; its aim is 
both pleasure and moral benefit ; xd^apdiq ra>v nad--q!idTa)v. 



S6 SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 



CHAPTER V. 

SOCRATIC, PLATONIC, AND ARISTOTELIAN SCHOOLS. 

I. SocRATic Schools. 2. The Academy. 3. Peripa- 
tetic School. 

I. SocRATic Schools. 

There are two special influences in Socrates; (i) 
questioning, dialectic, eristic ; (2) moral, practical ; each 
was developed by those who but partially followed the 
master, into (i) Megaric, (2) Cynic, ( 3) Cyrenaic 
Schools. 

A. Megaric School, (i) ^2/<:/2<^ of Megara, (distinguish 
from Euclid Alex.) was present at Socrates' death ; re- 
tiring to Megara, was followed by many of his fellow- 
disciples. 

He united S.'s conceptions of the good with the 
Eleatic one. The good is the only being under many 
names, God, wisdom, woDc, etc. The opposite of the good 
is non-being. Plurality and diversity are denied. (Cic. 
Acad. Qu. ii. 42.) 

This school is eristic ^ famous for refutation, showing 
the contradictions involved in any empirical theory of 
knowledge. (See their many curious sophisms.) 

(2.) Stilpo of Megara, a lofty character, united Megaric 
thought with (practical) cynicism, teaching d-di-hta^ so 
leading towards the Stoics. 



SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 57 

B. Cynic School, (i) Antisthenes, b. 444, B. C, was a 
pupil of Socrates. He taught in the gymnasium " Cyno- 
sarges." (Diog. Laert.) 

He opposes the ideology of Plato, but tries to grasp 
the ethical in S.'s teaching. Virtue, i.e., self control, is the 
only good ; and the '^ sicmmum bonum'' is " a life accord- 
ing to virtue." Pleasure, sought as an end, is evil. What 
lies between good and evil, riches, honors, etc., is ddidcpopov. 
Knowledge and virtue are one. 

" The wise does not trouble himself with the laws of 
the state, but only with those of virtue." He despises 
high birth, glory, etc. Nothing is foreign to him ; he is 
a cosmopolit;e. (Note the decline of Greek national 
life.) 

(2.) Diogenes of Sinope, '-'•Itoxpa-ri- iiaivofitvoq^^ " the dog," 
despised culture; cynicism became antiphilosophic, till 
the Stoics elevated it. (Sen. Ep. i. 5.) 

C. Cyrenaic School ; Hedonism. 

(i.) Aristippus, of Cyrene, b. circ. 435, B. C, was a 
disciple of Socrates. (Diog. Laert.) 

He takes the eitdaemonism of S. in extremely one- 
sided view. Pleasure is the end of life, which he identi- 
fies with pleasure of the moment, a gentle emotion accord- 
ing to nature. 

Pleasures are to be valued according to their degree 
and duration, but morally they are equal. None are in 
themselves evil, though evil causes may produce an in- 
ferior pleasure ; (note inconsistency.) 

Two form of hedonism are found in the Cyrenaic 
School. Some later disciples present altruism instead of 
egoism. (Plat. Phileb. p. 66?) 

Wisdom and virtue are good as means to an end, 



58 THE ACADEMY. 

for they lead to the highest pleasure ; they teach us to gov- 
ern pleasure, not to be governed by it. (Hor, Ep. i., i. 
1.18; i. 17. 1. 17.) 

All knowledge is derived from sensation, subjective 
and objective, but the latter is (x). (Protagorism.) 

This school soon developes into Epicureanism. 

2. The Academy. 

Distinguish the A. as (i) the Old, (2) the Middle, (3) 
the New. Plato's disciples showed little comprehension 
of his principles ; they learned, chiefly, to question the 
empirical. 

(i.) Culture takes the place of a true philosophic 
spirit. 

(2.) Controversy of schools tends to general skep- 
ticism. 

(3.) The Greek States decline towards their fall. 

(i.) T/ie Old Academy, the direct followers of Plato, 
unite P.'s ideology with the Pythagorean theory of 
numbers ; e. g., Speusippus, Xenocrates, etc. Already 
appears a skeptical tendency with reference to absolute 
good and truth. 

(2.) The Middle Academy, becomes more and more 
sceptical. Arcesilaits, (b. 315, B. C.,) opposes the dogmat- 
ism of the Stoics ; (that the sensuous (pd^^ranim can be 
known to be conformed to its object. Note the variations 
of the former, and see Hume's argument therefrom.) 
No certain knowledge is possible ; hence, k-oy^t] . (Cic. 
Acad. Qu. i. 12 ; de Orat. iii. 18.) 

The wise will never assert any dogma, but probability 
is sufficient for rational practice. 



THE ACADEMY. 59 

(3.) The Nezv Academy, is, essentially, one with the 
Middle, but more fully developed. 

Carneades {a) (214-129, B. C.,) of high repute as a 
rhetorician, was embassador to Rome with the Stoic 
Diogenes, (155, B. C.,) where his teaching gave great of- 
fence and led to speedy dismissal. (Diog. Laert. ; Cic. 
Qu. Acad. ii. 45 ; Plutarch, vit. Cat. Maj.) 

(/^.) What is the criterion of the true } (a question 
coming into more prominence.) 

(«) Not reason, for that must have concepts. 

(/J) Not conception, for that must be preceded by 
(irrational) sensation. 

(r) Not sensation, for it needs a criterion by which 
to distinguish the true from the false. 

(r.) C. develops probabilism. He distinguishes in 
sensation, the objective and the subjective; in the latter 
relation, sensation is probable, r.iUayri (poyraaia^ or im- 
probable. The sensuous presentation is repeated, and 
being found to agree with the preceding, produces as- 
sent, while contrary presentations have the opposite 
effect : C. distinguishes degrees of probability. 

(a) Changes of relations in the subject do not weaken 
the assent ; 

(/5) The sensuous presentation may harmonize with 
others and be contradicted by none ; 

(r) It maybe thoroughly investigated in all its parts 
and connections, without being destroyed thereby. 

(t/.) Ethics, are more skeptical than those of 
Arcesilaus ; with the latter, good exists though not 
certainly known ; with the former it seems to rest on, and 
vary with, civil institutions. (Cic. de Rep. iii. i, etc.) 



60 peripatetic school. 

3. Peripatetic School. 

Beside comments on Aristotle, this school was given 
to scientific research, but soon reached its limit ; and, 
though in some points developing A.'s principles, it had 
little influence of its own. Theophrastus, author of the 
" Characters," is reputed successor of the Master. Aris- 
toxenics makes the soul a sort of musical vibration of the 
body ; Dicceairlms, the life or force diffused through all 
bodies, and inseparable from them. There is no immortal 
intelligence. Strata holds the world to be a pure mechan- 
ism ; there is a force in nature, devoid of all consciousness, 
which will explain all change, all production. Nature is 
matter having the potentiality of forming creatures, life, 
soul, intelligence, (cf. Prof. Tyndall.) 

So also, in man there is no vou<r apart from the body ; 
what is called reason is in a bodily organ ; and the sensible 
is the ground of all knowledge. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 10, 
etc. ; Acad. Qu. ii. 38; De Nat. Deor. i. 13.) 



THE STOIC SCHOOL. 6l 



CHAPTER VI. 

DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

I. Stoicism. 2. Epicureanism. 3. Pyrrhonism. 4. Ned- 

PLATONISM. 

I. The Stoic School. 

So distinct a school and phase of human thought, owing 
Httle to individual genius, little marked by the influence 
of any one man, yet distinguished, at least in its later 
period, and in Rome, by its disciples, seems to call for a 
different mode of study from the preceding. 

A. The Stoics : i . The Greek, protesting against and 
resisting the corruptions and decline of their age, are 

(i.) Zeiio, (b. circ. 340, B. C; d. circ. 260, B. C.,) a 
native of Cyprus, a merchant, shipwrecked, losing all, be- 
took himself to philosophy. At first a disciple of the 
Cynic Crates, then of Stilpo of Megara, then of the 
Academy. He is said to have taught in the ^roa Uotxa-ri, 
for fifty-eight years ; hence, " The Porch." He committed 
suicide in old age. His writings are extant only in frag- 
ments and show no well digested system. (Diog. Laert.) 

(2.) Cleanthes, successor of Zeno in the Stoa, author 
of the well known (pantheistic) hymn to Zeus, also did 



62 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

little to systematize Stoicism, He, too, ended his life by 
suicide. (Sen. Ep. 107.) 

(3.) Chrysipptcs, (d. 208, B, C.) was a very voluminous 
writer, the second founder of the school, as a systematizer 
of it, and an earnest opponent of Academic skepticism, 
and of Epicureanism. With other Stoics, he founded the 
science of Grammar ; none of his (705 ?) works remain. 

(4.) Panaetius, (180-111, B. C), had for disciples P. 
Scipio Afr., Lselius, etc. His -s^ol too ■/.ay'i-Y/.o^>>Toq was the 
foundation of Cic. De Off. (iii. 2). With him begin 
Stoical decline from a strictly philosophical stand-point to 
practical ethics relaxed from the primitive severity, to 
rhetoric, and an inclination to eclecticism. 

(5.) Posidonms, a disciple of Panaetius, born in Syria, 
taught at Rhodes, where Pompey and Cicero were disciples; 
was, also, a rhetorician and an eclectic. (Tusc. Quaest. 
ii, 25.) 

XL The Romans, practical, eclectic, originate no inde- 
pendent thought, (cf . their art and literature) do not firmly 
grasp the principles of any school, but are, morally, divided 
between Stoicism and Epicureanism, the former being the 
protest of the best against the corruptions of the empire, 
and the expression of their contempt of their age, while 
hopeless of its reform. (Cato, Brutus, Lucan, Juvenal, 
Persius, etc. ; " Summum crede nefas, etc." ; " Victrix 
causa Diis, etc." See also Sen. Ep. 14.) 

(i.) Cicero, (106-43, B.C.) produced De Rep. and De 
Leg. during the first triumvirate ; De Fin. Bon. et Mai., 
De Offic., Titsc. Qiicest. (Lib. 5), De Nat. Deormn. (Lib. 3) 
Acad., QucBst., etc., during Caesar's dictatorship. Averse 
to dogmatism, an elegant scholar, especially in Greek 
learning, he is essentially eclectic, inclining to the Middle 



THE STOIC SCHOOL. 63 

Academy. (Acad. Qu. ii. 21 ; De. Nat. De. i. 5.) Yet he 
sometimes seems to recognize primary truths. (See 
Whewell's Hist. Moral Phil., Pt. ii. Lect. vii.) In morals, 
however, C. inclines towards the Stoics, (De. Off. ii. 14; 
Qu. Tusc. iv. 17 ; V. i) but only as a probable theory. He 
is most positive in his opposition to Epicureanism. (De 
Fin. ii. 22 ; v. 11; De Deg. i. 7.) By making the " hones- 
Uim " equivalent to the " bonuml'' and both to the becoming, 
decoj'um, he introduces a relative standard of virtue. (De 
Off. i. 27, 28, 35 ; De. Fin. v. 22, 24.) 

In physics he wavers between different schools ; e. g., 
concerning the immortality of the soul, relation of the 
Universe to God, etc. 

Yet the elegance of his style made him influential on 
Roman thought, the western Fathers, the middle ages. 

(2.) Seneca, of Corduba, (A. D. 3-65), the tutor of 
Nero, memorable for the splendor of his fortune, and un- 
happy end, shows the contrast of a weak and inconsistent 
life, with his eloquent and brilliant statements of Stoical 
principles. His works, De Brev. Vitce^ De Providentidy 
De Vita Beatd, etc., and the Ep. ad Liccil. are remarkable 
for their pointed antitheses, and elaborate and overloaded 
ornament ; he exaggerates Stoical morals, and we may call 
him a Stoical rhetorician. Yet, with higher views of 
Deity than many of his predecessors. Fate becomes 
providence. (De. Prov. ; Ep. 73. On immortality, see 
Ep. 102.) He deviates widely from the old Stoics in 
metaphysics and physics, with the practical Roman mind 
turning rather to ethics. 

(3.) Epictetus, the Phrygian slave, set free, taught 
phil. at Rome, till driven thence by Domitian, (A. D. 94) ; 
then taught in Epirus; the poor and lame Stoic gave, until 



64 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

an advanced age, the model of a wise and heroic Ufe. For 
his principles see his Enchiridion, from his pupil Arrian, 
remarkable for its simple purity and grandeur of senti- 
ment. He adopts, with great earnestness, the moral 
side of Socrates' and Plato's teaching against Epicurus 
and the new Academy. There is in man an innate prin- 
ciple, e/j.(puTo<; eV^oca, of the good ; when he errs, it is 
through ignorance of its application to particular cases. 
Hence, compassion and forgiveness ; but, withal, there is 
the selfishness of the Cynic, and hopelessness towards 
moral evils, which are irremediable. (Ench. 12, 16). 

The practical tendency of later Stoicism brings forward 
more prominently the relation of man's will to nature and 
his life. What is in man's power, his opinions, impulses, de- 
sires and aversions, is his own work ; what is not, his body, 
fortunes, reputation, power, is not his work. God himself 
would not control man's will. 

E. lays special stress on man's relations to God ; man 
was made to behold and understand God and His works ; 
his humble spirit and dependence on God, are a remarka- 
ble contrast to Stoical pride. (Ench. 22). 

Reason has control of man's (pavraffuu, of nothing 
more. Govern then your thoughts according to nature, 
for this is the good ; it is within you ; what is without 
is for you nothing but your opinion of it. (Ench. 6.) 

Hence, self-denial, mortification of the irrational part 
of man. (Ench. 1 3, 29, 34, 48.) 

Let man remember his relation to the world of which 
he forms a part; this will be a foundation for relative du- 
ties. (See Pascal, Pensees, p. 122 seq. ; Farrar's Seekers 
after God.) 

(4,) M. Aur. Antoninus. His Meditations present the 



THE STOIC SCHOOL. 6$ 

religious side of Stoicism, tending to mystic self-contem- 
plation ; the " demon," the god within us, is the centre of 
his thought. He is largely indebted to Epictetus, and 
shows the same spirit of religious humility, the same aver- 
sion to science, and the same seeking after self-knowledge. 
(Med. ii. 13 ; xii. 26.) 

In general, the spirit of the later Stoics seems the result of their 
age, resignation and passive courage ; rd avdpoijnva Kaizvo- koI to /ut^SH'. 
Consider the possible influence, reciprocally, of Christianity and 
Stoicism, on the former in its early philosophy, and their sympathy 
in aversion to atheism, polytheism, skepticism, and to the speculative 
as distinguished from the practical ; and see Soirees de St. Peters- 
burg, ii. pp. 1 19-133. (cf. Kugler, on the Roman art of the period.) 

B. Stoicism, (i ) Pfhiciple, The practical, as an end, 
outweighs the theoretical. The strife after virtue is the 
one worthy object, and on it is founded man's happi- 
ness. 

The division of phil. is threefold, but all parts are re- 
ferred to the practical ; Logic, Physics, Ethics. (Sen. 
Ep. 89.) 

(2.) Logic, {a.) Theory of Knowledge. Stoicism is a 
system of dogmatic empiricism, which may be compared 
with the nominalism or conceptualism of the Middle Ages ; 
The universal is only in thought. 

All cognitions, ipayxaaiai^ come from the sensuous per- 
ceptions, al(n^(jetq. The soul is originally a tabula rasa^ 
and " nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu," is a fun- 
damental axiom. Sen'suous presentations, often repeat- 
ed, acting on the soul, their passive recipient, as a stamp 
on wax, by the aid of memory, produce iiJ-iz^ipia. The suc- 
cessive steps are 

(a.) ala(}riazi^, of the individual ; 



66 THE STOIC SCHOOL. 

(13.) 7tpoXrj(l>£ti;, natural, spontaneous notions of the uni- 
versal, produced by («•) ; 

(;-.) e>'^oiac, are (/5.) corrected by experience and reflec- 
tion ; in forming these the mind becomes active. The 
Platonic theory of ideas is, of course, rejected. 

The Stoics aimed especially at 

(d.) A Criterion of Truth. This seems to be distinctness 
in the sensuous presentation, when the (pa^^raaCa shows 
itself and what produces it. (Cic. Acad. Qu. i. 1 1 ; ii. 47.) 
This leads to a voluntary but firm conviction of truth ; this 

is a ^«v. ■/.aTalrj-zuij. 

(c.) Categories. Every true substance being corporeal, 
ideas, h^^ttrv.^ existing only in our minds, the general being 
identical with what is conceivable, the name signifying, 
not the thing in itself, but the concept in the mind, the 
genus is a union of several concepts, and the categories 
are the highest genera. 

(a.) Substance, rb b7zoxziiJ.v>ov ; 

C^-) Quality, attributes, properties, -b Tzotov ; 

(rO The relative, rd -wq s/jr^, which is based on the na- 
ture of the thing, as sweet and bitter ; 

(d.) Particular, accidental relation, rd 7:pbq ri h/w^ the 
correlative; e. g., the right side. (cf. the noun, adjective, 
verb, and conjunction.) 

Through concepts come judgments and inferences. 
The Stoics developed the hypothetical syllogism. 

(3.) Physics, -BiVQ materialistic, tending to pantheism; 
whatever is real, is material. (Sen. Ep. 106.) 

{a) Cosmology. Matter, the passive, and force, the active', 
are the two ultimate principles ; (Plut.; Diog. Laert. vii. 132, 
seq.; Sen. Ep. 89 ;) both are reduced to body, as that which 
acts, or is acted upon. Force, intelligent and omnipotent, is 



STOICISM. 6j 

inseparably j oined with matter, giving it form. Nature is 
God. God is in the world, the aniina micndi ; (Hymn of 
Cleanthes.) The world as a whole is one, finite, beautiful, 
(in symmetry and proportion of endlessly varied parts,) 
ordered, conscious, and that consciousness is the world- 
reason. Deity. (Cic. de. N. D. ii, 5-8, 22.) 

Fate, necessity, ^liJ.a-p'.i.hr^^ arises from the fact that force 
has set immutable laws on matter; God, the world-soul, 
acts from necessity of nature; hence also are developed 
in passive matter, oppositions, conflict of forces, moral 
evils. 

Provideivce, r.po'^ota^ is due to God, the world-intelli- 
gence, conducting all things to their end with unity and 
wisdom, looking to individuals, rewarding and punishing, 
perfect, happy. (Cic. de. N. D. i. 14 ; ii. 65 ; Diog. Laert. 
vii. 147 ; Plut.) 

The Heraclitean flux. God, the principle of life is the 
vital heat, a form of force; (Cic. de N. D. ii. 9, 10.) 
Earth and water are the passive elements, issuing from 
the world-fire, the primal ~op ~tyr^v/.6^^^ and they will return to 
it again. At the end of a cosmical period is a general con- 
flagration when all things are absorbed into deity, followed 
by a new evolution, for God is the (j-eoiiaxv/M Uyo^ of the 
world, (Cic. de N. D. ii. 22, 32; Plut. adv. Stoic. 36 ; Diog. 
Laert, vii. 136.) 

Moral evil. Though the world as a whole is perfect, 
yet moral evils, in parts, have necessary relation to the per- 
fection of the whole (vid. et supr. and cf. Hymn of Clean.). 

(b.) Psychology, applies the same principles ; there is 
a ruling active force in the mind, and a passive matter ; 
the soul is corporeal, a vital fire or air, and the union of soul 
and body is a y-paaiq of two bodies, like that in the world. 



68 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

Immortality is variously held ; with some, e. g. Cleanthes, 
the soul endures till the world-fire, for it is a spark of 
Deity. (Sen. Ep. 63 ad fin. ; 92; 120. M. Aur. Ant., Med. 
ii. 4; vii, 9. 18; xii. 25, etc.) 

The soul is one, a unity of force, from which, a ruling, 
rational principle, rjysrjjr^r/.ov^ issue the irrational senses 
and instinct, opp-yj, seven in number. Appetites and pas- 
sions are a corrupt reason. (Cic. Quaest Tusc. iv. 7, 11.) 

Free will : The mind is controlled, not by external cir- 
cumstances, but by its own nature, along with the general 
laws of the world. Chrysippus distinguishes the relative 
freedom of individual acts from the collective character of 
humanity controlled by law. 

(4.) Ethics, (a) Man is the highest product of nature, 
and mankind a commonwealth with the. gods ; all things 
beside are for the common sake of these. (Epict. Disc. i. 3.) 

ifi) Virtue, is an end, a good in itself, the summum bo- 
num, the only true good, the only source of happiness. 
Other things are adui(pnpo.. 

(o.) Yet certain of these have a relative value, rd rcpo- 
7]ypi>a, (health preferable to sickness, etc.,) and hence arise 
rd xaSrjxu'.ra or imperfect duties, as the care of health, etc. 
(Cic. De Fin. iii. 10, 15, 16.) 

(fi.) Other indifferent things are absolutely so. 

(rO Others are to be rejected, avoided. 

Pleasure is neither moral, nor an end of life. 

Virtue is 07te ; the four cardinal virtues are different 
manifestations of it, but he who has one, has all. 

There is no mean between virtue and vice, the good 
man and the bad ; all good actions are equally good ; all 
evil, equally bad, by reason of their source. (Diog. Laert. 
VIL 120.) 



THE STOIC SCHOOL. 69 

{c) The mle of virtue is not founded on prudence, re 
suits, positive law, notions of individuals or nations, but on 
the law of nature, "to live according to reason,"=" to live 
according to nature," which is reasonable, governed by 
law, etc. (Diog. Laert vii. 8/ ; Cic. de Fin. iii. 9 ; Sen. 
Ep. ^6, 89). This, however, must be understood of uni- 
versal nature ; if that of the individual be considered, the 
Stoical rule relaxes. (Cic. De Fin. iii. 5.) 

Politics are less regarded than in earlier Greek phil. 
The sage is a cosmopolite, and all the wise are his fellows. 

(d) The wise is he who possesses virtue, all other 
things are to him indifferent : hence, his d-di9eca. He is 
master of himself, the only rich, free, or lord. He is a 
god in all but immortality. 

His virtue,=wisdom, he can never lose ; without this 
man is a fool. (Diog. Laert. vii. 123 ; Epict. Encheir. 19., 

(e) Passions, the corrupt reason, opposing law, are to 
be eradicated; they are false opinions. Affairs do not 
trouble men, but their opinions about affairs ; d'^e/jiu 

xai aTzi^ou. 

Troubles, so called, are part of the system of the world. 
Pain and pleasure, being neither conformed to law nor op- 
posed to it, are ddcd(popa. 

Remember always that duty, and, therefore, happiness, 
lie in that which is in our own power ; not so, health, wealth, 
reputation; (Sen. Ep. 50, 85, 116.) 

(5.) Moj^al defects of Stoicism. 

(a) Arrogant sense of human independejtce. 

" Non sunt ista bona qu^ in te isti volunt congeri, unum bonum est 
quod beatae vitae causa et firmamentum est, sibi fidere." "Quod 
votis opus est? fac te ipsum felicem." (Sen. Ep. 31, 73.) 



70 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

{b) Apathy, and condemnation of human passions ; im- 
possible, if desirable ; undesirable, if possible. (Sen. Ep. 

74. 85-) 

{c) Immoi^al tendency ; the wise cannot do wrong, for 
all his actions spring from the inward virtue. An im- 
practicable standard ends in practical license, so long as 
the motive is not self-interested or voluptuous ; e. g., lying 
for gain, prostitution, etc. 

{d) Defence of suicide. (''za-vo? Inrt^ a-ipioimir) 
(Cic. de Fin. iii. i8 ; Diog. Laert vii. 130; Plut. adv. 
Stoic. 33 ; Sen. Ep. 17, 58, 70, Jj) 

2. Epicureanism. 

This system offers no great names, except Lucretius. 
(See Br. Quarterly, Oct. 1875.) (Note, the condition of 
Greece at the period of its origin.) 

Epicurus (A.) Life. (342-271 B. C.) At an early 
age a student of Democritus, in his 36th year he opened 
a school at Athens, his followers making a social league 
or fraternity. His life was considered blameless. He 
wrote voluminously (works not extant,) and composed 
short formulas for his disciples, which remain in Diog. 
Laert. x. 

(B.) Divisions. Canonics, physics, and ethics ; but his 
logic is principally criteria of truth, and his physics are 
with reference to ethics, their aim being to free man from 
superstitious fears of nature and the gods. (Lucret. de. 
Rer. Nat. i. 62 seq.) 

(C.) Principle is pure sensualism, a union of the atomic 
system of Democritus with the hedonism (modified) of 
Aristippus. Phil., as with the Stoics, has for its end the 
practical ; its object is happiness, the removal of disturb- 
ing causes. Its chief obstacle is ignorance, (i) of the laws 



EPICUREANISM. /I 

of nature, which produces false hopes and fears, the rem- 
edy being physics ; (Rer. Nat. ii. 59.) (2) of the nature 
of man ; hence the need of canonics and ethics. 

(D.) Canonics. (i.) Theory of knowledge, is purely 
sensualistic. External objects, bodies, produce {a) sensa- 
tions, alffOrja-tq ] material images, sldu^Xa^ from bodies, per- 
petually emanate from their surface, dr.oppoiat^ and enter 
the organs of sense ; (Rer. Nat. iv. 26 seq.) 

(^b) -poly]4>stq^ mental representations, permanent im- 
ages in the memory, are the collected result of several sen- 
suous impressions, when the eldwXa reach the mind, which 
is their pas,sive recipient. (Cic. de Fin. i. 6.) 

(2.) Criterion is {a) the sensuous perception, which as 
such is true ; reason cannot oppose, for its concepts and 
judgments are based only on this ; 

ib) The concepts, then, are equally true ; error is found 
in our generalizations, in assumptions which sensation does 
not confirm ; (verification ;) 

{c) The feelings, -dd-q^ agreeable and disagreeable, 
which, duly considered, are a guide for practical conduct. 

(E.) Physics, (i) Cosmology, is that of Democritus, 
developed. Atoms and movement explain the universe. 
Nothing exists but body and vacuum, all beside is proper- 
ty or accident. 

{a) Atoms, are sensible entities, so small as to escape 
the sense ; they are the indivisible elements of bodies, in- 
finite and eternal ; their properties are size, form, weight. 
There is a vacuum in which they move, which is also infi- 
nite in extent. (Rer. Nat. i. 329.) By their weight, per- 
petually moving downwards, yet deviating from a parallel 
course, their collisions produce ever-changing bodies, con- 
tinually generated and destroyed. 



72 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

" De nihilo nihil fit ; " and nothing is destroyed. (Rer. 
Nat. i. 155, seq. ; 951 seq. ; ii. 61, seq. ; 294 seq.) 

(On the inconsistency of the atomic theory with sen- 
sualistic principles, see Ritter, x. ii. Physics of Ep.) 

{b) The gods, probably exist, since they produce im- 
ages as in dreams. They are immortal bodies, in a happy 
life, and trouble not themselves about human affairs. 
They are formed of the finest atoms ; they are not to be 
supplicated or adored. (Rer. Nat. ii. 646, seq. ; 1090, 
seq.) 

There is neither teleology nor fate in nature. 

(2.) Psychology. The soul is atoms of the finest kind; 
for, otherwise, it would not affect bodies, nor be affected 
by them. These atoms are scattered at death. (Diog. 
Laert. x. 63-67; Lucret. de Rer. Nat. iii, 161, seq.; 830, 
seq.) 

Sensations, varying according to the atoms of the im- 
ages, and the state of the bodily organs, are agreeable or 
disagreeable, and thus produce the passions. (Rer. Nat. 
iv. 633, seq.) 

Man is developed from the brute state. (Rer. Nat. v. 
925, seq.) 

(F.) Ethics. The suinmum bonitni is happiness,=pleas- 
ure ; brutes seek it instinctively ; let men do so rationally, 
using wise calculation to avoid the disagreeable, to gain 
the agreeable. (Diog. Taert. x. 129.) 

(i.) Pleasure^ is of two kinds ; {a), in action, h^ xiv-qaei ; 
(h) in rest, d-ovia.^ drapa'^ia ; the former is most vivid, (pas- 
sions), but brief and mixed ; the latter is true happiness, 
the repose of the soul. 

Pleasures differ among themselves in vivacity and du- 
ration ; e. g., of the body, and of the soul ; the latter are 



EPICUREANISM. 73 

higher, for the soul remembers and anticipates. (Diog. 
Laert. x. 136.) 

(2.) Virtue is wisdom, (pp6vri(nq^ right judgment ; for 
present pleasure may bring lasting pain ; present pain, 
lasting pleasure ; and the higher pleasures are to be pre- 
ferred by the wise, viz., those of virtue. 

True repose, freedom from passion, is either through 
perfect freedom from needs and desires, which is impossi- 
ble, or through limiting them to such measure as can al- 
ways be satisfied ; and this is the practical rule, indepen- 
dence of the pleasures of luxury and idle opinion, e. g., 
public honors. (Diog. Laert. x. 130.) 

Domestic affection, patriotism, disturb the soul's quiet. 

(3.) Divisions. The four cardinal virtues are the four 
great means of happiness. 

(jx) Prndence, (a) escaping superstitious fear of 
gods and their vengeance, and of death ; 

(/5) regulating pleasures with reference to the future, etc. 
(U) Moderation, restricting desires to our power of 
satisfying them. 

(c) Courage, keeping off troublesome emotions ; bear- 
ing temporary pain for ultimate happiness, and taking leave 
of life when it is wholly disagreeable. 

(^f) Justice : There is a compact among men not to 
injure one another, and he who observes it is happy in 
friendship, in fearing no strife, in being protected in his 
pleasures by law, etc. 

(4.) Politics, are based on utility -and a compact, men 
having been originally savages ; a system of natural 
rights. The interest of the moment may not be per- 
manent, and therefore the need of mutual sacrifice. (Rer. 
Nat. V. 1 105, seq. ; cf. Rousseau, Condillac, and see Calder- 
wood, Mor. Phil. c. ii.) 

4 



74 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 



in. PYRRHONISM. 

Note the change, political, social, moral, artistic, at 
once a cause and a result of philosophical decline, of 
skepticism. (Ritter x., iv. i.) 

The skeptics confine themselves to a refutation of dog- 
matic principles, especially Stoical. Happiness implies a re- 
nunciation of dogmatism, and of search into the nature 
of things. There are three schools : 

(i.) Pyrrho and his followers. 

(2.) The New Academy (vid. sup.) 

(3.) Aenesidemus and his school. 

(A.) Pyrrho s School, (i.) Pyrrho, of Elis (circ. 360- 
270 B. C), was, partly, a follower of the Megarians, but 
specially devoted to Democritus ; (Diog. Laert. ix, 61, etc.,) 
he is chiefly known through 

(2.) Tiinon, (B. C. 325-235), a disciple first of Stilpo, 
and then of Pyrrho. (Diog. Laert. ix.) Sense and intel- 
lect are equally deceptive ; owing to the instability of our 
impressions, perceptions and representations can neither be 
called true nor false ; (the subjective not yet denied, but the 
objective certainty). "That a thing is sweet I do not 
affirm, but only admit that it appears so." (Diog. Laert. 
ix. 105.) 

The supra-sensible is an unknown {x) ; of two contradic- 
tories one is not more to be affirmed than the other. 
Hence, practically, 

No dogmas, oo<Jh^ iwlhrj^ but suspension of judgment, 
^~"/^') for real things are unattainable, {fi.y.a~alr^(l'i<j). 

The beautiful, the ugly, the just, the unjust, rest on 
human statutes and customs ; and true happiness is found 
in freedom from dogmas concerning them, arapa^ia. 



PYRRHONISM. 75 

(B.) Aenesideimis School, (i.) Aenesideimis, (ist cent. 
B. C). 

All principles, sq called, are reducible to hypotheses. 
Imputed to him are ten rpo-ot, or ways of justifying doubt ; 
(^) Different classes of beings are differently consti- 
tuted ; whose sensations are true ? 

(d) Different men are differently constituted ; 

(c) The several organs of sense give different impres- 
sions from what is called the same thing ; 

{d) Our own physical and mental states vary, and re- 
presentations of things vary with them ; 

(e) Position, distance, etc., alter the appearance of 
things ; 

(/) All experiences of things are affected by other 
things, and by the subject himself; (a subjective element 
in knowledge) ; 

{£-) The object, changing quantity, structure, etc., 
produces various appearances ; 

(//) Sensations always appear in various combinations 
and associations, and relations to ourselves ; (relativity 
of knowledge) ; 

(/) Notions vary as objects are perceived more or less 
frequently ; 

(/^) Opinions, customs, theories, differ. 
(See Berkeley's Hylas and Phil, Dial, i., against the ab- 
solute existence of matter.) 

Aen. especially attacked the principle of causality. 
(a) Only body can act on body, and even then contact 
is necessary, but impossible ; 

(<^) Two things are mutually conditioned, and which 
is cause, and which is effect, cannot be determined ; for, 
(c) The cause, so-called, must either be synchronous 



76 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

with, or precede, or follow the effect ; and each of these is 
absurd. 

(2.) Agrippa, (2d cent, after Christ.) reduced these ten 
commonplaces to five ; 

{a) The discordance of opinion ; 

{b) All knowledge is relative ; 

{c) Every proof requires proof, ad inf. ; 

{d) All systems are based on hypotheses, and in 
these is disagreement ; 

{e) Demonstration moves in a circle. 

(See Kingsley's Hypatia, c. v.) 
(3.) Sextus Empiricus, a Greek physician, (circ. 200 
A. D.) wrote Adv. Math., etc., which are extant. He re- 
duces the common-places to three. 

Neither body nor soul can be known, for how can 
the thinker know himself t Experience is nothing but asso- 
ciation of phenomena. Thought is modified sensation. 

Experience is our only moral guide, for by nature 
nothing is either good or evil, and conduct depends on the 
circumstances and conditions of life. 
He denies the existence of God. 

{a) He can be neither body nor soul ; 

(b) There is evil, which he either cannot, or will not 
remove, and either alternative is contrary to what men 
mean by the term God. Phil, is an irrational delusion. 

(C.) Criticism of Pyrrhonism. 

(^i.) In being dogmatic, which it cannot avoid, it is 
suicidal. It asserts doubt, at least as a mental state. 

(2.) The ten common-places are directed and valid 
against Epicurean sensualism ; they do not touch the in- 
tuitions of pure reason, e. g., the principle of contradic- 



NEO-PLATONISM. JJ 

tion, which the Pyrrhonists often assumed. So, also, the 
argument against the syllogism, because its major is itself 
an induction from particulars, and therefore contains the 
conclusion. 

(3.) Such a school has no permanence; it is the tem- 
porary result of controversy, or of indifference, resigning 
man's noblest work. It is easier to doubt, than to investi- 
gate. 

(4.) It rests on an irrational demand for proof of the 
validity of that which it, in common with mankind, is 
compelled to assume, and which is its own voucher. 

4. — Neo-Platonism. 

A. Introduction. Alexander brought Greece into con 
tact with the East. His successors. Attains at Pergamus, 
the Seleucidae in Syria, the Ptolemies in Egypt, spread 
abroad Greek literature, phil., and art ; Alexandria, espe- 
cially, became a new centre of commerce, science and the 
arts. (Note the Museum of Ptol. Lagus, its universal 
library, the ** Septuagint " under Ptol. Phil.) At Rhodes, 
also, was a school (rhetorical) of the Stoics. 

While scientific culture attempted an eclecticism of all 
Greek schools, we find in Alex, also a Syncretism of Greek 
ideas of all phil. systems, with Oriental religions, leading 
to deification of individuals, an attempted unifying of all re- 
ligions, ascetic mysticism. (Note the language of the 
Athenians to Demetrius.) 

An opposite extreme from materialistic and practical 
Stoicism and Epicureanism, from the scepticism of the 
Academy, it found refuge in mystic contemplation and di- 
rect intuition of truth in its source. 



yS DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

An attempted reform of popular religion, modified by 
Oriental ideas, all-embracing, rested on primeval religious 
tradition. When all other schools were dead it still strug- 
gled against the Christian faith, but it ended in tJieurgy. 

\X.?> first prmciple was a mystic theosophy ; union with 
God was the beginning and end of wisdom. Pythagore- 
anism and Platonism were most accordant with the aim. 
but Peripatetic and Stoic ideas were added. Oriental erna- 
7iation, through a decreasing series of entities (God him- 
self inaccessible to man) at last terminated in matter and 
evil, remote from God. Therefore in sciences the trans- 
cejidental was sought, and, in a contemplative and spiritual 
life, a refuge from the evils of action in the world of na- 
ture. 

B. Helleno-yudaic Philosophy. Philo, (i) (b. 25 B.C.) 
" Judceiisl' of a distinguished family, pleaded the cause of 
the Jews before Caligula : a very voluminous writer. 

(2) Principle, an inconsistent Syncretism, is largely 
borrowed from Platonism. Perception is of the individ- 
ual, the corporeal, which is unreal, and the sciences only 
end in knowledge of our ignorance, or, at best, in the 
probable ; their only value is in purifying the soul from 
error, and preparing for a higher knowledge. This is, in 
the Nous, of imperishable ideas, through the Logos. 

Hebrew Revelation is indeed a source of truth, but 
under the form of images ; its histories are allegorical, 
while Greek phil. presents the truth under the forms of 
reason. Interpret the former by the latter. 

(3.) Theosophy. God is above all predicates, even the 
good and the beautiful ; we can only name Him to ov ; 
from His works we know that He is, not what He is. The 
S. Ss. give anthropomorphic, allegorical notions of Him. 



NEO-PLATONISM. 79 

(4.) The Logos, is intermediate between Him and 
the world, His Sofia^ l(y-io'^ ^'^^od. He is the seat of 
Ideas, the archetype of the sensible world, the Organon 
of the Unnameable One in its production, the y-oaiioq 

This Logos, the second god, the first-begotten, reveals 
Himself in the sensible world. (Aoyog hdtdO^zoq and A. 

7tpo(poptx6q?) 

True knowledge is knowing God through the L. ; in 
that we know all ideas. 

From the L. proceed a series of emanations, or energies, 
down to man and the material world, which in itself is mere 
passivity, non-being. (See Am. Ch. Quarterly, Oct., 1875.) 

(5.) Ethics. The four cardinal virtues are active, need- 
ed in human society, and, like the sciences, preparatory ; 
higher are the contemplative virtues ; 

{a) The ptirifying, emancipating from evil, i. e., the 
sensuous ; faith, hope, piety, penitence ; 

{b) The unifying, wisdom, contemplating God, given 
by the grace of the Logos, who is the only light of man's 
Notts. Let man silence sense in the ascetic life, and rise 
above his discursive reason to oneness with God. 

Man is then free from the bondage of sense, of mat- 
ter, so far as is possible. He has the intuition of God; 
and outward perception, active will and judgment, are 
abandoned (ecstasy). God alone works in him. 

P. speaks of his own exaltation above himself and sur- 
rounding circumstances ; he became full of ideas and 
thoughts not his own : (" genius "). 

(Cf. the Gnostics, the Jewish cabala, and the Alex, 
fathers.) 

Passing by Apollonius of Tyana, the wonder-worker, 



80 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

and Plutarch, the eclectic Neo-Platonist, (who places evil 
in the soul), we come to 

C. Plotinus. 

(i.) An Egyptian {205-270 A. D.), taught at Rome, 
aet. 40 ; he had, six times, the " Vision of God." Porphyry 
wrote his life, and collected his writings in six Enneads 
(extant). 

(2.) TheosopJiy. The first principle we can only name 
the One,=the Good. But no properties can be predica- 
ted of it ; it is unutterable. It is not ~o ov, nor ooaia^ beau- 
ty, goodness, nor Nous ; it is over all these ; for even " the 
good," the first cause, «/>/'?, are relative words. " The 
One " is most convenient, though imperfect ; (Enn. vi. 9, 3; 
9, 6, Ritter). 

All common conceptions of God are anthropomorphic, 
and even thought, being, unity determine Him. 

(Note ; the real and the determined are synonymous ; the finite rather 
ihan the infinite is determined : but cf. cTre^pov in Gr. The attempt 
is the impossible concept of the Absolute First apart from all rela- 
tions.) 

Mythology becomes symboHsm. 

(3.) The Nous with the wr/^-ov makes a duality ; there- 
fore it is not the First, but an emanation and an z.-awv of 
the One. Turning back to its source, it becomes con- 
scious. It is the second God, God's Son, the one World- 
Reason. Radiation of light from the unchangeable sun 
is a frequent illustration (Enn. v. i, 7). 

Ideas, -o vorjTO'^, are immanent in the Nous, which is the 
unity of all intelligible essences ; these, the object, are 
identified with No?is, the subject. Thus the all, or the 
many, emanates from the one, for the good communicates 
itself. 



NEO-PLATONISM. 8 1 

(4) The Soul. The multiplicity of ideas is the active, 
efficient principle of the phenomenal world, but does not 
act directly upon (passive) matter. 

Intermediate is the third principle, the World-Sotil, 
the third God, emanating from the World-Nous, its Lo- 
gos, its thought, its e^xwy, which produces, in matter, the mul- 
tiplicity of finite souls. 

(5) Matter, is the terminus of the emanations, a shad- 
ow of the real, by itself without form, quantity, quality, a 
mere negation. In itself, also, it is the evil ; which, how- 
ever, is a mere negation of good. 

The sensible world, then, is from two principles, the 
World-Soul, which gives form, and formless matter. In 
itself it is not real, for its qualities are mental concepts, 
and take these away, not-being remains. What is, is ideal 
(Idealism). 

(6) Psychology. 4'^yjf'' r^'-^'-^? i^«^?- The soul is related 
both to the ala'hiTov and the ^M)t]r6^^^ (Enn. iv., 8, 8.) The 
body is in the soul, not the soul in the body. It depends 
on the body only so far as it is the principle of life and 
sensation ; otherwise, it is free. The World-Soul suffers 
degradation through matter, sinking still lower in the brute 
and vegetable creation. The true man is soul only, or 
rather reason, using matter as its tool (Enn. i, i., lo) 
But the fall is not total, for the individual soul can turn 
back to its origin. 

The Divine Nous, therefore, immanent in the World- 
Soul, is united with individual souls, their rationality. 
Knowledge is of five kinds : 

{a) Sensuous, which is only a dream ; 
ip) Of the operations of the soul ; 
if) From analysis and synthesis ; but for true knowl- 
4* 



82 DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 

edge the soul must turn back to the Nous, to a priori 
principles ; 

(d) Of primary virtues or principles, not objective, 
but a development from the soul itself ; 

(^) The highest is ecstatic, the contemplation of the 
One, acupia kv fitujpia^ which gives a supernatural light above 
intelHgence or love; (we love a person). 

(7.) Ethics. The soul, in begetting the corporeal, hav- 
ing descended, must turn back. Matter is evil, and the 
soul has well nigh forgotten its divine origin. (Enn. v. 
9, 10). Reason alone is free. 

There are three kinds of virtues : 

(a^) Civil, the four cardinal virtues. 

(<^) Purifying, ascetic, delivering from sin, which is 
the bondage of matter. The body's desires must be de- 
stroyed. 

(<f) Contemplative, unifying, producing union, hwaiq, 
with God, accomplished not by thought, which is action, 
y.v^-rjtjLq, but by rest, ecstasy. This is man's stcmnium 

bonutn J "^^ ohx k'^w d/xaprtaq elvai dXXa d-eov elvatT 

Some men are naturally sensuous, pleasure-seekers ; 
others practically virtuous ; others, b}^ the ascetic life, at- 
tain the "Vision of God." 

(See also Olympiodorus in Cousin, Fragm. Philos. i. 
P- 477.) 

D. Subsequent History of Neo-Platonisin. 

(i.) Porphyry, a disciple of Plot., b. in Syria, (233 
A. D.,) taught with great success at Rome, made evoca- 
tions and worked miracles, had the " Vision of God," d. 
304 A. D. 

He systematized and extended the doctrine of his 
master, made it more ascetic, (himself a "vegetarian"), 
defended necromancy, opposed Christianity. 



NEO-PLATONISM. 8^ 

(2.) After Por., N-P. became, as in Jamblichus, 
chiefly theurgic ; yulian tried to support it as an antago- 
nist to Christianity. 

(3.) ProcluSy b. at Constant. (412 A. D.), was a pupil of 
Plutarch and Syrian at Athens, taught and died there 
(487 A. D.) He had apparitions, and worked many mir- 
acles. P. was a man of genius and vast erudition ; honor- 
ing the gods of all nations, he was what he describes the 
philosopher as being, " the hierophant of all nations." 

Many gods are emanations from the One ; below them 
are demons ; man ascends to the highest through these 
media. This is the object of faith and love, viz., the divine 
goodness and* beauty. 

Justinian closed the school at Athens, 529 A. D., and 
the surviving teachers went to Chosroes, hoping to find a 
congenial air in Persia. Disappointed, they returned to 
neglect and contempt ; this was the end of Anc. Phil, 



84 RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER VI. 

RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

I. Introduction. 2. Opponents. 3. Apologists. 4. 
Ante-nicene Patristic Philosophy. 5. Post-nicene 
Patristic Philosophy. 

I. Introduction. 

Christian Rev. was a new and fertile element in 
thought. Virtue, which had been a philos. theory, was 
taught as a life, as a supernatural perfection, attainable by 
all through the Holy Ghost. 

Reason was elevated by familiarity with highest truths, 
received, at first, as a faith. Previously, there had been 
no permanence of principles ; supernatural truths now 
became not only the guide, but the object of reason ; i. e.y 
speculative phil. was allied with speculative theology. 

There are three eras : (i) Patristic ; (2) Scholastic ; 
(3) Modern. The first laid the foundation for Christian 
phil. in Christian dogmas formulated, systematized, esjDc- 
cially the doctrine of the Logos Incarnate ; while, for 
ethics, were established their spirituality, and their root in 
love. 



OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN DOGMA. 85 

In the first era are two periods : (i.) Ante-Nicene (to 
325 A. D.), essentially unphilosophic, phil. being only 
employed for defence, 

(a) In philos. terms applied to statements of Chris- 
tian truths ; 

{b) For the " prseambula fidei ; " e. g., monotheism 
justified to reason. 

(2.) Post-Nicene, to Charlemagne, (A.D. 800), phil. ap- 
plied to, and co-operating in, the development of Christian 
dogmas. 

2. Opponents of Christian Dogma. 

A. Gnosticism : the first attempt of pre-existing phil. 
to accommodate itself to Christian facts and dogmas. This 
reconciliation was founded on esoteric teachings of Christ ; 
hence the r^aitrfc, a direct knowMge of the One, the First 
Cause. Its forms are excessively fantastic, but in general 
agreement concerning emanations, the Aeons. (See Mos- 
heim. First Three Cent., etc.) 

(i.) Cefi7it/ms, 2ig3ir].s,t whom is the Gospel of S. John. 
The world was not made by the supreme God ; He caused 
the Aeon Christ to descend on Jesus at His baptism, 
withdrawn before His death. 

(2.) Saturninus, of Antioch, in Hadrian's reign. The 
Unknowable God originated angels, etc. ; they, the world 
and man. The God of the Jews was only an angel. The 
flesh is from the evil principle. The Unknown Father 
sent His Son, Christ, who took only the appearance of a 
human form. (Docetism.) 

(3.) Basilides, of Alex., also taught a series of emana- 
tions from the eternal Father. One of the lower, the God 
of the Jews, formed the world. The First-born, Nous, is 



86 RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Christ, who was not, in reahty, crucified. The body is 
not immortal. 

B., with most of the Gnostics, found two souls in man ; 
the one, divine, rational, pre-existent, for its offences sent 
down to an earthly body ; the other, from the soul of 
matter, sensuous, brutal. 

(4.) ValmUnus, (B. and V. both in the first half of the 
2d cent.) of Egypt, taught, in Rome and Cyprus, that a 
succession of aeons in sum constitutes the J? lero7n a. Jesus 
is its common fruit. Highest among the (30) Aeons is 
an Ogdoad ; lowest, is Wisdom ; from her " Achamoth," 
the spirit of formless matter, and from her is the Demi- 
urges, from whom the Law and the Prophets. The Son 
of Mary was not made by him, for the body of the former 
was psychical, or spiritual. He came to attack the tyranny 
of the Founder of this wotld ; (common Gnostic theory.) 

(5.) Carpocrates, of Alex., taught a universalistic ra- 
tionalism. Pythag., Plato, Jesus, had the true gnosis. He 
asserted the pre-existence of souls ; the world is from the 
lower angels. 

(6) Marcion, of Pontus, taught at Rome. There are two 
eternal principles, one of good, the other of evil, darkness, 
matter. Between them is the Demiurgos, the opponent 
of the good God, who is just, indeed, but the maker of the. 
world and the cause of physical evils, bloodthirsty, change- 
able, and full of contradictions. Jesus, sent by the Father, 
in the appearance of a man, against him and the Prince of 
darkness, was assaulted, not really slain by him. Hence, 
extreme asceticism, abstinence from flesh, etc., against the 
evil of matter. 

B. Manicheism, is best known through its disciple and 
opponent, S. Aug. It is a combination of Gnosticism 



OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN DOGMA. 8/ 

with (Zoroastrian) dualism ; the element of the latter in 
Gnost, being here completely developed, but emanations 
added from the former. 

Manes, a Parsee, of the Magian race, at the court of 
Sapor (A.D. 280), was put to death by the Magi. (For 
revival of Persian dualism, and political life, see Gibbon, 
i. 8.) 

There are two eternal worlds, of light, and of darkness, 
and two eternal laws or principles, — good and evil, (J. S. 
Mill) ; the latter, with the spirits of darkness, dwelling 
in chaotic matter, the world of darkness. The O. Test, 
is from the spirit of darkness. The world-soul, the third 
emanation from the Good, is Christ. God, of course, is 
of limited power, etc. The two worlds are mingled in 
this present earth of ours. 

Man has two souls ; one, the life of the body, is from 
the evil principle, the other is a part of the world-soul ; 
hence extreme asceticism, or licentiousness. 

C. Monaixhianism, the opposite of the Gnostic poly 
theism, was a modified Ebionitism. 

(i.) Praxeas (circ. 150, A.D.), Noetus, (circ. 230 
A.D.) taught that the Deity appears in various relations 
to men ; in Christ, as the Son. 

(2.) Sabellms, of Libya, at Alex, and Rome, (257 

A.D.) " ri jurmq T^lazu^^diiaa yiyovs rptaqj' The LogOS is the 

power of God. 

(3.) Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch (260, A.i).); 
Christ was made divine by His ethical perfection. God 
dwelt in Him, strengthening His reason and will. 

D. Arianism, was a union of Monarchianism and Gnos- 
ticism, based on Philo ; as Gnostic, it held that God can- 
not directly unite Himself with corporeal matter, but only 



88 RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

through a medium. A created Logos, the medium by 
which God made and governs the world, joined to itself a 
human body, not a soul (Apollinarianism.) There was 
no inward conflict in Christ, because there was no Noils. 

3. Apologists. 

A. Against the Heathen. Justin M., Tatian, Athena- 
goras, and Theophilus Antioch., distinguish a threefold 
birth of the Logos ; (i) immanent, eternal, as a Divine 
Person ; (^'^r- ^vdiddsroq of Philo.) 

(2.) emanent, at the creation of the world ; (^o^. 
TtpocpoprKoq); 

(3.) Incarnate, in human body, soul, and spirit. 
They also give teleological proof of the resurrection. 

B. Against hei^etics. S. Irenseus, (140-200, A.D.) 
Hippolytus, Tertullian, teach an eternal Deity, in a three- 
fold Divine "economy." 

Evil\i2j$> its ground in the misuse of human freedom. 
The " traducian " theory of the origin of human souls is 
employed in explaining the (inherent) evil of humanity. 
The (Gnostic) threefold division of human nature is op- 
posed. Man consists (Stoical) of body and soul, ^f^/^'. 
Spirit, TTveD/aa, is a supernatural gift, god-likeness, (S. Iren.) 
Reason, vt»D?, is a power of the soul. (Tertull.) 

4. Ante-Nicene Patristic Philosophy. 

Independent Christian Phil, appeared first in the east, 
at the catechetical school of Alex. ; e.g., S. Clement Alex, 
(from 189 A.D.), Origen, S. Gregory Nyss. In the West, 
we find Minucius Felix, Arnobius, Lactantius. 

A. 5. Clement Alex., recognizes partial truths in 
Greek phil., highest in Plato, the gift of the Divine Logos 



ANTE-NICENE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 89 

who is the Image, shcov^ of the Father, the unity of ideas, 
the antitype of the world. (See Mosheim, Cent, ii? 
§§25-6.; 

B. Origen; (A.D. 185-254) (i) b., at Alex., disciple of 
S. Clem. Alex., at eighteen lay-catechist of the school. 
Controversy with his bishop led to his retirement to Pales- 
tine. He wrote T^epi apyjbv. Christian faith is the norm 
of right thinking about divine and human things, but 
Philonism and Neo-Platonism in him are very prominent. 

(2.) God is incomprehensible, higher than truth, wis- 
dom, or being, ixovaq or ^'''dq^ known only in and through 
His works. 

The Log-OS is the (personal) Divine Wisdom, I5ia -orj 
idsa)'^ ; through Him all things were made, and all things 
become and remain through Him. He is the universal 
revealer, the source of human reason, of all truths seen 
by it. 

World-AeojiSy in perpetual succession, are without be- 
ginning, for God is eternally mighty and good ; hence, 
always creator. 

(3.) There are two worlds, of matter, and of spirit ; the 
former differs only in concept from the sum of its 
qualities. 

Spiritual beings, on the other hand, are essentially 
alike ; differences arise only from (free) choice of good or 
evil ; for spirits are not, essentially, one or the other. 

In \h^ pre-existence of souls, some have always kept 
their loyalty to God, while others have fallen away in dif- 
ferent degrees ; most of all, demons ; less, in various de- 
grees, those now united with human bodies and a sensu- 
ous, corrupting soul. 

Created souls cannot exist, save in concept, apart from 



go RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

body, (understood as above,) and death is not the parting 
from all body, but only from the earthly or fleshly, veiled 
by which is another. (Swedenborg.) 

(4.) Freedom of will is necessary to good or evil, but 
for the former is needed Divine help ; the latter is simply 
privation, or falling away from God. The rational soul, in 
order to rise, must emancipate itself from the bondage of 
the material, and of the sentient soul, and be joined to the 
Son of God. 

(5.) Eschatology. Through the redemption by the 
Logos, souls will be gradually purified, in this world, or 
after death by fire, until at last all, and, finally, Satan, will 
be restored to their first estate. 

The world-aeons end in the resurrection of bodies, in 
the elevation of the material world to its first condition, 
in the unity and perfection of the whole creation. 

C. Lactantius, (d. 325, A.D.) was tutor of Constan- 
tine's son, Crispus. His Instil. Divince are marked by 
Ciceronian purity of style. 

Matter is created ; if it were eternal, it would be un- 
changeable, and a world-formation impossible. 

Each soul is immediately created by God. He dis- 
tinguishes animus from aiiima. 

The sitmmum bonum belongs to the soul not to the 
body, and can neither be increased nor diminished ; i.e.y 
it is everlasting life in God, attainable, not by reason, 
phiL, but by religion ; man is animal religiosum. 

Virtue consists, not in destroying, but in rightly regu- 
lating the emotions. 

5. PosT-NicENE Patristic Philosophy. 

A. S. Athanasiiis, the Great, (296-373, A.D.) (Life 



POST-NICENE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 9I 

given at length in Gibbon ;)" " Contra Gentes^' and " De 
Incarnatione Verbi,'' have special relations to phil. 

(i.) God's unity is known from the order and harmony 
of the world, as our soul in us, from the organic unity of 
many parts in the body. But he who raises himself above 
the sensual, and is inwardly purified from sin, needs no 
such proof; in the mirror of his soul he will recognize 
the Logos, and the Father through Him. 

To deny God is to deny the soul, and conversely. 

God is infinite, and cannot be comprehended by the 
soul ; He is known only through His works, i. e., the 
Logos is known, the revealer of the Father; but we 
rather know what God is not, than what He is. 

(2.) The soul is essentially different from the body 
for it knows what sense does not reveal ; it rises above 
the empirical ; it thinks and loves the unchangeable and 
immortal; therefore it is such itself. 

(3.) Only because of soul, is man subject to a law of 
doing good and avoiding evil. Will is free ; and herein is 
the ground of good and evil. The latter is not being, but 
privation. The good consists in man's knowing and lov- 
ing God ; if he turn away to the sensual, this privation of 
knowing and loving God is evil. 

B. Many thinkers in the East, following Origen 
tried to unite Neo-Platonism with the Catholic faith ; e.g.j 
S. Gregory Nyss., Synesius of Gyrene, a disciple of Hy- 
patia, and, most influential, — Dionysius Ai^eopagitica, in 
*' Theologia Mystical' ' De Ccslesti et Eccles. Hierarchia. 
etc.,'' (Circ. 490, A. D.) After Scotus Erig. translated 
these, they exerted a great influence on the middle ages, 
especially on the mystics. 



92 RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Dion. Ar. gives a complete mystic theology christian- 
ized, a " positive " and a " negative ' theology. 

(i.) God is infinitely above all good, all being. No 
predicates are applicable to Him, as applied to created 
things. He is above all names, all concepts, the unuttera- 
ble ; but He is the cause of all being, and so embraces in 
Himself all their predicates. Through these He is not 
known as He is in Himself, but we draw nearer to Him. 

(2.) In Him are all created things, -poopiffpAi ; but 
these are not only ideas but active powers ; through these, 
then, come from God all things that are. The goodness 
of God thus sheds itself abroad, as the sun its light, with- 
out losing transcendence and unity. 

God is all in all ; the being of all things is grounded in 
the transcendent being of God (cf. Emanations of Neo-P.) 
All things, also, strive to attain to the transcendent unity 
from which they came ; God, because of His goodness, 
draws them back. He is the end, as well as the cause, of 
all. 

If man would pass by the various circles of the mystic 
hierarchy, (i^d) the unpurified, {b) the holy, {c) the perfect, 
(monks) etc., the central point being Christ) he must pass 
beyond sense and the super-sensual, beyond all activity of 
sense and reason, and, in this holy silence, lose himself in 
Deity ; the deification of man. 

C. vS. Augustine, the highest, clearest, most compre- 
hensive of Christian philos., has left a permanent mark on 
Christendom and the world ; the Plato of Christendom. 
(See Sir Wm. Hamilton's Met. xxxii.) He demands spe- 
cial study as marking the union of reason and phil. with 
the new faith ; an epoch in the history of thought and phil 

(i.) Life ; b. 353, A. D., in Numidia, was a rhetori- 



S. AUGUSTINE. 93 

cian, a Manichean, at Carthage, Rome, Milan. He turned 
first to the scepticism of the New Academy, then rose to 
the lofty idealism of Plato. Converted under the preach- 
ing of S- Ambrose, (always followed by the prayers of his 
mother Monica) in 395, A. D., was bishop of Hippo, in 
Africa ; d. 430, A. D. 

His first works were philosophical ; e.g., " Contra Ac- 
ademicos ; " " de Vit. beata ; " " de Ord. ;'' '■^ de Immort. An ; " 
and works against the Manichees. Later, and of special phil- 
osophical value, the Confessions, and " De Civ. Dei!' His 
literary labors were immense. 

(2.) Theory of knowledge. In point of time authority 
precedes scientific knowledge ; " tempore auctoritas, re 
autem ratio prior est," (Ord. ii. 9.) Knowledge cannot 
go so far as faith, for Rev. gives truths which cannot be 
perfectly grasped by reason. Knowledge contains two 
factors, subject and object: the latter is twofold, the sen- 
sible, and the supra-sensible ; the subject therefore has 
two powers, empirical and rational. (Ord. ii. 11.) Cer- 
tainty is possible, for the probable is like the true, and 
has the latter for its measure. (Contra Ac. ii. 7.) Even 
where no proposition is dogmatically affirmed, the dis- 
junction of contradictories is known. Even in doubt, is 
knowledge of existence, and of the doubt, etc., for con- 
sciousness attests that we think, will, remember, etc. 
Neither happiness nor wisdom is possible unless truth 
can be found, (c. Acad. iii. 4, 10, 13 ; Beat. Vit. c. ii.) 

Sense-perception reveals an outward world, and does 
not deceive; deception is due to careless, prejudiced in- 
ference, etc. 

There are two modes of knowledge of the intelligible ; 
{a) Proceeding from the sensible to its cause ; 



94 RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(J?) Inward knowledge, in the reason, the more ex- 
cellent ; but man must purify his soul from the deceits of 
sin. (Solil, i. 6 ; Verd Rel. c. 39.) 

The ground of intellectual knowledge is in the Abso- 
lute truth, i. e., God. The proof is Platonic. 

(a) There must be a norm of the true, beautiful, and 
good, by which to distinguish it. That norm must be un- 
changeable, always present, over-ruling our spirit. Such 
is God only. 

{b) Suppose a human teacher offer us proof ; we 
must have in ourselves a measure of that proof, viz. abso- 
solute truth, i. e., God's eternal Word, revealing it to us, 
with clearness and evidence, according to our moral state. 
(De Magis. c. 11.) The outward teacher only sends us to 
Him, and is not properly the teacher ; /. e., he may excite 
belief ; he does not give knowledge. 

Our spirit, then, is united mysteriously with the un- 
changeable truth. " In God's light we see light, and He 
sheds it on all, so that all see intelligible truth according 
to their moral state." (De Ord. ii. 16.) "Divina non 
jam credenda solum, verum etiam contemplanda, intel- 
ligenda, atque retinenda." 

From this is our knowledge of created things. The 
Divine Word embraces in Himself the rationes, the type- 
forms of all things, after which they are made. We know 
the essence of things, thus, "in rationibus aeternis." 
So we arrive at the knowledge of God as the Light 
showing all intelligible things, the ground of all knowl- 
edge. 

The sensible world, as in Plato, is made after the 
image of the intelligible, has verisimilitude, and is the ob- 
ject of opinion. 



POST-NICENE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 95 

(3.) Theosophy and Cosmology. God is proved to be 
from our concept of the true and good. 

id) We know the true, but it is such only through a 
participation in the absolute truth. We only know a 
thing as true by reference to that which is unchangeable, 
seen by all alike, and not dependent on any ; this is God. 
(Lib. Arb. ii. 12.) 

{b) We strive after the good, for we would be happy ; 
but changeable goods are not the good in itself, but are 
good through participation in the absolute and unchange- 
able, i. e., God. 

God is above all the categories, even that of substance. 
Essence or being is the most suitable predicate ; but He 
is incomprehensible. This is truest knowledge of God ; 
"Deus melius scitur nesciendo." (De Ord. ii. 16.) 

He is absolute unity ; whatever properties, wisdom, 
goodness, etc., may be attributed to Him, are one and the 
same. His absolute, infinite essence. He is goodness, wis- 
dom, etc., absolutely unchangeable, absolute Intelligence, 
Will, Spirit. As such. He is the Trinity. The Logos is 
His eternally-begotten Thought ; the Holy Spirit, the per- 
sonal Love of these. God, in the Logos, expresses, causes 
all created things, (cf. Neo-Pl. and Conf. vii. 9). 

God is omniscient ; we know things because and as 
they are ; but they are, because and as God knows them. 
Almighty, but also unchangeable. He can do all that con- 
tradicts not His nature and essence. 

Creatiojt. Needing nothing. He created with absolute 
freedom. He needed no pre-existing matter, nor from His 
essence proceeds the world ; then it were like Him ; but 
He created from nothing, after the eternal ideas whose 
seat is the Loo'os. 



96 RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Creation is the revelation of God's goodness, but God 
is perfect without the world. 

The created is not eternal, for it is changeable and 
transitory, limited by time and space. 

Time is the measure of motion and ©riginates with it, 
the law of successive thought in created beings. (Conf. 
xi. ad fin) The world is not in time and space, but time 
and space are in and with the world. 

Theodicea. The evil is by God's permission, against 
His will, i. e., His holiness. He wills in permitting its 
existence, but makes it contribute to greater good than if 
it did not exist. It is included in the order of creation, for 
nothing is outside of that order. As darkness sets out 
light, so the justice of God were not, if all were good. (De 
Ord. i. 6, 7 ; ii. 4.) 

(4.) Psychology. The soul is simple, spiritual, immor- 
tal. The categories of quantity and place are not applica- 
ble to it. The proof is 

{a) If body, it is known to itself as a body of cer- 
tain qualities ; but this is not so. 

{h) From sense-presentation. Body could not have 
such a mass of sensuous images, much less intellectual 
cognitions which reach the immaterial and supra-sensual ; 
e. g., in geometry. This shows the nature of soul. (Quant. 
An. cc. v., xiii.) 

{c) We penetrate into truth more perfectly, the 
further we withdraw from the merely sensual. This were 
impossible, if the soul were merely a harmony of the body. 
(Quant. An. c. xiii; Immort. An. c. x.) 

{d) The body is mutable, reason immutable ; there- 
fore soul is not a harmony of the body. (Immort. An. cc. 
ii. iii.) 



POST-NICENE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Q/ 

(e) The soul's sensuous experiences, in its whole 
e^o, are complete at every part of the body ; therefore it 
is simple, incorporeal. (See Bishop Butler, on Personal 
Identity.) 

From the soul's simplicity and spirituality result, 
(a) htdividtLality ; i. e., not one universal soul, but 
to each his own ; 

{b) The absurdity of transmigration ; 
{c) Community with the angels, also embodied, but 
immortal. Between them and the beasts is man, animal 
ratio7iale inortale. 

The first human soul was created for union with a 
body. This union is not the ground of evil. Traducianism 
and Creationism both seem to present insuperable difficul- 
ties. (Retract, ii). 

The soul has {a) an inferior part, vegetative and sensi- 
tive powers, sensuous experience and activity : these are 
essentially united with bodily organs ; 

{h) A higher part, reason, will, and memory, not 
conditioned by bodily organs. 

But the distinction of these two is relative only. 

The soul is what gives its specific character to the 
body ; " tradit speciem anima corpori, ut sit corpus, in 
quantum est." (Immort. An. c. xv). 

Man is neither body nor soul, but a third, single na- 
ture, the unity of the two. The relation of the two is a 
mystery. In the sensitive soul, beside the five senses for 
sensuous knowledge, is the common sense, their unity, the 
presentative faculty. (Lib. Arb. ii. 3.) 

The soul, as spirit, has three faculties, {a) intelligentia, 
{b) voluntas, (c) memoria. 

Intelligentia is («) contemplative ; {mens, ratio ; " ratio 

5 



gS RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

est aspectus animi quo per seipsum, non per corpus, verum 
intuetur:" Immort. An. c. vi). 

(/5) discursive, i^ratiocmatio). 

All these are relative distinctions in one essence. 

The spirit is the image of God the Trinity in its 
threefold unity, form, and order ; or, being, intelligence, 
and will ; or, towards God, memory, thought, and love. 
(Conf. xii. II ). 

Immortality of the Soul. The proof is Platonic. 

{a) If that which is in a subject is unchangeable, 
then the subject is. Truth is in the soul, so far as it re- 
cognizes it and knows it. 

{h) The soul is inseparable from reason ; the con- 
tents of reason, viz. truth, are unchangeable, therefore 
reason is immortal ; therefore so is the soul, for reason 
can be only in a living subject. 

if) The soul is life, not an animated subject ; there- 
fore it cannot cease to be ; annihilation is impossible. 

{d) Being has no contrary which can destroy it ; 
e. g.y elements of body are not destroyed in death ; being 
remains. The being of soul, also, has no opposite ; its 
life is truth. 

(5) Ethics, (a) Free-zvill, is the subjective ground of 
ethics; This concept has a two-fold sense ; («) ability, 
capacity, of choice ; (/5) Freedom, from evil and to the 
good ; (super-naturalT) (a) is an essential property ; it is 
a freedom from physical necessity. The power to choose, 
to determine, is what constitutes will. Will not self-deter- 
mined would be a contradiction in thought. This is the 
most evident fact in consciousness ; without it, no moral 
good nor evil ; no moral laws ; no well-desert, nor ill 
desert ; no reward nor punishment ; no praise nor blame ; 



POST-NICENE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 99 

no remorse nor self-approval. (See Cousin on The 
Good.) 

(/5) is dependent on Divine grace, which only can 
free from evil and preserve the power to (super-natural) 
good. (Conf. vii. ad fin.) 

{a) Liberum arbitriiim, cannot be lost, but (/?) can be for- 
feited through our own fault. 

Divi7te foreknowledge affects not the former, for God 
foresees actions as free. Man does not act because God 
foresees ; but God foresees because man wills and acts. 
(Lib. Arb. iii. 3.) Man's free power is more certain, so 
to speak, because He foreknows it. 

{b) Simimiini bomiin. The good admits of a twofold 
distinction ; (a) bo7i. beatificiLin ; " eo fruendo quisquis be- 
atus est, propter quod caetera vult habere, cum illud jam 
non propter aliud, sed propter ipsum diligatur." (Ep. 
cxviii. iii. 13.) 

The Sitm. bon. must (a) make us perfectly happy ; (/5) 
be not amissible ; (/-) be the ground of our perfection. There- 
fore it is not sensuous pleasure, nor even virtues, which 
are but means ; it is God, the Vision and the Love of 
God. (De Beat. Vit. §§ 10, 11, 34; Civ. Dei, viii. 8 ; Lib. 
Arb. ii. 19.) 

(c) Divine Law is the way to this ; in following this 
norm consists moral good, and the fulfilment of life's work. 
Hence comes the obligation to strive after virtue, for this 
is the means to the sum. bon. Apart from this, action is 
no more virtue, but only vice. 

Virtne is " animi habitus, naturae modo et rationi con- 
sentaneus " ; "ars bene recteque vivendi." It is aptness 
and disposition of will, strength and constancy in accom- 



lOO RISE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

plishing the good. It is not dndOeia, but the ruling of the 
passions according to the moral law. 

Love comprises" all other laws; (a) of God, referring 
what we have, are, and do, to Him ; From this, (/5) True 
self-love, willing our true sum. bon. (vid. supra.) {y) of 
our neighbor, willing his sum. bon. also. 

This also comprehends all virtues ; 

(a) Prudence, distinguishing what hinders love from 
what it demands ; 

ip) justice, the service of the loved : 

{j) courage, to endure all for what is loved ; 

{p) moderation, love keeping itself unstained for what 
is loved. 

id) Evil, is no substance ; all that is, is good. It is 
negation, privation of the good, and only possible through 
the good. A being purely evil is simply non-being. (Con- 
fess, vii. 12.) Evil is against nature, robbing it of part 
of its good, a corruption of nature. It is two-fold : 

('/) Malum culpce, the moral privation of moral good, 
man turning from the stmt. bon. to transitory good. (Lib. 
Arb. ii. 19.) Man thus inverts the order of things, and in 
this lies evil conduct. He thus violates the Divine law 
which marks out the only way to the sum. bon. ; and so this 
mal. culpcB is " dictum, factum, vel concupitum contra le- 
gem Dei." 

(/S) Malum pcencB, is caused by (ji^. It is the ac- 
tual privation of the sttm. bon. ; Intellectual blindness, 
moral hardness, misery, not now complete, for transitory 
goods offer some satisfaction ; but that this come to an 
end, is of Divine justice ; and this retribution is good, be- 
cause it is just. It is only evil to the evil men who pro- 
duce it. 



POST-NICENE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Id 

The good is positive, not only in act, but in aim ; the 
evil, positive in act, is negative in aim, /. e., it has a catisa 
deficiens. (Lib. Arb. ii. 20.) 

D. After S. Aug. philosophical progress ceased. 
The barbarians extinguished all light, except in the mon- 
asteries, and those only preserved it for better days. 

(1.) Boethms, (470-526, A. D.) a Roman Senator, un- 
der Theodoric long imprisoned, translated Aristotle's Cate- 
gories, and De Interp., with the Isagoge of Porphyry, and 
added comments ; he also wrote De Consol. PhiL, a Theo- 
dicea. (See Gibbon's elegant sketch of his life, c. xxxix.) 
God is the highest good of man ; our life's aim is to strive 
for happiness in Him, not in earthly things ; these are 
means which God uses, to lead us to Him. Earthly evils 
are thus made tolerable. 

(2) Cassiodorus, a Senator, (458-575, A. D.) discussed 
the trivmin (Gram., Dial., Rhet.) and the quadrivium, 
(Mus., Astron., Geom., Arithm.) He wrote Z>^ Artibus ac 
Disciplinis Artium Liberalium, which became a sort of 
text-book. His De Anima proves the immateriality of the 
soul. It is made in God's image, audits predicates do no-t 
belong to the categories of body, e. g., quantity. 

(3) Isidore, Hispaliensis, bishop of Seville, did much 
to civilize the Visigoths. His Originum is an encyclo- 
pedia. 

(4) Beda, Ven., (674-735 a.d.) a voluminous writer, 
chiefly borrowed, and made compendia. De Nat. Rerum 
is from Isidore. 



102 SCHOLASTICISM. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

SCH OLASTICISM . 

I. Introduction. 2. Period of Growth. 3. Full 
Development. 4. Decline. 

[.Re/ere?ices : — Milman's Lat. Christ, v. lii. viii. 5; v. vi. xiv.3 ; Cousin Phil. Mod. ; Stbckl,J 



I. Introduction. 

Two new elements now enter phil. ; (i) the Christian 
Revelation, (2) the barbarian races emerging into civil- 
ization under its influence and that of the Eastern and 
Western empires : (at a later period Saracenic and Judaic 
influence.) 

Phil., at first subordinate to theology, emerges into an 
independent career, though guided or ruled by Christian 
thought : it is the development of patristic phil. into sys- 
tems. (On influence of Cath. Ch., cf. Comte, Pos. Phil, 
trans. Martineau, v. ii, p. 262 seq.) 

Predominating influences are (i) Cicero, (2) S. Augus- 
tine, (3) Aristotle, although, until the 12th cent, were 
known only part of his logical treatises, with the Isag. of 
Porph. In II 28 A.D. were added the Analytics and 
Topics, through the Arabs. 

Phil, had a two fold development; 



INTRODUCTION. IO3 

(i) Scholastic, speculative, by the aid of the trivium 
and quadriv., in the cloister-schools founded by Charle- 
magne, himself, at the age of forty, a pupil of Alcuin, etc. 

{2) Mystic, contemplative, allegorizing S. Ss., following 
Dionys. Areop. (see S. Theresa in Southey's Notes to Joan 
d'Arc, 18 ; Gibbon, c. Ixiii.) 

Nominalism and realism are the general key to philos. 
questions in the Mid. Ages. (Cousin, Fragm. Philos., ii p. 
100.) The question was started by Porphyry, through 
Boethius ; " of genera and species, whether they subsist, 
or exist only in the mind, whether separate from sensibles, 
or in sensibles, I decline to speak ; it is a profound subject, 
and demands deeper investigation." 

Of universals, then, sc. the five ^' predicamenta',' are 
three views : 

(i) Realism. Universal concepts are objectively real, 
the only realities ; individuals are not proper substances, 
but manifestations of true being ; " tuiiversalia ante remr 
(Erigena.) 

Moderate realism, as in Aristotle, finds " tmiversalia in 
re,'"' distinguishing, as A. did, the contents of the univer- 
sal and the form of universality. The individual is the 
proper substance ; the universal form, '' pi^cedicabile de 
omnibus',' is given by abstraction. The universal has ob- 
jective reality, as to its content, in individuals. 

(2) Nominalism. Universals have no objective real- 
ity, are products only of our thought. Similar things are 
indifferently expressed under common names ; " univ- 
post remr 

Extreme nominalism makes genera mere words for 
individuals, '^ Jlatus vocis!' 

(3.) Concept iialism, moderate nominalism, makes gen- 



104 SCHOLASTICISM. 

era subjective concepts expressing the totality of manifold, 
but homogeneous, things ; the matter is similar in individ- 
uals of the species, the form is different ; e. g., humanity in 
Socrates and Plato. So also in species of the same genus ; 
e. g. man and beast ; (the matter, animal.) 

This is the perpetual question of phil., pervading sci- 
ence, politics, morals, religion. (Cousin. Frag. Phil. M. 
Age, p. 62.) 

Note that this is, still, a question of the day. See Max Miiller, 
in Littell's Liv Age, No. 1578; Mivart. Geti. of species, p. 289; 
Agassiz' " Type-forms." " If species do not exist at all, as the sup- 
porters of the transmutation theory maintain, how can they vary ? 
And if individuals alone exist, how can the differences which may be 
observed among them prove the variability of species ? " See also 
Cont. Rev., Nov. 1875. 

There are three periods : (i) of Growth, (600-1200 A. 
D.,) (2) of full development in the 13th cent., (3) decline, 
in the conflict of mutually destructive systems. 

2. Period of Growth. 

A. Alcum, at the head, first, of the " Schola Pala- 
tina," then at Tours, where he was abbot, wrote treatises 
on the trivium, and De Animce ratione, based on S. Aus" 

B. John Scotus Erigena. (i) b. in Ireland (circ. 800 
A.D.,) was at Paris, (Schola Palat.) under Charles the Bald, 
(a.d. 843); he wrote De Divisione Naturce, translated and 
followed Dionys. Areop.; was also a follower of Basil, 
Greg. Naz., Greg. Nyss., and Origen. He was an Alexan- 
drian Neo-Plat. ; ^^ vera philos. est vera religid' and con- 
versely. 

(2) God is the essence of all things ; He only has 



PERIOD OF GROWTH. IO5 

essential subsistence; negative theology denies of God 
all predicates, even substance, or essence. He is trans- 
cendent Being, Goodness, Power, etc. " Affirmative " 
theol. uses these predicates symbolically, for He is their 
cause in created things. 

(3) God is the source of primordial causes, archetypes, 
ideas, contained in the Divine Wisdom. Creation is the 
eternal procession of God, through these into the world 
of creatures, (emanation,) the " second nature," " quce 
creatur et crcat ;'' the invisible making Himself visible, 
etc. ; " theopJianiar The sensible world is the " third na- 
ture," " qiicB a^eatur^ non create" the product of the ideal 
world, all things that appear in space and time. The 
"fourth nature," "qtccB non cj^eatnr et non creat^^ is also 
God, as the end of all things, for to God all will again 
return ; " unum^ individinL'tn atque immutabile manebuntr 

Erig. is an extreme realist. God, as unity, evolves the 
generic ; then species, etc. The species is the proper 
being of the individual ; otherwise, the latter is merely the 
assemblage of accidents : hence the appearance of diversity, 
which is the result of the Fall, all things, in reality, being 
one essence, the second nature ; (Pantheistic emanation). 

(4.) He is a mystic. Reason finally looks, without 
any medium, directly at the highest truth, or rather, that 
truth beholds itself in man. Man finds not God, but God 
finds himself in man. 

(C.) Roscellin, (i) of Compiegne, b. in Brittany, 
studied at Soissons and Rheims, taught at Tours and 
Compiegne. His letter to Abelard alone is extant ; (Vid. 
Anselm and Abelard ; Cousin, Fragm. Philos. M. Age.) ; 
he was, life-long, persecuted for applying nominalism to 
the Cath. faith. 

5* 



I06 SCHOLASTICISM. 

(2) R. was an extreme nominalist ; not the originator 
of the system, but its clearest exponent and sharpest de- 
fender in the i ith -cent. Universals are merely universal 
names, '' flattts vocis,'' for the totality of things. 

This he applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, in the 
form of tritheism. There are three divine essences or 
substances, like one another ; for only individuals have a 
real existence. 

(D.) William, of Champeaux, (1070-1121, A. D.) a 
scholar and lecturer at Paris, founder of the famous 
school of S. Victor, a friend of S. Bernard, wrote " De 
Origine Animcer 

W. is an extreme realist. The universal is wholly in 
each individual ; individuals, in essence, are one, differing 
only in their accidents. This view was afterwards soft- 
ened down in order to meet the objection that "then So- 
crates would be Plato." 

(E.) 5. Aiisehn, (i.) b. in Piedmont (1034, A. D.), Ab- 
bot of Bee in Normandy, archbishop of Canterbury (1093 
A. D.), d. 1 109 A. D. ; wrote " Dialogus de Veritate,'^ (op- 
poses nominalism) ; " Monologiiiml' means of arriving rea- 
sonably at the faith, etc. ; '•' Proslogium',' faith seeking un- 
derstanding. 

(2.) Principle ; faith is the pre-requisite and the regu- 
lator of knowledge, but leads to it ; " non qticero ijitel- 
ligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligainy (Pros. c. i.) 

(3.) Theosophy, God can be known through reason. 
A. attempts ontological, a priori, proof, from the concept 
to the objective existence. That than which a greater 
cannot be conceived, cannot exist in intellect alone ; for 
then a greater can be conceived, sc. that which exists 
not only-/?^ intellectu sed in re, (Ueberweg, § 93.) 



PERIOD OF GROWTH. 10/ 

(A. was opposed by the monk Gaunilo, apparently 
with success.) 

A adds a posteriori proof ; (Monol.) the ideal of good- 
ness, power, etc., must exist, since it is the necessary form 
of whatever is. The universal exists independently of in- 
dividuals, which are good, etc., through participating in 
one absolute good, etc. The imperfect supposes a per- 
fect; the relative, an absolute, (cf. Fenelon, "De L'Ex- 
istence de Dieu ;" Bossuet, "De La Conn, de Dieu," etc.) 

There must be a first cause for things which begin to 
exist ; if many causes, they also have a first cause, God. 
There are gradations of good, etc., and the scale cannot 
be infinite. 

Deductions from the concept are, {a) Divine perfec- 
tions must be predicated, not qualitatively, but " quiddita- 
tively ;" God's justice, e.g., is Himself, not a quality ; 
(b) He is absolute unity ; for, in the compound the parts 
are, in a sense, higher than the whole which is derived 
from them ; but God is absolutely the highest Being. 

Similarly A. deduces eternity, unchangeableness, etc. 

(3.) Cosmology, The same line of argument is ap- 
plied to creation. If finite substances are from the Divine 
Substance, then it is subject to change and corruption. 
But created substances are, in idea, eternal in the Divine 
mind. The Divine ideas are the immanent Word of God, 
eternal, and not the mere collected ideas of a created 
world : God Himself is the object as well as the subject. 

(4.) Psychology. In freedom of the will, distinguish 
volimtas jtisti from vol. coimnodi ; the latter is not free 
but necessitated ; the former, rectitudo voluntatis, chooses 
the good for its own sake. 

Evil has its origin in free will ; the rational creature 



I08 SCHOLASTICISM. 

can will to forsake righteousness ; actions, etc., are only 
evil in the evil will. 

(F.) Abelard^ PeMis, ''Palatinus Peripateticus!' (i) b. 
in Brittany (1079 A.D.), a pupil of Roscellinus, then of 
William of Champeaux, he soon became the most re- 
nowned lecturer and dialectician of his age. Until 112 1 
A.D., he taught at Paris in the Cathedral School (founda- 
tion of the Univ. of Paris,) etc. Crowds from all parts of 
Europe attended his lectures. His writings being con- 
demned by the Council of Soissons, he retired to the ora- 
tory of the Paraclete. Crowds of pupils followed him. In 
1 1 36 A.D., we find him again at Paris, but his rationalism 
was opposed by S. Bernard, and condemned by the Coun- 
cil of Sens (1140, A.D.) He appealed to Rome; but, 
on his way, stopped at Clugny, where, having recanted, 
and been reconciled to S. Bernard, he died, professing the 
Cath. faith. (1142, A.D.) 

(2.) Principle. Opposing his masters, he aimed to es- 
tabhsh a new school over realism and nominalism, and 
laid the foundation of '' conceptuahsm." Inspired by 
Aristotle, he taught a moderate nominalism, that nothing 
exists apart from the individual, and in it the individual only. 

Genera are formed by the mind ; a group of similar 
objects, on the ground of their similarity, being embraced 
in one common concept, which can then be predicated of 
them all. 

In his free interpretation of S. Ss. etc. {^^ Sic et 
Non ") A. is the founder of modern Christian rationalism. 

(3.) Ethics. Christian ethics are a reformation of the 
natural. Moral good and evil reside not in the act, but in 
the intention ; actions, as such, are indifferent ; (laying 
stress on the subjective side of morals.) 



FULL DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOLASTICISM. IO9 

(G.) Christian Mystics, of the twelfth cent. Two spe- 
cial principles may be distinguished : 

(i.) The mystic route to truth is by supernatural 
grace. 

. (2.) In place of the pure myst. of the Neo-P., the con- 
templative life is founded in love. 

(i.) 5. Bernard, of Clairvaux, (1091-1153, A.D.) 
" Doctor Melliflnus!' was a man of renowned activity in 
the church life of his age, and of widest influence. The 
route to illumination is {a) inward humility ; {b) love of 
God. Beholding the truth in his own spirit, man is 
raised above himself (ecstasy), an anticipation of the fu- 
ture life, when, not losing individual substance or person- 
ality, man will be " lost in God." 

(2.) Hugo, of St. Victor, being teacher there, was a 
man of great eloquence, and attractive beauty of thought. 
(1097-1141, A.D.) 

There is a threefold power of knowledge ; (a) cogita- 
tio ; ip) meditatio ; {c) contemplatio, corresponding with 
the threefold powers of the soul ; {a) directed to the sen- 
sible world ; {b) discursive reason ; {c) direct intuition of 
the ideal. 

The means to (6) are moral perfection in Christian love 
and withdrawal from the sensual. Through Divine grace, 
the soul then free and untrammelled, beholds Divine truth. 

Sin obscures ib) and blinds {c). 

3. Full Development of Scholasticism. 

(A.) Character and Causes. From the 13th to the 15th 
cent, is the golden age of Scholasticism ; the great uni- 
versities were founded ; the religious orders marked the 



no SCHOLASTICISM. 

energy of religious life ; architecture, poetry, etc., showed 
the power of a new, inventive, creative genius, (cf. Kugler, 
Hist. Sc, vol. II.) 

Three periods may be distinguished; (i) Conflict of 
nominalism and realism ; (2) triumph of realism ; (3) 
revival of nominalism. (Note the relations of these to 
politics, art, etc.) 

The characteristics are (i) a strictly scientific and 
logical method giving (ji) the question ; (h) arguments 
cont. and pro ; (^) solution categorical and syllogistic ; (^) 
answers to arguments against the solution. 

(2) Aristotelian iorms of thought are universal, his logic, 
his analytical method, applied to all subjects whatsoever. 

(3) Platonism, of S. Aug. and the earlier patristic 
writers in the background, yet modifying. Aristotelian con- 
cepts. 

In addition to the advance of Christendom in civiliza- 
tion, order, etc., etc., the special causes of this era, produc- 
tive and modifying, are 

(i) The physical, ethical, and metaphysical treatises 
of Aristotle, introduced through the Arabs, at first con- 
founded with forged works of Neo-Plat. cast, and condem- 
ned by the church (circ, 1205, A. D.), were, from 1235, A. 
D., generally adopted. (Note the influence of S. Thomas 

Aq.) 

(2) Influence of Arabian phil. ; the (metaphysical) 
works of Alfarabi, Avicenna, etc., were translated through 
the Spanish into Latin; and though the " Averroists " 
were opposed by christian philos. and condemned by the 
church, yet they gave an added impulse to thought, (vid. 
inf.) 

(3) yudaic influence ; e. g.y the Judaic School at 



ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY. Ill 

Cordova, which translated the genuine and spurious works 
of Arist. and the Peripatetics, from the Arabic into 
Hebrew and Latin : this led to other translations directly 
from the Greek ; of special influence on Christian phil. is 
Avicebron's '' Fons Vitce,'' (circ. 1050 A. D.) 

(B) Arabian Philosophy, was based on Aristotle, at 
first with Neo-Pl. elements, but later, it became more 
purely Aristotelian. A.'s physics were applied to medicine, 
(the chief Arab philos. being physicians,) and his logic 
developed for science, though opposed by the orthodox. 

A. was introduced through Syrian Christians under the 
Abassidae, (circ. 750 A. D.) along with the Timseus, Rep. 
and Lkws of Plato, and Proclus. 

(i) Alfarabi, taught at Bagdad (the chief school of the 
East) and at Damascus, (d. 950, A. D.) 

He proves the existence of God, from the principle 
that all change imphes a cause (Arist. Met. XI. 7), a first 
cause. He uses Neo-Plat. emanations to explain the world. 

He distinguishes in man potential intellect from vot)?- 
iizty.r-qTry.6c, which is through the operation of the Divine 
Intelligence. 

(2) Avicenna, (980-1037, A. D.) taught medicine and 
phil. at Ispahan. (Note his famed Ca7ton medicince) He 
develops Alfarabi, but follows Aristotle more closely. 

{a) Logic ; " Intellectiis in formis agit iLniversali- 
tatem!' Matter is the principle of the plurality of things ; 
the mind, of universality. 

Genera exist, («) ante res in the mind of God ; {f) in 
rebus ; Qf) post res, as conceived by abstraction in the 
human intellect. 

(F) Metaphysics. There must be a first cause, who is 
absolute unity, wisdom, life, power, will, etc. ; but the 



112 SCHOLASTICISM. 

world, time, motion, are eternal. (Arist.) The potential as 
rendered actual, is grounded in God ; God and the world 
are related as cause and effect ; neither exists without the 
other. 

God is the perpetual cause, the continual producer of 
the world, and this, not through will, but through His 
thought, the first emanation, the " first intelligence," 
containing actuality and potentiality. From this proceed 
the world-soul, ^ouq -(nrjrr/.og^ and human souls, forms of 
things, potentiality, matter. Evil is the necessary limita- 
tion of good in the material sphere. 

The object of God's knowledge and providence is not 
the individual, but the universal. 

(^) Psychology. The soul is the essential form of the 
body. (Arist.) The voD<r r.oir^xv/.6q is the same in all men, 
an immaterial being, not dependent on the body. By it 
potential intellect is rendered active, as forms are given 
to matter. This is through the sensuous presentation. 
Not all intellectual knowledge, however, is through this 
means, for the Nooq, Tiocyjr. also enlightens the soul with- 
out any sensuous medium ; " intellectiLS infiLsus!' 

Orthodoxy subsequently triumphed in the East, and 
phil. was transferred to Spain ; (12th cent.) 

(3) Averroes^ (/i) b. at Cordova, (i 126-1 198, A. D.) was 
a physician, mathematician, jurisprudent, etc. ; persecuted 
by the Orthodox, he was banished to Morocco. 

{b) Principle. In many points Avicenna's science is of 
individuals in their universal aspect. Forms, subsequently 
developed, are embryonically contained in matter, and 
developed by matter's innate power. (cf.Tyndall.) A. differs 
most from Avicenna in his 

{c) Psychology. Nous, not only active, but potential, is 



ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY. II 3 

one in all men, acting on all individual and passive intel- 
lects to develope voD? ^Trurryrc^o?-. 

Intelligible species are educed from the human soul by 
the. mental power of abstraction. Man's passive under- 
standing receives and prepares the sensuous phantasma for 
the active (common) intellect ; men differ only in the great- 
er or less perfection of the passive understanding. 

There is no essential difference between the human 
soul and that of brutes ; the former is a developement of 
the latter in the vis cogitativa, the power of distinguishing 
and comparing individual sensuous presentations. 

The individual nous exists after death only as an ele- 
ment *of the universal, which is an emanation from deity. 

Religion is to be supported by philosophy as typical of 
truth, the latter containing pure truth, the former, truth 
under an image. 

The influence of the Averroists was extended and powerful, 
maintaining, especially, a God of unknown attributes, perhaps a force 
in matter; hence arose questions similar to those raised through 
later developements of physical sciences ; is there a God, apart from 
nature, who developes it (teleology), or are all its powers in it work- . 
ing blindly? (cf. H. Spencer's Biology, pp. 234-336; Mivart's Gen. 
of Spec, p. 264.) 

Against phil. in the Mussulman world, were the ortho- 
dox theologians, " Motekallemin," (teachers of the word), 
and the mystics ; e. g. Algazel, (d. mi, A. D.) 

Against the Averroists, argued, with powerful dia- 
lectic, 

(4) William oi Auvergne (bishop of Paris, 1248, A. D., 
d. 1249) in his " De Universol' and '' De Anima'' based on 
Aristotle, with ideology from Plato's Tim. and Phaed. 

As Aristotle proves a first cause, so W. proves Good 



114 SCHOLASTICISM. 

and Being, unconditioned, original, existing, not by parti- 
cipation, but in and of itself, 

A world of intelligibles is known through intellect, as 
a. world of sensibles through sense. 

The archetype of these is God's Son. 

He gives metaphysical proof of the world's beginning, 
from potentiality and necessity. 

The soul is related to body, as the cithern-player to 
his cithern. 

(C.) yudaic Philosophy. Three parties may be dis- 
tinguished among the Mediaeval Jews : — 

(i) Cabalistic, the traditional party. Judaic Gnostics. 
The esoteric meaning of the O. Test, at first traditional 
from Moses, was afterwards to be found in the Ca- 
bala ; 

(2) Neo-Platonic, developed from the Cabala ; 

(3) Aristotelian, as a foundation for Jewish dogma, 
finding pure truth in phil., represented by images in reli- 
gion. This, as among the Mussulmans, created an an- 
tagonistic party. 

Moses Maimonides, (a) b. 1 135 A. D., at Cordova; 
studied Aristotle under Averroes ; was opposed by the 
Jews as heretical ; retired to Fez, and then to Cairo, as 
physician to the Sultan; d. 1204 A. D. He wrote 
'' More Nevochim," Dnctor perplexorum. 

{b) He aims to reconcile Aristotle with Judaic 
dogma. No attributes can be predicated of God. Such 
predicates either {a) indicate His different workings in 
the world, or {b) are purely negative ; e. g., wisdom, 
predicated of Him, asserts that He is not unwise, etc. 

M. opposes Aristotle concerning the eternity of mat- 
ter. 



JUDAIC PHILOSOPHY. II 5 

Towards Rev., he shows a rationalizing tendency. 
M. had ahnost unlimited influence over Jewish thought, 
and very great among Arab and Christian philos. 

(D.) Albertus, Magit., (i) b. in Swabia, (1193 A. D.); 
educated at Paris and Padua, he joined the Dom. Order ; 
in 1254 A. D., was Provincial in Germany ; he taught at 
Cologne and Paris ; he was bishop of Ratisbon (1260-2, 
A. D.), but returned to Cologne, and taught with greatest 
renown; (d. 1280); ''Doctor Universalis '^' commented on 
Aristotle ; wrote against Averroes, " De Unitate Intel- 
lecttts ; " composed Snmma Theologice, applying Aristo- 
tle's philos. to Rev. ; also, treatises on Nat. Hist. He was 
popularly reputed to be a magician. 

(2) Pidmiple. He distinguishes philos. from theol- 
ogy, the former based on reason, the latter on faith ; the 
former speculative, the latter practical. In relation to 
revealed truth, reason perfects faith, leads to faith, refutes 
its adversaries. 

(3) Metaphysics. Potentially, form is in matter, and is 
developed from it by an efficient cause. The form is the 
rational thought in matter, the work and the manifesta- 
tion of Intelligence ; as, conversely, through the form, 
things are intelligible. 

The universal exists in the form, not in the matter of 
things. It exists, then, (a) ante re^n, in the mind of 
God ; {h) in re ; {c) post rem, as a subjective concept in 
the human understanding. 

Theosophy. God is incomprehensible by intelligence, 
but not unknown by it, as the First Cause, differing from 
and exceeding all that is caused. Not only His being, 
but His essential attributes, may be partially known by 
reason through His works. 



Il6 . SCHOLASTICISM. 

That " God is," is also a proposition indirectly proved 
from the absurd and impossible conclusions resulting 
from its denial. 

(4) Physics, (a) Cosmology. Here he opposes Aris- 
totle ; matter is not eternal, for God has been proved abso- 
lute cause of all being. The formula, " ex nihilo nihil fit!' 
and the proofs offered, have force in physics, are appli- 
cable to secondary causes. The world, time, motion, had 
a beginning. 

(J)) Psychology. The spirituality of the soul is 
proved from its intellectual activity, which is not of a 
material nature ; from the simplicity of thought, from the 
freedom of the will. 

The rational soul is the essential form of the body, dif- 
ferentiating man from the beast. Active and potential 
intelligence are not separate principles, but its powers. 
The former abstracts intelligible forms from sensible 
things, and so renders them intelligible ; and thus the 
latter arrives at knowledge of the essence of these 
things. 

Freedo7n of the will consists in power of choice, not 
limited by any necessity. 

Consciejzce is the law of reason, which engages us to 
act or not to act ; " lex mentis habittis natitralis est 
quantum ad principia, acquisitus quantufn ad scita!' 

A. distinguishes from conscience the moral sense, 
" synteresisy' which is not a habit, but a potentia. His 
philos. principles, however, are more fully developed in 

(E.) 5. Thomas Aqidnas, who should be thoroughly 
studied as a key to Scholasticism, (i) He was born at Ac- 
quino, in the kingdom of Naples (1225 A. D.); connected 
with the Royal house of Hohenstaufen ; ed. at Monte- 



S. THOMAS AQUINAS. 11/ 

cassino and Naples ; entered the Dom. Order. He after- 
wards pursued his studies at Cologne and Paris, under 
Alb. M. He taught crowds of scholars at Cologne, 
Paris, Bologna, Naples, etc.; was summoned by Greg. IX. 
to the Council of Lyons, but died on the way (1274 A. D.); 
''Doctor Angelicus ;'' was canonized in 1323 A. D. 

His works are : Comment, on Arist., on the Sen- 
tences of Petr. Lomb., on S. Ss. ; ''De Veritate'' ''Sttmma 
contra Gentiles T ^^Summa Theol." etc., etc. 

S. Thom. A. is the Aristotle of the Middle Ages. 
Strict analysis was never carried further, and his influ- 
ence >has been permanent in thought, both in theol. and 
phil. 

(2) Principle. {a) He assumes Aristotle's concepts 
as sufficient and indispensable in all possible subjects, 
although slightly modified by Plato through S. Aug. 

{b) Reconciliation of reason and faith is, for the 
first time, fully attempted, by fixing with precision their 
respective limits ; and his determination has been per- 
manently accepted by Christian phil. Truth is twofold : 
(a) Natural, discovered and demonstrated by reason ; 
(/5) Supernatural, needing Rev. These are not different 
in essence, much less contradictory ; for both are 
grounded in the Divine Wisdom. If reason find argu- 
ments against the faith, they are probable or sophisti- 
cal. Reason can refute objections to (j5), and show that 
it is not opposed to («) or to reason ; it can also establish 
the credibility of Rev. Reason also offers us analogies, con- 
sequences which bring Rev. truth nearer to the specula- 
tive reason ; {e. g., the internal word and love in man) ; 
but the assent of faith is an act of will. {Su7n, TheoL 
I. Qu. I. 8). 



Il8 SCHOLASTICISM. 

{c) Relation of Phil, to Theol. Rev. assumes, re- 
veals certain natural truths, which, without it, would 
be discovered only by the few, and after long labor and 
search, and with liability to error through the limitations 
of reason, itself. (Sum. II. II. Qu. ii. 4.) These truths are 
prceambula jidei ; '' gi-atia natitram nontollity sed perficitT 
Hence, the distinction between phil. and theol. The 
former proceeds, a posterioin, from the creature to God ; 
the latter, by deduction, from God to His works. 

(3) Theory of Knozvledge. We begin with individu- 
als. The object produces in the subject an image of 
itself ; so that the subject, in a certain sense, resembles 
the object. This image, the species, is not that 
which, but that by which, the object is known. It is the 
formal principle of knowledge : {a) of sensuous knowl- 
edge (sensible species) ; {U) of intellectual (intelligible 
species) ; (a) represents the sensuous phenomenon, {h) 
the intelligible " esse." But " omnis nostra cognitio intel- 
lectualis incipit a sensu " (Summa I. Qu. I. 9), and " nihil 
sine phantasntate intelligit aniinar Thus, the fact is ac- 
counted for, that lesions of a bodily organ [the brain] 
interfere with intellectual operations, since the former is 
essential to imagination, etc. (Sum. I. Qu, Ixxxiv. 7 ; 
Cont. Gent. I. 3). There are no innate ideas ; the mind 
in itself resembles a '•^tabula rasa ;'^ knowledge of prin- 
ciples is, indeed, a natural " habit ; " but the terms which 
these principles contain can only be known through in- 
tell. spec, received from phantasmata. 

The primary object of intellectual knowledge is the 
intelUgible in the sensible ; abstraction is made by the 
intellect from the phantasmata in three degrees ; {a) of 
materia signata, or individualis, the principle of individu- 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. I IQ 

ation, to get the species of a natural thing ; e.g., "these 
bones'' etc. 

{b) Of mat. comimmis, or corporeal matter, as in 
mathematical forms ; but not of mat. mtelligibilis, or 
substance. The former has sensible qualities, heat, 
cold, etc.; the latter has quantity. Thus is abstracted 
mat. intellig. individiialis. 

{c.) Of mat. intelL cominiuiis, as in ens, one, power, act. 

This is direct knowledge ; indirect, is the soul's knowl- 
edge of itself in thought and reflection. Finally, the mind 
raises itself, mediately, to the knowledge of God. 

Aqiiinas distinguishes the active from the passive intel 
lect ; the former, by abstraction, produces the intell. spec, 
the latter thus obtains the concept. 

The complement of these is ratio, the power of pro- 
ceeding to new truths through deduction on the basis of 
principles supplied as above. 

We do not see the truth immediately in God ; He is 
the last, not the first term of knowledge. 

Truth and falsity are primarily in the intelligence when 
making propositions : the former adds to being {ens) its re- 
lation to the mind. 

(4.) Metaphysics (Aristotelian.) Primary substance is 
the individual ; its principles, in corporeals, matter and 
form. In the concept of matter, {a) negation, {b) poten- 
tiality of determination, of actuality ; form is the principle 
of determ., of actuality. 

Forms are {ci) substantial, constituting the substance 
in its esse ; {b) accidental, giving outward determination. 

Forms also are (d) material, or inherent ; {b) subsist- 
ent, which can be actual without matter, are immaterial, 
spiritual. 



120 SCHOLASTICISM. 

Distinguish between essentia and esse: a determined 
essence {stibstantia) needs an efficient cause to render it 
actual; this- gives it being. Esse: essentia:: actuality: 
potentiality. 

SpiritiLal beings have not matter and form, but essence 
and being ; the concept of these, their determinate be- 
ing is their form ; whereas in material things, the essence 
is of matter and form, and, since many things have like 
form and matter, the essence is the universal, the qnidditas 
of individuals. The common essence of many individuals 
is actual in these only so far as it shares their quiddity. 

The .principle of individuation is the quantitatively 
limited matter, materia signata, with its individual acci- 
dents, as opposed to the materia communis. 

Spiritual beings do not admit of a universal concept. 

By abstraction, we can consider the universal alone, 
which, as such, exists only in the mind ; objectively, only 
in individuals, in re^ which have a like essence, and of 
which the univ. can be predicated. (Sum. I. Qu. Ixxxv. 2.) 
It is ante rem, in the Divine mind (I. Qu. xv.) ; post rem in 
the human, through abstraction. 

Eternity is life, unlimited, " tota simzd,'^ (prior and 
posterior non-existent), immutable, perfect and complete at 
once. Time is apprehended by number applied to motion. 
The difference between the two is not per accidens, but 
per se. 

Theosophy. Intuitive knowledge of God is not pos- 
sessed in this life ; proofs are needed. Rejecting the 
(Ambrosian) argument from the concept to objective being 
(Sum. I. Qu. ii. i), the only valid arg. is, d post, from the 
works of nature to their First Cause. 

{a) There must be a first cause of motion ; whatever 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 121 

is moved, is moved by another ; for motion is change 
from potentiality to actuaUty. 

{b) Effects such as we see, must have a first efficient 
cause. 

{c) The accidental, contingent, conditioned {pos- 
sibile), depends on the necessary, unconditioned. 

{d) There are grades of perfection in earthly things ; 
this implies an absolutely perfect. 

{e) Nature is directed towards intelligible ends, 
while it has riot intelligence. (Sum. I. Qu. ii. 3.) But all 

this gives inadequate concept of God : " sensibilia sunt 

ejfecU-^s caiLscBvuUUiLin non ceqitantesr (Cont. Gen. i. 3.) 

In God is no composition of matter or form, nor any 
other. He is pure actuality ; for potentiality, in any 
sense, would imply an actuating cause. 

In Him essence and being are one. 

In Him is no imperfection, because no potentiality ; all 
perfections which earthly things possess, being from Him, 
are in Him, one and indivisible. 

From God as Absolute Intelligence follows, neces- 
sarily, the concept of God as Absolute Will. He wills 
what is not Himself freely, because it is not necessary to 
His perfection and beatitude. From this follows His 
Omnipotence. 

His Providence is the ordering of all things, both uni- 
versal and singular, with reference to an end, (opposes 
Maimonides and Averroes), for it extends as far as His 
knowledge and causality. 

The casual is with respect to a particular cause, not to 
the universal. 

Ills, corruptions, defects, are permitted in particular 
things, contributing to the greater good of the whole. 



122 SCHOLASTICISM. 

(5.) Physics. Cosmology, {a) Reason can prove a 
creation ex nihilo., (matter not pre-existent or eternal,) 
but (F) we knov/ only by faith, the limited duration of the 
world, {Esse per se siibsistens is one, sc. God), though {c) 
it cannot be proved to have had a beginning. (Sum. I. 
Qu. xlvi. I, 2.) The proposition {ci) follows from the 
principle that God is the First Cause of all being, i. e., 
not only of form but of matter. And since matter is not in 
God, it must be His creation. As for (^), ex nihilo does 
not necessarily involve ''post niJiiliimr (c) is against 
Aristotle ; if, of necessity, the world have no beginning, 
then of necessity it exists ; but in what shall this neces- 
sity be grounded } (Vid. Stockl in loc") 

Optimism. The end of creation is the manifestation 
of God's perfection ; He is the final cause of all things 
(Sum. I. Qu. xliv., 4) ; and hence all things are ordered, 
with different degrees of good, for the perfect good of the 
whole. 

Evil in parts (deficiency of good), heightens the excel- 
lency of the whole. 

The world is one, both in correlation of all parts to one 
another, and in one order relatiyely to the one efficient 
cause. 

Psychology, is Aristotelian developed : 

Genera Potentiarum Animce. (Note ; distinguish in 
the mind {a) faculties, (b) habits, {c) acts. 

(a) Vegetativ. ; («) nutritiv. ; (/5) augmentat. ; (r) gene- 
rativ. 

Q) Sensitiv. ; (a) exterior, (five) ; (/5) interior, which 
has four powers, (1.) sens, communis, (H.) imagination, 
(HI.) memory, (IV.) vis cestimativa, of particulars as 
hurtful or beneficial, useful or useless, etc. 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 1 23 

(<f) Appetitiv. ; («) sensitiv., is (I.) concupiscible, 
by which the mind pursues the agreeable or useful, 
and avoids the hurtful ; (II.) irascible, by which the mind 
resists what hinders the one or aids the other, {e. g. anger, 
hope, fear, etc.) : its object is difficult good; (/S) rationale, 
^^ actus appetitus intell.,'^ Vohtntas \ (Love, etc., equivocal 
terms.) Its object is the good as a known good. Love 
is the root and ground of all other emotions of its class. 
{d) Motivum, according to place. 
{e) Intellecthmin, (souls of this order include the low- 
er genera) ; («) passive {possibile), receiving species of 
things and retaining them ; (/^) active, abstracting species 
from images and rendering the potentially intelligible, ac- 
tually so ; cognizing universal forms. 

Included in (,3) are (I.) iutellectus, " cognoscens sim- 
plici inttiitul' (II.) i^atio, " disairrendo de tmo in alitidj 
though not as separate faculties, /^/^/^//<^, of the mind. 

The intellect requiring phantasmata which are prepared 
by the sensitive power, which has its organ in the body, 
the body [brain] is fatigued in tho-^jight, per accidens. 

The soul (sensitive) is the form of the body. 
Immortality. The soul, as an intellectual principle, is 
incorporeal, '' forma per se subsistens',' therefore incorrup- 
tible ; not so the soul of brutes, which is sensitive, not intel- 
lectual. Of its five genera of faculties some are only in it 
as their subject, these remain after death ; others, which 
are of the compound being man, do not. 

Against the Averroists, an intellectual principle is in 
each individual man. 

The sensitive soul is ex traduce, not created ; proof is, 
it is not res subsistens, but the form of a composite sub- 
stance, the animal. But the intellectual soul is created by 



I2zj SCHOLASTICISM. 

God, 7'es siibsistens, for active virtue existing in matter {in 
seinine) cannot produce immaterial effects. (Note that 
man's soul, <?;/^ essence, possesses the lower powers, and 
becomes the form of the embryo when it is ready to re- 
ceive it : the veget-sensit. form then disappearing.) 

(6.) Ethics, {a) Good and being are identical, sec. 
rem, but differ in thought, for the former contains the con- 
cept of .the desirable (Sum. I., Qu. v., i) ; every being, as 
being, is good ; when called evil, it is so called as wanting 
something (privation). 

The good is («) konesttim, (,5) titile, (r) delectabile. 

Moral good in acts, is derived from {ri) the genus, 
what they have of the plenitude of entity, (evil is defici- 
ency). (Sum. II. I., Qu. xviii. 1-4) ; 

(;'5) The species, the object in its relation to the agent 
(convenient) ; 

(j) The circumstances ; 

(^) The end, extrinsic. 

Only voluntary acts are moral ; they are formally good 
or bad according to their end ; materially, according to the 
outward act. But since the quality of good in the will 
depends on the object offered to it by reason, (moral light, 
conscience,) the same goodness depends, secondarily, on 
reason itself ; primarily, on eternal law, which directs rea- 
son. 

ib) Summum bonuin. All men seek beatitude as their 
ultimate end, and this cannot consist in any created good. 
God is its cause or object ; its essence is in the speculative 
intellect. In special sciences is found only a participation 
of this perfect beatitude ; its perfection is in the Vision 
of God, " Cognitio perfecta intelligibilis finish Joy is 
concomitant to this, the rest of the loving in the loved. 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 12$ 

In the beatitude of this Hfe (imperfect) a well-ordered 
body is needful, since speculative intellect makes use of 
it. Outward goods also are serviceable, as instruments 
for the works of an active and contemplative life, which 
perfect this earthly beatitude. 

(c) Free will. God's will is always accomplished; 
but as First Cause. He makes some second causes ne- 
cessary, others contingent. He does not will sins to be 
committed, but wills to permit them. 

Mans will is not under necessity of co -action (exter- 
nal compulsion), but is determined to the means which 
are necessary to its ends ; and, by natural necessity, to its 
end, beatitude ; and whatever in general is natural to man. 
It is determined to the good as good, but not of necessity 
to this or that good. Freedom of choice {liberiun arbit- 
rimn) is related to will, as ratio to intellectus ; the former 
viewing various things as means to an end, or obstacles to 
it ; the latter, simply the end. Brutes have not choice, 
for sensitive appetites determine to one object only. 

The voluntary is that whose principle is inward (this 
need not be the first principle), along with knowledge of 
the end sought for. The will seeks the good only, or appa- 
rent good ; the intellect {int. practictis) moves the will 
not as efficient cause, but by presenting to it its object. 
So also the sensitive appetite moves the will ''expatte ob- 
jectir In willing the end, the will moves itself to will 
the means. 

The primary exterior mover of the will is God only ; 
yet not by coi^tpulsion (contrary to the motion of the will) ; 
for then, willing and not willing would be coincident. 
God, as first efficient cause, does not determine it to will 
this or that. Its moral goodness depends ultimately on 



126 SCHOLASTICISM. 

its formal conformity to the Divine will ; it may be good 
when not materially so conformed. 

The order of will and action is («) simple volition 
(determined) of the end ; (/3) intuition of the end by cer- 
tain means ; (j-) deliberation (rational) concerning the 
means ; (5) consent (rational and voluntary) to the means ; 
(c) choice (rat. and vol.) of some one means ; (C) use (vol.) 
of the means ; (>?) execution ; (»'>) fruition. 

Acts of the will can be directed (imperati) by rea- 
son ; the latter can command itself, and assent or dissent 
in the case of contingent (not demonstrated) truths. Acts 
of the sensitive appetite are partly subjected to reason, 
and partly follow the condition of the bodily organs. 

{d) Moral sense {synderesis) is not a special faculty 
{potent id), but a habitns of the practical reason, giving 
intuitive knowledge of primary practical principles (Sum. 
I., Qu. Ixxix). Conscience is the act of this habit, by which 
we practically apply this knowledge. Even erring reason 
creates obligation ; and will at variance with it, is evil, if 
the error is voluntary ; otherwise, if it is involuntary. 
Good will alone does not constitute a good act, but due 
matter and circumstances, determined by reason. 

{e) Viftne is '' good mental habit by which one lives 
rightly." (See Arist., def. of habitns). 

The four cardinal virtues are grounded in four sub- 
jects ; in practical reason, (a) prudence, which is distin- 
guished from the other intellectual virtues (not moral), sa- 
pientia, sciejitia, ijitellectus, in having contingent (not 
necessary) principles, derived from education and experi- 
ence. 

(/S) Justice is grounded in the will, a perpetual fixed 
will to render to all their dues ; metaphorically, it is ap- 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 12/ 

plied, also, to the parts of a man's own nature. (Arist.) 
The commutative, is of voluntary and involuntary ex- 
changes, as passions and actions ; it implies restitution. 
It includes religion, piety, gratitude, etc. Against it is the 
vice which- injures a neighbor in his person, those join- 
ed to him, or his possessions. 

(y) Temperance is in the concupiscible part of the 
Tjis sensit. ; courage, in the irascible. Passions in themselves 
are not morally good or evil, but only as subject to reason 
and will, or according as their object is rational or not. 
These virtues are grounded, not perfected, in man by 
nature. 

The theological virtues are divinely infused for a su- 
pernatural end, a second beatitude above and beyond 
man's nature ; their object is God : (a) faith, for cogni- 
tion of supernatural truth, perfecting the speculative in- 
tellect ; 

(,5) hope, for the willing of this supernatural beati- 
tude ; 

(r) charity, for spiritual union with the source of it 

Virtues are also divided (Neo-Plat.) into («) political, 
(/9) purifying, (r) exemplary, i. e. after the Divine pattern. 
(11. I. Qu.lxi. 5.) 

(/) Evily the privation of good, is, in voluntary agents, 
(a) mahim poencs, privation in the agent himself ; 
(/5) malum ctilpcs, privation in his actions, either ne- 
gation or defect of due manner and order. God is, per ac- 
cidens, the cause of the former, not of the latter. Hence 
it follows that there is no 

Suinmum maluni^ the cause of all evils ; (evil, privation, 
has no terminus). The assumption of two principles 
arose from considering particular causes of particular ef- 



128 SCHOLASTICISM. 

fects, without regarding the sum of all being : what was 



hurtful, per accidens, to another, was regarded as hurtful 
in itself. (J. S. Mill.) 

Vice is against the nature of man because it excludes 
the order of reason. Sins, acts against order, are (a) 
against God, (/5) against self, (r) against neighbor. 

Sin. Man, like everything else, seeks the good ; sin is 
in corruption or disorder of man's principles of action ; 
{a) intellectual, sins of ignorance; (/5) appet. sens., of pas- 
sion ; (y) of will, disordered in loving the less good more 
than the greater, sins of malice or evil will. 

Mortal sin can be in («) will, (/S) reason, (i) not knowing 
what it can and ought, (ii) not duly governing inferior 
powers. 

Passions cannot directly control the will, but only by 
distracting or misleading the judgment. 

The sinful act as act is from God (material part), the 
formal part (deficiency) which makes it sin, is not. He 
is the cause of blindness of reason and hardness of heart, 
by withdrawing grace. 

Good and evil actions justly merit retribution, either 
from individuals or from society; the same holds good 
with respect to God, as He is the proper end of all ac- 
tions, and as He is Ruler of the Universe. 

{g') Law is founded on reason, not on will, for reason 
is the rule and measure of human acts ordained for a 
common good (since a part is for the whole, and man is a 
part of society), either by the community or one man 
^^ vicein miiltitiLdinis gerensT (H. I. Qu. xc. i, 2, etc.) 

In the most general sense, law is 
(«) eternal, in the Divine Mind, reason governing 
the universe, the principle of Providence; Will and rea- 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. 1 29 

son in God are one ; He is reason. Fortuitous things, so 
called, are under higher law ; 

(/5) natuj^al, in us, participating the eternal ; by it 
good and evil are discerned : a natural inclination to due 
act and end ; the primary, self-evident principles of prac- 
tical reason, that good is to be sought, and evil avoided ; 
sc. (i) good of nature in general, law of self-preservation ; 
(ii) of animal nature, as sexual love and care of children ; 
(iii) rational, as that ignorance is to be shunned, not to 
offend others, etc. This is one law for all nations, in its 
common, unchangeable principles, not equally known, 
however, in its remote deductions, and it may be depraved 
by passion, evil customs, and bad natural dispositions : 
it is the foundation of all moral positive laws ; 

(/-) human, in particulars, by probable, contingent deduc- 
tions, from («) and (/5) ; as determined to special cases the 
declaration of jus ; (i) jus gentium, direct deductions from 
the law of nature concerning man as man ; (ii) jits civile, 
particular determinations in each state; these are (i) 
moral or (2) positive, pertaining to Divine cidtus (ceremo- 
nial), or relating to man's neighbors (judicial). 

Human laws are to restrain the evil, especially in what 
injures others : if just, they bind conscience ; not so the 
unjust, except to avoid scandal and tumult, and not at ah 
those which contravene the natural. Authority, divinely 
given, does not extend to unequal or unjust burdens ; the 
law of common sense is higher, for no human law but has 
exceptions, and the spirit of it is. to be sought for, 

ip) Divine, positive, promulgated for man's eternal 
beatitude as a supernatural end. 

The State is best in which, by popular voice, the best 
are chosen to rule, all having a share in the government 



130 SCHOLASTICISM. 

by choosing and being eligible ; the blending of mon- 
arch}^, aristocracy, and democracy ; for by this, peace and 
patriotism are best secured. (Note S. Thomas' liberalism.) 

The use of natural things is, by nature, not in society 
but in individuals ; still they are bound to hold them for 
the common good : in extreme necessity any one may, 
without violating natural justice, use another's possessions. 

{Ji) Prayer. Human affairs are under Div. Pro v., not 
necessity ; prayer is not useful to change the Div. Mind, 
but God has disposed effects, has appointed from what 
causes, and in what order they shall come ; among which 
causes are human acts — prayers. These, then, are to be 
used according to Divine command, as other secondary 
means are, which are ordained by God as conditions of a 
certain result, in order that man may deserve to receive 
what God fore-ordained before the world was. 

(F.) S. Bonaventiira, John Fidanza, (i) (i 221-1274, 
A.D.), b. in Tuscany, a Franciscan, studied and taught at 
Paris, general of his order ; wrote besides Comment, on 
the Sent. Petr. Lomb., " Speculum AnimcE',' De Septem 
Gradibus Coiiteniplationis, ^^ Itinerarium mentis ad Deum!' 
etc. ^^ Doctor Seraphiczcs." 

(2.) B. is a mystic of the school of the St. Victors ; 
ecstacy is the end of science and virtue, the union of the soul 
with God, a (supernatural) love which unites the loving 
with the Infinite, so that the former is lost in the latter. 

Plato through S. Aug. is preferred to Aristotle ; A.'s 
doctrine of the ethical mean is only valid in the common 
life. The way of contemplation is by grace on God's 
side, on man's by holiness and prayer ; the three principal 
steps are, {a) the outer world, which bears the mark {vesti- 
gium) of God ; {b) the inner, or the soul, the image of 
God ; (r) immediate intuition of God Himself. (Stockl.) 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. I3I 

(G.) Roger Bacon, (i) (1214-1294, A.D.), b. in Somer- 
setshire, Eng., a Franciscan, at Univ. of Paris, taught at 
Oxford ; devoted to mathematics, physics, languages ; 
suspected by his order, and forbidden to teach ; Clement 
IV. removed the interdict ; Bacon wrote for him, opus 
majus, op. ininus^ op. tevtmm. After C.'s death, he was 
imprisoned, as a sorcerer, in his convent ; his works treat 
of optics, astronomy, mathematics. ^' Doctor niirabilis!' 

(2.) Experience, (outward, inward,) is necessary to 
knowledge ; demonstration, without it, gives not certainty, 
but only connection of premises and conclusion. 

(H^.) Dims Scotus, (i) founder of the Scotists, oppo- 
nents of the Thomists, b. at Duns, Irel. (1266 A.D.), 
Franciscan, taught at Oxf., Paris, Cologne ; d. there, 
(1308 A.D.) " Scotia me genuit, Angliame siiscepit, Gallia 
me doctdt, Colonia me tenet!'' A most subtle dialectician. 
His philos. is fully presented in Comment, on Sent. Petr. 
Lomb. ; he wrote also comments on Aristotle, " De Renim 
principio',' etc. " Doctor subtilis!' 

(2.) Aristotelian, though not so strict a follower, as S. 
Thomas, ' His genius is rather critical than constructive ; 
questioning with extreme subtilty, the arguments by which 
Thomism is sustained. 

The verities of faith rest on the will of God, and faith 
on the will of man. 

(3.) Matter is actuality, being, in the order of nature, 
prior to form, which simply determines its actuality. All 
created beings have matter and form, (God only being 
pure form,) the former being unlimited, potential, the lat- 
ter, the principle of individuation, actuality. The '' primo- 
prima'^ matter (formless) is the same in (created) bodies 
and spirits ; the 2do-Ima'' is subject to generation and 



132 SCHOLASTICISM. 

decay; the ^^ Jtio-lma'^ is that which is shaped by the 
artist^ having already received its natural form. 

The universal, then, is not the form of things, but is 
objectively real, distinct from the individual, though exist- 
ing only in it, potential existence, the ground of unity 
among individuals. Positive determinations being added, 
first specific, then individual, we reach the last (individual) 
form, hcBccitas ; '•' qiwdciuique ens est iji se qnid, et habet 
in se aliquem gradicm determinatum in entibttsy But if 
this latter constituted the only reality, there would be only 
singulars, but no unity of nature. 

Thus the universal is prior but undetermined, and can 
be thought {distinctio rationis^ as it is, {a parte rei,) poten- 
tial being. The last form is not a thing, i^es, nor a mere 
concept, it is a formal reality. 

God can be known, a posteriori^ as {a) the First cause, 
{b) the Final cause, {c) perfect Being, unity. 

S. applies his metaphysical principle ; (vid. supr.) 
" DivincB peifectiones distinguntttr a parte rei^ non realiter 
qiddeni, sed formaliterr 

Reason cannot prove that God is Almighty ; nor, 

(4.) the creation of the world out of nothing. Free 
will in God is His supreme law. Against S. Thomas, who 
said that God acted conformably to His nature and essen- 
tial attributes, S. saw in God nothing to be a reason for 
creation, etc. In strict logical consistency is his 

Psychology ; There is a unity of nature in the univer- 
sal, as a "formal reality," among souls, as, in the individ- 
ual soul, in its faculties. 

The immortality of the soul cannot be proved ; it is of 
faith. 

The will is superior to the intellect ; its freedom is an 



DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM. 1 33 

absolute indifferentism, undetermined by its object which 
is " naturaliter agens " i. e. with necessity. The will can 
direct the intellect to an object, or turn it away. " Vo- 
limtati, etiam quando producit hoc velle, non repttgnat op- 
posituin velle ; " "potentia ad sticcessionem oppositomm." 
Even in perception, the intellect is active under the will. 
(5,) Moral law, then, is founded on the will of God ; 
the good is good because God commands it. 

4. Decline of Scholasticism. 

The 14th and 15th centuries made no further progress 
in phil. ; but to the two Schools Thomist and Scotist, 
" realists " and " formalists," were added, the Nominalist, 
(revived) and, (by reaction), the Mystic, both wide spread 
and vigorous, the former tending to empiricism and skep- 
ticism, the latter, equally, to rejection of all phil, although 
at first, starting from scholasticism to reach the people in 
popular forms : (German Mystics). 

Scholastic forms were growing more and more careless 
or barbarous, stiff or tasteless ; unity of thought and aim 
being lost in subtle distinctions and verbal quibbles, vic- 
tory over an antagonist being sought instead of truth. 

(A.) Nominalist. William of Occam, may represent 
the school ; (i) b. Surrey, Eng., joined the Franciscans, a 
disciple of Duns Scotus, taught in Paris under Philip le 
Bel, and took his side in the controversy with Boniface 
VIII. ; later he sought the protection of the Emp. Louis 
of Bavaria against the pope ; " tti me defendas gladio, ego 
te defendam calamo ;'' d. at Munich, (1347 A.D.) He 
wrote Summa logices. Questions on Physics, on the Sen- 
tences, etc. ; wrote also on the Eccles. power ; " Venerabi- 
lis inceptor," " Doctor invincibilisr 



134 SCHOLASTICISM. 

(2.) Principle, and theory of knowledge. All know- 
ledge-begins with sense-perception : this is intuitive knowl- 
edge. The act of abstraction is a spontaneous act follow- 
ing two perceptions, and is knowledge of the same objects 
in an indeterminate way, the concept being a sign of either 
of them ; but " Scientia est de rebiLS singiUaribus',' for sen- 
sation gives particular objects only. Sensible and intelligi- 
ble species are equally denied ; the object and the sense- 
perception are sufficient, (cf. Reid), and '^ entia non snnt 
multiplicanda prcEter necessitateinr Image and concept 
are natural signs of the only realities, particular objects. 

Neither Thomism, Scotism, nor conceptualism will 
bear the canon " entia non sunt, etc!' for abstraction does 
not eliminate a reality, but only generates a sign of it in 
the thinking mind. 

Words. Terms are arbitrary signs of signs, i. e., of con- 
cepts. The universal is the undetermined concept, " signi- 
ficans itnivoce plura singularia^' the result of abstracting 
knowledge : as a thought, it is as singular as any other. 
Genus is a concept applicable to more, species, to fewer, 
individuals. 

(3.) No theological dogmas are demonstrable ; even 
God's existence and unity are matters of faith. For 
reason, there may be more than one world, more than 
one prime mover ; finite effects can only conclude, ration- 
ally, a finite cause. 

We know God, not in His existence, but in His attri- 
butes, which are concepts or signs, Avhose difference is not 
grounded in the nature of His Being : " eos conceptus 
prcedicainus non pro se., sed pro Deo ; " " licet eniin hi C07i- 
ceptus dicant aliquid Dei, nullus tamen realiter dicit quod 
est DeusT 



NOMINALISTS. 1 35 

Ideas in God are the thought of individuals ; the im- 
perfect unUmited concept, the universal, can only be 
known as a product of our thought. 

The doctrine of the Trinity is realistic, opposed to 
reason, rests on faith merely. 

(4.) The vS^?//cannotbe proved to be an immaterial, incor- 
ruptible substance ; it is not the only essential form of the 
body, there is 'd}i'$>o forma corp or eitatis. The intellectual and 
sensitive souls are not one ; for the latter has extension, 
is joined circumscriptive yssiXh the body; the former has not 
extension, is joined diffiiiitive. As with bodies, so with the 
soul, we know not the substance, but (intuitively) qualities, 
as acts of willing, thinking, pleasures, etc. 

(5.) Good is simply what God wills: '' adeo nt miUata 
ed vohuttate, quod sanctum et jiistum est, possit evadere 
injiLstum. (On O. See Br. Quarterly, July, 1872; Jan. 

1874.) 

yohn Bnridan, Rector of the Univ. of Paris in 1327, 
A.D., a pupil of Occam, developed nominalistic logic, and 
offered a theory of the will (intellectual determinism) in 
his logical treatises, and Questions on Arist. In the for- 
mer, he sought a ready means of finding the middle term, 
^^ pons asinoriLmr In the latter, the will is determined to 
the judgment of the higher good ; if motives are equally 
balanced, the will cannot decide to act: (the ass between 
the bundles of hay). How then is the will free } It is not so 
in the instant of judgment, but it may be at another when 
that judgment is not in the mind : or it can turn the judg- 
ment from the higher good to the lower ; or it can delay 
its decision of a given case, and the judgment of the mind 
may change. 

Nominalism, strenuously opposed in many quarters, 



136 SCHOLASTICISM. 

was forbidden in the Univ. of Paris, (1340 A.D., etc,,) but 
at the opening of the 15 th Cent., Pierre d'Ailly (nomi- 
nalist) was chancellor. Louis XL (1473) issued a new de- 
cree against it, abrogated in 1483. 

The Thomists, e. g. Archb. Bradwardine, of Canter- 
bury, maintained the cause of realism, especially in the 
Dominican Schools, arguing, 

(i.) Nature chiefly aims at and preserves species ; 

(2.) Human laws recognize the human race as essen- 
tially one ; 

(3.) The goods we seek are changeable, there is 2. sum, 
boil., Hheir unity. 

(On the fruits of nominalism in art, in tlie 1 5th Cent., see Lubke, 
Vol. II. ^. ^. Donatello, p. 167: Note the decline of poetry, and 
architecture.) 

(B.) Mysticism : Under this head may be arranged a 
group of thinkers, widely different in character, though 
united in a ground of extreme realism, and having in com- 
mon an ever increasing distrust of scholasticism, a despair 
of reason, a refuge in higher intuitions. (See Br. Quarter- 
ly, Oct. 1874). 

Earliest, most thoroughly scientific in form, and of wide 
spread and permanent influence, is 

(i.) Eckharty {a) (b. at Strasburg.? circ. 1250 A. D.) 
joined the Dominicans, taught and preached through Ger- 
many ; was made general Vicar of his order : d. 1329 A.D. ; 
Twenty-eight theses were condemned in papal bull. (See 
Ueberweg, v. I.) 

(J)) Principle, follows Dionys. Areop. and Erigena, 
tending (unconsciously) to emanistic pantheism. The 
inner ground of man's soul is Divine, a ''spark" of Deity; 



MYSTICISM. 137 

knowledge is a real union of subject and object. The 
soul's highest power is an immediate intuition of the 
*' Godhead " transcending the determinate. 

{c) Theosophy : The Absolute is impersonal, concealed 
ever from thought ; of the " Godhead " no predicates may 
be used ; It is hidden in eternal darkness. In the act of 
self-knowledge, God is developed as the Trinity, the form 
of " Godhead," which beholds itself with love ; the sub- 
ject is the Father, the object is the Son, the love is the S. 

Sp. _ 

God is the essence of all essences, which are ever in 
Him ; in sending forth His Son, He sends forth all things, 
(idea] world). In space and time, natura natiLrata, 
are the Three Persons of the Trinity, eternal as the world 
is, but in natura non naturata is only the " Godhead." 

{d) Cosmology : Apart from God, the world is non- 
entity ; God is in all things, and is all things, for creatures 
have no essence except God. Yet He is not nature, but 
above it, for the world of space and time is created out of 
nothing. The motive of creation is God's goodness, 
which necessarily extends itself ; and, by the same neces- 
sity, creation is continuous, eternal. Different from this, 
as the realizing of the ideal by the artist, is the creation 
out of nothing, in time. 

{e) Psychology : In man's soul are three parts ; (/) the 
external senses ; (/S) empirical understanding, and the ap- 
petitive faculty ; (7') memory, will, and reason. There are, 
then, three kinds of cognition ; (^v) sensible ; {f) rational ; 
(r) supra-rational ; only the latter reaches the whole truth, 
and, with true knowledge, all images, instructions, dogmas, 
cease ; for the ground of the soul is a Divine image, free 
from all activities, the organ of mystic contemplation, 



138 SCHOLASTICISM. 

which sees pure being, the " Godhead," unconscious of 
self : this alone is immortal. 

{f) Ethics, is the end of all wisdom, that man, by di- 
rect intuition, may arrive at absolute rest in union with 
the Infinite, the " Godhead." This is the deification of man 
as the Son of God, made one with the eternal Son ; for 
God became man that man might become God ; this, how- 
ever, is not annihilation. Yet E. is not antinomian ; the 
stillness of reason, in this life, is not inconsistent with use 
of the faculties which belong to the earthly nature. 
The conditions of this oneness with God are, 

{a) Freedom from sin, entire, perfect ; then only 
the will is perfectly free, it wills only what God wills, the 
good. Moral laws are for the imperfect ; the perfect is 
free from them, being above them ; he is not virtuous, he 
is virtue's self ; 

(z^") Withdrawal from all outward things into the 
soul ; moral acts are only a step towards this ; better is 
holy rest; (Quietism.) 

{y) Death to self and all its powers, passions, affec- 
tions, will, reason, that God may speak, act in man : man 
must cease to act for a reward ; he is " deceased," and so, 

Qd) Unification with God is accomplished ; man is 
not only the adopted son of God, he is one with the eter- 
nal Son. This is the (necessitated) emanent begetting of 
the (immanent) eternal Son of God. 

(2.) yo/m Tauler, popular preacher at Strasburg and 
Cologne, (d. 1361, A. D.), did much to bring before the 
people the mysticism of Eckhart. Natural light of reason 
gives no true knowledge, it must be renounced for the 
mystic light of grace. 

(3.) Author of the " German Theology, " (14th or 15th 



MYSTICISM. 139 

cent) ; self-love is the root of all sin ; God's love, of all 
good ; self, ego, must be wholly renounced, so man is dei- 
fied. (Note influence on Luther and the German Re- 
formation.) 

The " brothers of the Common Life " gave practical 
form to German Mysticism. (See also '' De Imitatione 
Chris ti!') 

Among philos. less purely mystic, but with marked 
tendencies thitherward may be placed, 

(i.) Gerso7i, {a) ( 1 363-1429, A. D.) was chancellor of 
the Univ. of Paris ; took an active part at the Council of 
Constance ; was banished by the Duke of Burgundy for 
debouncing the murder of the Duke of Orleans, and found 
a refuge in Bavaria ; subsequently entered the cloister at 
Lyons, and taught little children. G. was a man of uni- 
versal learning ; but though he attempted a reconciliation 
of realism and " terminism " (nominalism), his distrust of 
human powers found utterance in his " Mystic Theology, 
speculative and practical," ''De Ilhiminatiojie Cordis,'' etc. 
{b) True science is that of the religious sentiment, 
the immediate intuition of God by the soul ; this makes 
even the fool a true philos. (Cousin, Hist. Gen. Phil. c. 
V.) 

(2.) Petrarch, (i 304-1 374, A. D.) who, towards the 
close of his life, abandoned profane studies for the con- 
templative phil. and wrote " De Contemptu Mtmdi,'' " de 
Vita Solitaria,'^ etc. 

(3.) Raymond of Sebonde, professor of medicine at 
Toulouse, (d. 1432, A. D.), who wrote Theologia natziralis. 
(See Montaigne, Essais, ii. 12.) 

The book of nature proves to us what the book of 
Revelation gives on authority. Through knowledge of 



140 SCHOLASTICISM. 

nature man may arrive at knowledge of himself, and 
through that, of God. This is better than physics, logic, 
or metaphysics ; in the first we learn (a) being, {b) life, {c) 
the sensitive ; in the second, thought ; and then the 
first cause, sc. God. Grateful love must lead to union 
with the loved. 

(See also the life of S. Theresa (i 525-1 582) written by 
herself.) 



INTRODUCTION. 141 



CHAPTER IX. 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 

I. Introduction. 2. Platonists, Cabalists, Mystics. 
3. Peripatetics. 4 . Independent Philosophy and 
Skepticiism 



\References :—?>&&, beside those already named, and special ref. below, Rittsr, Stockl, 
Lecky (Hist. Ration.), Blakey, Cousin (especially Frag. Philos. vol. iii ;), Erasmus, Enc. 
MorijE and Epistles ; Epist. Obsc. Vir.; Lubke's Hist. Sculpt, v. ii. ; Hallam's Hist. Lit. 
Europe.] 

I. Introduction. 



(A.) Character: (i.) Phil, took a position of indepen- 
dence with respect to Christian dogma ; highest truths 
were to be determined by reason alone, not even an ap- 
peal for verification to Christian Rev. recognized. An- 
cient systems were reconstructed without any reference 
to the teaching of the church, or it was maintained that 
philos. truth might be false according to faith, and con- 
versely. 

(2.) The underlying unity which, generally, marked 
scholasticism in all its schools was now lost ; as, in society, 
the unity through Pope and Emperor was abandoned. 
The only remaining unity was one of antagonism to 
scholasticism, (on both sides a war of bitter words), a re- 
tention of some of its forms of thought, a general attempt 



142 PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 

to ignore all that had passed since the downfall of Anc. 
phil, and a tendency to a certain method (psychological) as 
well as to certain subjects, e. g. human faculties, the means 
or limits of knowledge, and physical and mathematical in- 
quiries, at first associated with cosmological and theoso- 
phic speculations (Cabalistic), and often with magic. 

(3.) The sixteenth century was a period of transition 
of confusion, without settled method or principle ; there was 
no predominating school, no originality, but a vague follow- 
ing of every ancient school. Greek thinkers were now read 
in the original, and men, no longer scholastics, were Platon- 
ists. Peripatetics, etc., but rather as scholars, classicists, 
than with any comprehensive or productive grasp of the 
principles which they professed. 

(4.) Without great names, there was a widening of the 
sphere of phil. ; it was popularized, but the influence of 
classicism made the culture of mere form as extreme as 
the neglect of it among the later schoolmen ; but philos. 
at the same time exerted, particularly through the " human- 
ists,'' a more manifest influence on general literature, 
science, and social hfe. 

(B.) CaiLses. Beside (i.) inherent causes in the state 
of scholasticism ; and (2.) the religious movement which, 
from the German Mystics, took form as the " Reforma- 
tion," and which, in attacking the church and religion of 
the Mid. Ages, also attacked (though not invariably) its 
phil., and, at least, developed a demand for change, or sci- 
entific progress, with distrust of all existing principles, 
may be noted as special causes, 

(3.) The renaissance of classical art and literature, be- 
ginning with the second half of the 14th cent. Here was 
found deep thoug^ht in a beauty of form to which, in such 



PLATONISTS AND CABALISTS. I43 

subjects, the age was a stranger ; theory spoke to heart 
and imagination, and was not covered up in harsh and re- 
pulsive forms. 

The Ren. began in Italy. Petrarch and Boccacio, in 
the first half of the fourteenth cent, had done much to ex- 
tend a taste for the classics, especially for the Greek. But 
the fall of Constantinople (1453 A.D.) was a most pro- 
ductive agent in spreading through Italy its teachers. 
Greek MSS. were diUgently collected and translated. 

(Note Politianus, Bembo, Erasmus, Ficino, the Picos, etc.) 
Especially the Medici in Florence, through their Platonic Academy, 
spread abroad the enthusiasm for Greek art, poetry, and phil. 

(4.) The invention of printing, together with the in- 
crease of wealth in the free cities, widened immensely the 
interest in philos., and brought it sensibly into general 
literary culture and political life. 

2. Platonists and Cabalists. 

The contention between Greek teachers for the suprem- 
acy of Plato or Aristotle, soon created two rival parties 
which divided the advocates of the new learning in western 
Europe. The followers of the former were Neo-Platonists, 
and sought in the Cabala, a Divine Rev. for their philos. ; 
Plato had learned of Moses. (On Platonism in Literature, 
see Fleming's Diet., " Idea" ; e. g., Calderon, El Purg. de 
S. Patr. ii.) 

(A.) Marsilius Ficinus, (143 3- 1499, A.D.) a Flor- 
entine, taught at the Platonic Academy in Florence ; trans- 
lated Plato and Plotinus, and (partly) Porphyry, Jamblichus, 
and Proclus ; wrote, also, " Tkeol. Platonica^' etc. 

The sensible species cannot beget the intelligible spec. 



144 PLATONISTS AND CABALISTS 

whereby the subject of knowledge is united with the ob- 
ject : this spiritual form is innate in the soul, and sensible 
experience only awakens the soul to consciousness of it. 
The object of knowledge, the true essence of the thing, 
is the Div. idea, which by the soul is seen, immediately, in 
God : " signatitm est super nos lumen vtdtiLS Ttii." As 
the eye in seeing by light, so the soul sees not the species, 
nor God in Himself, but the object through the idea, and 
God in His relation to the finite. 

(B.) yohn Pico de Mirandola, (1463- 1494, A.D.) 
devoted himself to Platonic studies at Florence, and, 
through the Hebrew, to the Cabala ; for Pythagoras and 
Plato had derived their principles from the inner meaning 
of Hebraic Ss. At the age of twenty-four, he devoted his 
property to founding a Platonic Acad, at Rome, which 
was suppressed by the Pope : (note the 900 theses to be 
maintained against all opponents.) There are three worlds, 
the counterparts of one another, (i) the super-celestial, (2) 
the heavenly, (3) the sub-lunar ; man is a union of the 
three. With him is associated his nephew, John Francis 
Pico de M. 

(C) yo/m Reiichlin, (145 5-1 5 22, A.D.) b. at Pforz- 
heim, devoted himself at Paris to the new learning and 
Hebrew ; studied law ; was envoy of the electoral princes to 
Florence and Rome ; there introduced to the Cabala and 
Neo-Platonism, he transferred them to his native land, 
writing '^ de Arte Cabalistica',' etc. 

The Cabala as doctrine, contains, through Div. Rev., 
all truths ; as art, it deals with the mystic meaning of let- 
ters, words, and S. Ss. ; but the Cabalist himself must, 
through purification and contemplation, receive Div. inspi- 
ration, in order to know super-sensual truth. Distinguish 



PLATONISTS AND CABALISTS. I45 

(i) ratio, for scientific knowledge of the sensible ; (2) 
mens, the eye of faith, which by Div. light sees, immedi- 
ately, the super-sensual world. Syllogistic theology only 
leads to a rriaze of errors. 

(D.) CorneliiLS Agrippa,{\dfZ'j-\^2^, A.D.) at Paris 
devoted to law and medicine, a humanist, taking the practical 
side of the Cabalistic Pythag. and Neo-Plat. phil. of his 
day, seeks, in his '' occtdta philosophia',' the hidden power 
of nature, through geomancy, hydromancy, pyromancy, 
chiromancy, necromancy, etc., etc. : at length, a skeptic, 
he wrote " de Vanitate et hicertudine ScientiariLm!' 

(E.) In the Lutheranism of Germany appeared a 
mystic element, strenuously opposed by dogmatic Luthe- 
rans, but finding utterance in Weigel and 

Jacob Boehme, (i 575-1624, A.D.), (i) b. at Goerlitz,an 
illiterate shoemaker, began to have visions early in life, in 
which was " such a wondrous inward clearness of vision, 
that it seemed he could look, unhindered, into the deepest 
and last principles of all things." His numerous works 
are the popular gospel of German mysticism ; from nature, 
the Bible, the ideas of earlier German mystics, he devel- 
opes a new and complete " Cabala, " in most fantastic 
forms, confounding ideal and sensual, spiritual and physical, 
ethical and natural. God is, in Himself, the purely un- 
determined, from which proceed, in' Self-Rev., the contra- 
dictories (i) darkness, eternal nature, the first principle ; (2) 
light, His spirit. From the harsh " fire-principle," the 
Father, emanates the Light-Principle, the Son, (the second 
principle). The world is a third being produced from 
these two {gnostic emanation). This is ethical also : from 
the one, God=:nothing, in development proceed good 
and evil, a cosmical necessity in things. 

7 i 



146 rillLOSOPlIY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 

In man, also, the image of God, the microcosm, is a 
three fold soul, the fire-soul from the first principle, the 
light-soul, the Divine image, and llic animal-soul (for 
earthly knowledge). Three [)rinciples then strive for the 
mastery in man. 

(Note the rise of the Rosicrucians, on a mystic basis.) 

(3.) Pf.ripatetics. 

Averroism had maintained itself in Padua in the latter 
half of the middle ages, at first in the extreme form, sc, 
the oneness of the intellect in all men, but subsequently 
made more orthodox, by many, sc, the unity of primary 
principles in all men. The introduction of the Greek text 
gave a fresh stimulus to this sect of Peripatetics, but also 
produced another, the y^/r-iv^z/^^m/i-.C Alex. Aphrodis.) teach- 
ing a deistic naturalism. The individual reason is insep- 
arable from the phantasma and sensation, and disappears 
with the bodily organs ; but what is true in phil. may be 
false in faith. Most conspicuous was 

(A.) PctJiis PoDipoiiatinSy who in 15 16, A.D., wrote 
^'' lie Ivimortalitatc Aniviccy (i) Vegetative-sensive func- 
tions are as valid proof of the materiality of the soul, as 
intellectual, of its spirituality ; (2) it is the entelechy of a 
body, therefore it is corporeal ; it depends on sensuous 
images ; in and for itself, therefore, it is material, mortal, 
though in certain relations it possesses a similarity with 
the immaterial and immortal. Virtue and vice need no 
reward or punishment but in themselves. 

In like manner Aristotle and his Alex, commentators 
are used against miracles, and the freedom of the will ; 
what happens on earth is due to stellar influence. (Note 



INDEPENDENT PJIILOSOPIIY AND SKEPTICISM. 1 47 

opposition to astrology among the Platonists.) Prominent 
among Averroists may be named 

(B.) Andreas Ccesalpinus, (1509-1603, A.D.), physician 
to Clem, VIII., and the first writer of a systematic botany. 
He discards the comment, on Arist. God is the soul of 
the universe, tlie one intellect of stars and men, individ- 
ualized only in bodies and for a limited time. 

Through Melancthon Peripateticism was established in 
the Protestant Universities. 

(4.) Independent Philosophy and Skepticism. 

Entire independence of ancient systems is not to be 
looked for in the i6th cent.; but attempts may be 
noted taking different directions with different classes of 
thinkers who agree only in rejecting the old, but without 
any common principles of reconstruction. P'irst may be 
named 

(A.) The HiLinanists^ Philologists, most bitter oppo- 
nents of Scholasticism, especially in dialectics, which they 
strove to make chiefly an aid to rhetorical elegance : hence 
their special devotion to Cicero and Quinctilian. In addi- 
tion to Von Hutten, to Erasmus, and his friend Vives, of 
special note is 

Peter Ravius, (i) (15 15-1572, A. D.), b. in Picardy 
studied at Univ. of Paris, was Prof, in the Coll. of P>ance, 
against scholasticism ( " qiieecimqiie ab Aristotele dicta 
essent commentitia esse''), sought to give phil. elegance of 
form, to reform dialectics, physics, metaphysics ; his works 
were suppressed by his adversaries, and he was forbidden 
to teach ; finally he was murdered by personal enemies on 
S. Bart.'s day, 1572, A. D. 



148 PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 

(2) There is a natural logic of which the dialectic art 
must give scientific account ; it consists in {a) invention, 
finding the principles by which to solve the question ; (b) 
judgment, attaining from this the proof. For {a) R. gives 
commonplaces, from which arguments may be attained ; 
for (b) he shows how to apply them in judging rightly ; (a) 
by syllogizing, (/9) by arranging, collocating as a whole, by 
definition and division. 

The " Ramists " formed a party in Eng., Germ., and 
France. Milton translated his dialectics. 

(B.) T\\^NatiLralists. (i) Telesio, (1508-1588, A. D.) 
a Neapolitan, (b. at Cosenza,) educated at Rome, Milan and 
Padua, founded at Naples the first Acad, for the nat. sci- 
ences ; in his " de Naturd reritmr he sought to establish 
the nat. sciences on a new foundation. 

His method is to "follow sense and nature, which is 
always at one with itself, always produces the same result 
in the same manner." 

Knowledge is of entia realia noit abstracta, by means of 
sense-perception (empirical), from which are concepts and 
deductions; for the animal soul is conscious of change in 
itself produced from without, and thus has {immediate) per- 
ception of the object which causes it. Perception of like and 
unlike changes gives the universal concept. On memory 
of past perceptions is based deduction (commemoratio), 
which is imperfect knowledge when compared with imme- 
diate perception. 

The three principles in nature are {a) warmth, the ex- 
pansive ; {b) cold, the contractive ; {c) matter, the passive 
recipient of these: in heaven {a) is active, in earth, (b)', 
all things have sensation of these two principles, and hence 
a universal sympathy and harmony. 



INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHY, AND SKEPTICISM. I49 

The bodily nature is an animal soul whose seat is in 
the brain, and thence through the nerves it expands itself 
over the whole body. 

Man has an immortal soul, also, of intellect and free- 
will, created by God, ^^ forma stipei^addita,'' which, through 
the animal soul, is connected with the sensuous world. 
(Note Telesio's relations to Bacon.) 

(2) Campmiella, (i 568-1639, A. D.) b. in Calabria, a Do- 
minican, devoted to nat. sciences, 27 years"imprisoned for 
conspiring against the (Span.) government, spent his last 
years at Paris. 

Besides physics, C. sought to reform also metaphysics. 
All finite beings are a complex of being and non-being ; in 
the %rmer are three principles, {a) power, ip) knowledge, 
ic) love ; in the latter, {a) impotence, {b) ignorance, {c) hate. 

God is absolute being, in whom, not distinct, are (a) 
power, ib) wisdom, {c) goodness. Deity produces ideas, 
angels, men, the world, mingling non-being with His being. 
The proof of His existence, anticipating the Cartesian, is 
from the concept of the Infinite, which we did not, could 
not, produce. 

(3) Paracelsus, (1493-1541, A. D.) physician, naturalist, 
undertook to reform the medical system of Galen, as well 
as the nat. sciences, by Cabalistic ideas. All created things 
issue from one prime matter, the liiitbus, the ^gg, from 
which is developed, through the brooding world-spirit, the 
universe. Each thing has its own vital spirit, unconscious, 
instinctive. Man, the microcosm, with a threefold nature, 
earthly, sidereal, divine, has a threefold light, natural, 
rational, divine, (faith). In his steps follows closely 

(4) Joh. Baptist Helmont, (i 577-1644, A. D.) who, in 



150 PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 

his numerous works, developes still more fully and applies 
to medicine, the mystic Cabahsm. 

(5) Giordano Bruno, (a) (i 548-1600, A. D.) b. at 
Nola (Neapolitan), entered the Dom. order, abandoning 
which, he went to Genoa, Venice, Geneva, France, Eng., 
Germany; atlength,returning to Venice and Rome (1593, A. 
D.), was brought before the Inq., condemned as an Atheist, 
burned at the stake. He had devoted himself to physics, 
math., astron., and found the Copernican system irrecon- 
cileable with Catholic dogmas. 

(^) B. developes scientifically a materialistic panthe- 
ism ; opposing dualism, he finds one matter, infinite, eternal, 
developing from itself a plurality of beings by the plurality 
of forms whose potentiality is in it : form is the " actus 
substantialis',' which, as an inherent energy, actualizes mat- 
ter; this, then, is efficient as well as formal cause of all 
things, the intelligent soul of the world. Matter and form 
are, in essence, one, differentiated as the active and passive 
whose independent existence is unthinkable. 

Through all changes of the plurality of different forms 
this essence remains unchanged. It is God. He is natura 
naturans ; plurality developed from this unity is natura 
nattcrata, a universe necessitated, unlimited in extent or 
duration. The elements of all things are indestructible, 
unchangeable monads, at once psychical and material. 

Our knowledge is perception of similitudes and rela- 
tions, a seeking for the hidden unity of the first princi- 
ple above indicated. 

(6) Vanini, (i 585-1619, A. D.) a Neapolitan, educated 
at Padua, setting out from Alexandristic views, developed 
a naturalism of his own, in '^ de Adinirandis NaturcEy re^ 
gincB de(Eque mortaliwn, Arcanis!'' There is no intelligence 



INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHY, AND SKEPTICISM. I5I 

in matter ; the world is moved by its own inherent powers. 
Virtue and vice depend on climate, temperature, food, etc. 
The sole end of man is sensual pleasure. He seems to have 
put in practice his own principles. (On Bruno and Vanini, 
consult Cousin, especially Fragm. Philos. M. Age.) 

Connecting this period with the next, we may note 

(7) Gassendi, (i 592-1655, A. D.) taught at Dijon and 
Paris, devoted to math, and physics, the correspondent of 
Hobbes, Des Cartes, Galileo, wrote various works on the 
Epicurean system, which he followed though with some in- 
dependence. (See Lange, Gesch. d. Hist. Materialismus.) 

Atoms and vacuum are neither infinite nor eternal ; 
order'' and design prove an originating, superintending 
cause. The irrational soul is formed of atoms, but not so 
the rational. 

For this life the Epicurean ethics are alone valid. 
(C.) The yurists. (i) Nicolo MacJiiavelli, (1469- 
1527, A. D.) b. at Florence, wrote Hist, of Florence, "// 
Principe',' etc., notorious for its moral principle, that means 
employed for the independence and power of the state are 
to be morally estimated solely by the end proposed. 

Platonic ideals of the state appear among the 
" Utopists ; " most notev^^orthy of whOm is 

(2) Sir Thomas More, (1480-15 35, A. D.) who wrote, 
before the troubled later period of his life, " De Optimo 
ReipubliccB statu, deq. Nov. Insula Utopia',' which was dis- 
covered by '^Raphael," a companion of AmericusVespucius. 

Property among the Utopians is administered by the 
community, which is purely agricultural ; hence, no need 
of a commercial class. The government is repubHcan, 
the prince being chosen for life by the protophylarchs. 
All children are educated (compulsory) by the State. 



152 PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. 

Religion is free, except that none are to deny the immor- 
taUty of the soul and Div. Providence. 

HtLgo Grotius, (i 583-1645, A. D.) ; b. at Delft, driven 
from Holland, took refuge first in France, then in Sweden ; 
wrote " De yure Belli et PacisT 

He distinguishes jus divinum (Revealed) and jus 
htunanuni : the latter is (a) jus naturale^ {b) jus civile. 
Reason and language predetermine man to society, and 
whatever is necessary to its existence belongs to jus nat. 
Society rests on natural consent, i, e,, contract ; its right 
to punish is only for ciistodia societatis, not for retribu- 
tion, but to deter from crime : community of goods is the 
law of nature ; division is by compact. The State has 
dominiiun emineits over the property of its citizens. 

Yxovnjus nat. arises also the law of nations. 

Puffendorf (1632-1694, A. D.) follows essentially the 
same principles. 

In opposition to the " Divine right of kings," immedi- 
ate and absolute authority from God, as maintained by 
many of the Reformers against the Papacy, some Catholic 
Divines, e. g. Bellarmine and Suarez, reproduced the po- 
litical phil. of the Schoolmen, that authority was immedi- 
ately in the people, "mediately in" the prince, though, hy jus 
nat., he should rule, being selected by the people's 
choice, 

(D.) The Skeptics, the invariable product of conflicting 
systems, and overthrow of established principles, find 
utterance in 

(i) Michael de Montaigne, (1533-1592, A. D.), b. in 
Perigord ; popularized skepticism in his brilliant essays : 
especially noteworthy is ii. 12 (see also i. 19; ii. i, and 
Pascal's Pensees). Since sensuous experience is the 



INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHY, AND SKEPTICISM. 1 53 

source of all knowledge, what warrant have we that our 
notions correspond with the object? If reason tries to 
judge, where is the criterion of its correctness ? Philoso- 
phers vary endlessly, even in practical morals. " Igno- 
rance and incuriousness {que sgais-je) are two charming 
pillows for a sound head." 

(2) Pierre Charron (i 541-1603, A. D.), friend of M., in 
his " De la sagesse',' maintains, in similar manner, that 
man is born to search for truth : its possession is with 
God only. 

(3) Fr. Sanchez, (i 562-1631, A. D.). Prof, of Med. and 
Phil, at Toulouse, reduces skepticism to scientific form. 
Beings^ are possibly infinite in number : how can we know 
them all } or, if limited, yet we can know only part of the 
whole, which uncomprehended, no part is truly known : some 
are too great, some too little. In sensation and conscious- 
ness we perceive only states of ourselves, — nothing, not 
even the soul, in itself. Imperfect beings are incapable of 
true, i. e., perfect knowledge. 



154 DEVELOPEMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 



CHAPTER X. 

DEVELOPEMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

I. Philosophical Character of the Seventeenth 
Century. 2. Bacon. 3. Hobbes. 4. Locke. 

\_Refereftces : — Hansel's Met.; Whewell's works ; Mackintosh.] 

I. Philosophical Character of the Seventeenth 
Century, 

(A.) We notice at this period marked attempts at 
entire reconstruction of phil., with absolute freedom from 
authority, not only that of the scholastic, but of the an- 
cient systems, as well as of the theosophic conceptions of 
the previous age. Very few, until and including Kant, 
read or knew much of the ancients, — neither Descartes, 
Spinoza, Malebranche, Hobbes nor Locke. (See De 
Quincey, Phil. Writers, i. 116"; note also Bacon, pas- 
sim, " azit inveniani viain, aut faciam!^) 

(B.) To theol. and eccles. authority are left super- 
natural truths ; but, in the natural, reason tries to pursue 
its own course without reference to these. There are few 
priest-philos., and the religious orders lose their pre-emi- 
nence ; in place of these are, first, the Universities, then 
the Academies in the middle of the 17th Cent.; e. g.y 
R. S. Lond., 1645 \ Acad. Paris, 1665 ; Berlin, through 
Leibnitz, 1700. 



SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. I 55 

Bacon is a lawyer and statesman ; Descartes, a sol- 
dier, etc., both men of the world, and elegant in literary 
style. Hence, also, the rise of a " deistical" school of nat. 
theology. 

(C.) Whatever variation in results, a similarity in 
method may be observed, an inquiry into human facul- 
ties, (Psychology, Goclenius), into the origin, truth and 
certainty of human knowledge, — an analysis of the facts 
of nature and consciousness. 

(D.) The art of printing, the discovery of gunpow- 
der, of the mariner's compass, modifying civilized life 
lead to a popularizing of phiL, and to the fruitful dis- 
coveries -of nat. science : these give an impulse to their 
methods in phil., sc, to 

Empiricism, the method of experiment and observa- 
tion, and combination of facts so obtained. Assuming 
the validity of such facts, and neglecting analysis of the 
primary principles involved in the investigation, knowl- 
edge is limited to the objects of experience. Its ten- 
dency is to {a) sensualism, {b) materialism, (r) positiv- 
ism, or {d) skepticism. 

(E.) The developement of math, is closely con- 
nected with Rationalism, which bases itself on the deduc- 
tions from universal principles given by pure rea- 
son. 

(F.) Independent national life gives a marked char- 
acter to the progress of national thought, and compels a 
recognition of national schools in a manner previously- 
unknown ; although these, of course, act and react upon 
one another. 



156 development of english empiricism. 
2. Bacon. 

[References ;— Whately's Ed. of the Essays ; Macaulay ; Campbell's Lives ; Whewell's 
Hist. Ind. Sc. ; Sir Wm. Hamilton's Discussions ; Hansel's Aldrich.] 

(A) Bacon's life, so prominent in political history, 
need not be recounted here ; Francis Bacon, b. in Lon- 
don (1561, A. D.) ; although the "Essays Moral, Econ. 
and Polit." appeared in 1597, and the "Advancement of 
Learning in 1605, it should be noted that his chief con- 
tributions to Phil, were made after his busy practical life 
was ending in his disgrace in 1621 ; '' De Aug. Scientr 
appearing in 1623; ''Nov. Org'.' in 1620; the '' Historia 
Nat. J' or " Sylva Sylvariiml' after his death (d. 1626). 

(B) Principle. He recognizes the ideal as existing in 
the Div. mind, but man is to attain it by gradual induc- 
tion from particulars. He opposes scholasticism, which, 
beginning with principles given in pure reason or by rev., 
had proved unfruitful in discovery ; yet he assumes a 
moderate realism, that though in nature exist only individ- 
uals, yet true knowledge is of their forms : (Aph. Nov. 
Org. 1. ii.) 

He attaches himself to Democritus, (De Aug. iii. 4 ; 
Phil. Essay on D.), though he declares that all received 
opinions and notions must be laid aside^ for Phil, has 
neither produced useful result, nor shown capability of 
advancing ; " auctoritas pro veritate, no7i Veritas p7v auc- 
toritate:'' (see Nov. Org. i. Aph. Ixxxi.) a new and safe 
way must be opened, resting, not on authority, but on 
*' experimenta lucifera : " (Aph. Ixxxiv.) Hence the title, 
" Ins tau ratio Magna." 

(C.) Divisions : B. first reviews the whole field of the 
sciences which are contained in (i) Hist., resting on mem- 



BACON. 157 

ory ; (2) Poesy, on imagination ; (3) Phil., on the under- 
standing ; it is {a) Phil, prima, the concepts and 
principles common to all sciences, which he makes no at- 
tempt to determine, assuming some, e. g. " Ex nihilo 
7iihil fieriy necque quicqicam in nihilo redigi .*" ib) all 
sciences, either (i) divinely revealed. Theology, or (2) 
Philosophy, {^^ altera oritttr a senstL!' De Aug. iii. i.) 
Phil, has three objects («) God, (/5) nature, (-^) man. 

{p) strikes our intellect by direct ray : (We must dilig- 
ently listen to nature's own voice, mingling nothing from 
ours with hers) : 

(«) by refracted rays only, and Phil, can answer objec- 
tions to Rev. merely, not give any affirmative decision 
(De Aug. iii. 2, ix. i) : the subject is referred to Theol. 

{j) Man's intellectual nature also is not. cognizable. 
(" Sin ipsa in se vertatnr, etc!' De Aug. i.) 

" Philosophy," sc. of nature, is (a) speculative ; («) 
physics, for laws of nature and efficient causes ; (/5) meta- 
physics, for forms and final causes : 

{b) Operative ; («) mechanics ; (/5) nat. magic. 
(D.) Method and Theory of Knowledge. This is B.'s 
almost exclusive work. (See Nov. Org. l.ii.) The object 
of Phil, being to attain power over nature, through " in- 
terrogatio nattcrce^" we must (i) strip Phil, of its Theoso- 
phic character. ^/?/^n reasoning in physics from final 
causes is absolutely false and misleading. 

(2) The syllogis7n is applicable to human laws and 
Divine Rev., not to discovery; it may answer for probable 
conclusions in ethics ; but lower principles in physics can- 
not be so deduced from higher, for the very terms may be 
badly abstracted from things. (De Aug. v. 2.) 

(3) The mind must be rid of its idols, for though all 



158 DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

all knowledge originates with sense perception, yet the 
senses need to be guided, to be guarded from errar by- 
judicious procedure. (Aph. Nov. Org. i.) 

{a) Idola tribus, deceiving phantoms originating in our 
common nature, e. g., arguing in physics from final causes, 
imagining parallel cases, following will and feelings, 
neglecting less sensible for grosser phenom., etc. ; 

{b) Id. specus, in individual idiosyncracies, innate, from 
education, custom, prejudice, etc. ; 

if) Id. fori, in the common use of words ; definitions 
must be continually tested by example ; 

{d) Id. theatri, in dogmas of Philos. schools, in ming- 
ling Theol. with Phil. ; {e. g., Genesis and book of Job ; 
Nov. Org. i. Aph. Ixv.. Ixxxix.) 

(4.) True '' interpretatio natures',' then is by 

{a) Establishing facts through observation and experi- 
ment ; 

ib) Arranging them, and thus basing Phil, on Nat. 
Hist. (See Inst. Mag. Pt. iii. ; " Sylva Sylvanmz'') For 
positive instanticB, we must .look at the most opposite 
matter : we must consider privative inst. in similar mat- 
ter ; distinguish solitary, analogous, monstrous, crucial, 
inst., etc. (Nov. Org. 1. ii.) ; thus definitions may be ob- 
tained : (the bee, not the spider). 

{c) By induction proceeding, step by step, to higher 
and higher laws ; not by mere 'Hnd. per ejiiimerat. simpl.^' 
but by exclusions, etc. ; nor by '' anticipat. mentis',' leaping 
from a few instances to the highest generalizations (Nov. 
Org. i. Aph. 19, 104), a most fruitful parent of error. 

{d) '* Descendeiido ad opei^a, since axiomata may jDoint 
out new experiments. 

(E.) Psychology and ethics. B. is not a philos. in the 



HOBBES. 159 

widest sense of the term ; his empirical method may, he 
maintains, be applied- to all sciences ; to ethics, politics, 
etc. ; but see his tables of Nat. Hist., Inst. Mag., p. iii. 
Psychology can have little place in his system, for little 
can be known except of the irrational soul, which is cor- 
poreal, (motion, sense, found in all bodies ; but distinguish 
sense from perception.) In his essays he is a moralist 
without a doctrine ; the "light of nature," indeed, gives 
forth a feeble ray, but even that needs Rev. to make it 
clear enough to be a rule. The rational soul is referred 
to Theol. (Pref. Inst. Mag.) 

In brief, B. marks out a path for empiricism, but does 
not himself follow it. The 6th part of his Inst. Mag. 
would have been a Phil, founded on legitimate interpreta- 
tion of nature, but he did not expect to reach it. 

3. HOBBES. 

[References :—Whewell, Hist. Eth. ; Cousin, Phil. i8th Cent.; Hallam, Lit. Europe.] 

(A.) Life, Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury, (1588- 
1679, A.D.) studied at Oxf., then in France, etc., a friend 
of Gassendi, pursued Math, and Nat. Sc, the disciple and 
secretary of Lord Bacon ; in the civil war, siding with the 
king, he took refuge in Paris, (1640) and became tutor of 
Chas. II.; returned to Eng. in 1653 ; thereafter occupied 
himself with literary labor. Works " Elements of Phil." 
in three parts, appearing in reverse order, (i) ^' De Corpoi^e',' 
(1655-6) {a) Logic ; [b) Phil. Priina ; {c) Motion ; id) Me- 
chanics, etc. (2) "-De Homine'' " Human Nature," (1650) ; 
(3) '' De Give,'' (1642) ; "Leviathan," (1650); {repeats de 
Horn, and de Civ., but adds " a Christian Commonwealth, 
etc."; (4) '' De Corpore Politico,'' (1650); various discus- 



l6o DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

sions on " Liberty and Necessity," in answer to Bishop 
Bramhall and others, (1656) etc. 

H. is remarkably clear, simple, and vigorous in style, 
and develops his system with strict logical consistency. 
(Comte claims him as the father of " Pos. Phil") 

(B.) Principle, a rigid materialism ; the subject of 
Phil, is every body which can be generated or have any 
properties ; (Corp. i. i, 8) ; spirit is a corporeal substance 
(having extension) of such subtility as not to act on the 
senses. {De Horn. xi. 4, 5 ; cf. divisions of Science, Lev. 

I. 9-) _ 

H. is, of course, a nominalist ; but individuals are 

known only in their (phenomenal) relations to the senti- 
ent. There are two kinds of learning ; the " mathemati- 
cal " from reason, sc, of magnitudes, numbers, motions ; 
and the " dogmatic," from passion. {De Horn. xiii.). Anc. 
Phil is " a phantasm full of fraud and filth." 

Phil, is the knowledge of causes from phenom. (effects), 
and of phenom. from causes (note def. of causes) ; its end 
is practical benefit through foresight of effects. 

(C.) Theory of knowledge. Absolute knowledge is 
impossible; it is limited to (i) phenom., (2) the chain of 
sequences. (Lev. i. 7.) 

Motion, the cause of sensation, communicated to the 
sentient, by reaction produces the phantasm, the aggre- 
gate of sensible qualities, which exist only in the sentient : 
continued, decaying sensation is named imagination ; with 
the added element of time, i. e. sequence of phenom., it is 
memory, '' s entire se sensisse,'' {De Corp. iv. 25 ; i, 2, 7.) 
Images in memory follow the order of their origin, 
("assoc. of ideas"), (Lev. i. 3). 

Cognition is the power of retaining images. To these 



HOBBES. l6l 

phantasms are applied (i) analysis, (2) synthesis, (advance 
upon Bacon.) 

Words are arbitrary marks and signs, to register past 
sensations (" thoughts "), and to convey them to others. 
(Lev. i. 4.) They stand for (i) matter or body; (2) acci- 
dents or qualities (motions, objective and subjective) ; (3) 
phantasms ; (4) names. {De Corp. i. 5, 2.) 

Common names denote any one of a multitude ; ab- 
stract, the supposed cause of the concrete, of our concepts. 

Logic. In propositions two names are copulated, which 
stand for the same thing ; syllogistic reasoning is the join- 
ing of three names, for adding or subtracting ; iratioc. 
= computatio) ; i. e. it is reckoning by means of word- 
signs. {De Corp. i. 1,2; Lev. v.) Discursive reason con- 
nects consecutive concepts as they were first connected in 
sense. 

Truth and error are in propositions ; the latter arises 
in passing from one image to another, or in joining a 
name of one class with a name from another. 

(D.) Divisions, (i) Phil Prima, with H., is defini- 
tions of fundamental concepts. 

(2) Science (phil.) is {a) 7iatural, of consequences from 
the accidents of nat. bodies, either accidents common, sc. 
quantity and motion, determinate (Geometry, etc.) ; or in- 
determinate {Phil. Ima) ; or qualities of bodies (Physics) 
ethereal or terrestrial (ethics, logic, etc.) ; 

{b) Civil, of bodies politic, the commonwealth. (Lev. 
i. 9; De Corp. i. i, 9.) 

(E.) Philosophia P^'ima. H. adopts scholastic forms 
from the nominalists, though unmeasured in condemna- 
tion of scholast. and " metaphysics." He is weak in met. 
and psych., devoting himself chiefly to political ethics, yet 



l62 DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

his whole system is based on logical deductions from pri- 
mary definitions. 

The nature and attributes of God are referred to 
theol. ; only his existence can be otherwise known. (Lev. 
i. 12 ; De Horn. xi. 2, 3) ; but note, in his ans. to B'p 
Bramhall, ''God is infinite spirit corporeal," sc. having ex- 
tension (universally diffused, moving ether .?), and that 
man's relations to God are based on His power. 

Cause is " the sum of all accidents in agent and patient 
which concur to the producing (note) of the effect, so that 
if they exist the effect existeth ;" not, if any one be ab- 
sent : cause = active power. {De Corp. i. 6, 10.) 

The cause of universal things is known by nature, viz. 
motioUy QDe Corp. i. 6, 5) ; efficient, is in the agent ; ma- 
terial, in the patient (ii. 9) ; where is no effect, there is no 
cause : we may imagine a part of the chain, and then the 
first is called cause only ; the next, cause and effect. 

Space is the phantasm of a thing existing without the 
mind ; time a phant. of before and after in motion of a 
body. 

All change is motion produced by a body contiguous 
(no void) and itself moved, (ii. 9, 9.) 

Contingent accidents are those which do not depend 
on the immediate antecedents of the other accidents which 
are under consideration, but they are equally necessitated : 
contingents are so named when we do not know their 
causes. 

(F.) Psychology (vid. supr.) There must be a corpo- 
real organ to retain motion : this distinguishes sentient 
from non-sentient bodies. (^De Corp. iv. 25, i.) 

It need only be added here, that appetites and aver- 
sions, in H., are vital motions of the heart, as modified by 



HOBBES. 163 

motions from without, reaching it through the brain, (iv. 
25, 12.) 

(G.) Ethics are a strictly logical developement of his 
def., his object being chiefly political ethics. 

(i) Individual. To comprehend H., we must first 
consider his theory of 

Liberty and Necessity. '' Will is appetite ;" exterior 
motions reaching the "vital motion " help or hinder it. 
{De Horn, vii.) This we name desire or fear, the motives 
of all our actions. Either actions follow immediately the 
first appetence, as when we act suddenly ; or, to first de- 
sire succeeds thought of resulting ill, a fear which im- 
pedes action. To this may succeed a new appetence, etc. 
This is *' deliberation :" the last desire or fear (the same 
in brutes as in men) is called will. (^De Horn. vii. i ; xii. 
I ; De Corp. iv. 25, 13 ; Lev. i. 6.) 

Every act of will is caused by antecedents. (Lev. ii. 2 1 .) 

Liberty is the power of doing what we will, — freedom 
from external restraints. 

Thus necessity determines each man's moral views, 
and each calls good what is agreeable to him, and evil 
what displeases him {De Horn, vii.), either immediately or 
through prudence, by expectation of future benefit, or fear 
of future ill. 

Hence, ethics of selfishness ; e. g., "no man giv- 
eth but with intent of good to himself, because gift is 
voluntary, and the object of the voluntary is a man's good." 
(Lev. i. 15.) 

Repentance is from knowledge that the action misses 
its end {sc. of appetite, enjoyment). {De Horn. ix. 7.) 

Honor is the acknowledgment of power, whether in 
the invisible (GoD=ether in motion 1) or in man. 



164 DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

Praise and blame declare a thing good or evil for me 
or some one else, etc., etc. 

Sin is transgression of a law, civil or natural ; sc. 
"to do to others," etc. ; (note, no account of personal sins, 
e. g., of lust; Corp. Pol. ii. 9, 3.) 

(2) Civil. The state is an artificial body, (see title- 
page of Lev.) " Corp. Polit!' ; The multitude united as one 
man by a common power for common peace, defence, and 
benefit. 

The natural state of man is one of equal rights to 
all things ; equal right to the end gives equal right to the 
means : then it is necessary that the strongest obtain, 
and thus perpetual war. {Corp. Polit., i. 2 seq.) In the 
natural state is no right or wrong, just or unjust, (Lev. 
i. 13), no meum 2iTidi tnnm : what each one can get, that 
is his as long as he can keep it. 

Society originates in {a) conquest, {b) compact. Thus 
peace is secured by the law of right reason (prudence) 
that it is expedient to give up something (i. 14). The 
cause of the commonwealth, then, is man's foresight of 
what is needful to his preservation. 

ytis (right) is, in nature, the freedom from external re- 
straints to action : this is totally surrendered in society to 
{a) one man (monarchy, which is best) ; {b) to a few (aris- 
tocracy) ; {c) to the community (democracy). This sur- 
render unites all powers, all rights, all wills. This sove- 
reignty is absolute, unlimited. (Lev. ii. 17.) Assured 
power confers the right to reign. (Lev. i. 14.) Tyranny, 
etc., the "same forms misliked." (Lev. ii. 19.) 

In this compact minorities have no rights, no redress ; 
subjects have none towards a sovereign ; for there can be 
no injury : resistance puts one in the state of nature. 



LOCKE. 165 

Property originates in the sovereign power assigning 
to each ; it does not exclude dominion of the sovereign. 

Religio7t is fear of invisible powers recognized by the 
state ; and private conscience may not oppose public, or 
the law. {Corp. Polit. ii. 6, 11, 12.) Good is what the state 
sanctions, as far as law extends. (Lev. ii. 26.) 

Ptmishment rests on power, removing the noxious, 
and deterring from future wrongs. God may punish by 
right of His omnipotence, for the same reason. 

Between nations is no jiis^ no moral obligation. 
Hobbes should be thoroughly studied with reference to 
the subsequent progress of materialism. 

IV. Locke. 

[References :— LeibnitZj Nouv. Ess. ; Cousin ; Morell's Hist. Mod- Phil. ; Hallara ; Raid's 
Inquiry etc., cc. i. vii ; Brown's Lectures, xxvii ; Whewell's Lectures on Moral 
Phil. ; Mackintosh.] 

(A.) Life, b. in Somersetshire; (1632) ; ed. at Oxf. and 
Fellow there. He devoted himself to medicine and the 
natural sciences : he followed the fortunes of the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, and was tutor to his son : in France (1675- 
1679,) ^3.s then recalled by the Earl: went into exile with 
him to Holland, returning in 1688 ; devoted himself to 
literary labors : d. 1 704. 

His works are, "Letters on Toleration," (1685) ; his 
" Essay on the Human Understanding," written in his 
exile, pub. in 1689; Two discourses of Civil Government 
(1689) ; on Education, (1693) ; " Reasonableness of Christ- 
ianity," (1695), etc., etc. 

His clear common sense, his manly honesty, his 
vivacious style, and even his somewhat unscientific modes 
of thought and expression were calculated to give him the 



l66 DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

wide-spread and powerful influence which he exerted. 
Empiricism with him seemed- to have reached its full 
developement ; his many followers in the 1 8th cent, added 
little, except in applying his method and principles to 
special investigations. '" 

(B.) Method. L. proposes to analyze the faculties of 
the human understanding and their limits, and so deter- 
mine the grounds and extent of human knowledge 
(psychological, empirical) ; but instead of an induction 
from our cognitions as given in consciousness, he begins 
by investigating their origin, (Cousin). 

(C.) Theory of Knowledge. An idea is defined as 
" anything with which our minds are immediately occu- 
pied when we think ; " (concept, or image .'*) Ess. i. i8). 

(i.) There are no i?tnate ideas ; the mind originally 
a tabida rasa ; no innate theoretical principles ; children 
and the uneducated know nothing of them : fundamental 
principles contain the most abstract ideas, which are least 
known. Still less are practical principles innate, which 
differ so widely among mankind ; not even the being and 
nature of God, about which men in the same nation vary 
so widely. (Ess. B. i.) 

(2.) All ideas are from expetience ; (a) sensation ; 
(F) reflection ; {a) for knowledge of the sensuous qualities 
of external objects ; {})) for knowledge of our inward 
states and activities; e.g., feeling, thinking, willing, etc. 

Thus, the idea of space is derived from sight and 
touch ; of time, from succession of ideas ; the infinite, is 
a purely negative idea, or the indefinite. 

On " reflection," note that L. limits the word in his def., "the 
notice which the mind takes of its own operations and the manner of 
them," (consciousness). But extend the word to defining, judging rea- 



LOCKE. 167 

soning, etc., and his proposition is nugatory. Refl., as he uses the 
word, is vague, fluctuating, and requires analysis ; the French sensual- 
ists, more consistent, discard it from its place as one source of 
knowledge. 

(3.) Genesis of ideas ; {a) the siinple^ by sensation 
and perception, in which the soul is passive ; («) ideas 
through one sense, as of colors, heat, smoothness ; {p) 
of sensuous qualities through more than one sense, as 
extension, from motion ; {y) given in " reflection," as 
thinking, willing ; (0) given in sense <27//3^ reflection pleasure, 
pain, power, existence, unity, ; (Ess. ii. 7), 

Distinguish («) primary qualities, given objectively, 
in bodies, extension, solidity, figure, motion, number, form; 
(/5) secondary qualities, in the sentient, signs of changes 
in things, as color, sound, etc. (L. does not inquire how 
corporeal qualities are converted into ideas of the mind.) 

These are the original ideas of all our knowledge, and 
as such, undefinable ; the soul is their passive recipient. 

('V) Complex ideas ; after sensation and perception, 
(consciousness of sens.) (^/) memory ; (,5) discernment. 
(Distinguishing, separating,) (r) comparison ; (J) composi- 
tion ; (o) abstraction, a power peculiar to man. Ideas of 
single objects are separated from accidents, from space 
and time ; thus arises a universal concept whose name is 
extended to all objects resembling the concept, (conceptu- 
alism). (Ess. ii. 9-1 1.) These are acts of the understand- 
ing, (the soul active). Comp. ideas are defined by analy- 
sis to the simple ideas. (Note, L. cannot explain unity ; 
e. g., man remains a complex idea.) 

They are ideas of («) substance an unknown some- 
thing, substrate to qualities ; {ft) modes ; (r) relations, 
as cause and effect, time and space relations, moral rela- 
tions, etc. 



l68 DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

(4.) Modes, compound ideas of qualities existing in 
something", considered at length (ii. 13 seq.), are — 

{a) Simple modes, whose elements are homogeneous ; 
e.g. 

Space, body, extension, of co-existent parts ; 

Time., duration, eternity, (indefinite repetition of 
measured duration,) of successive parts (ideas) not sep- 
arable. 

Number, finite and infinite, (a negative idea, indefi- 
nite addition of number applied to the determinate) ; 

The good, that which increases pleasure or diminishes 
pain ; 

Poiver, from change of ideas, the idea of the passive, 
receiving change ; from choice and determination, the 
idea of the active, making change ; 

Liberty, Quid. infr. psych, and ethics.) 

{b?) Mixed modes, the mind actively combining unlike 
elements into " notions," to which names are arbitrarily 
applied, as in bodies, (passive powers) ; in spirit, (active 
powers, thinking, motivity) ; in God, from enlarging to 
infinity modes which we experience in ourselves. (Note, 
L. cannot, empirically, separate his " mixed modes " from 
substances) ; words (Ess. iii.) represent not substances, 
but the idea of collected qualities. 

{^?) Relations arise from comparing two ideas, and 
hence come new '* ideas," and terms, (husband, whiter, 
old, great) ; thus the rel. of cause and effect from marking 
the change or becoming which follows the application of 
one thing to another (antecedent and consequent) ; as heat 
and wax. 

Identity and diversity, come from comparing the idea 
of a thing in one time and place, with the idea of the 



LOCKE. 169 

same in another ; id. and div. are relative. Distinguish 
personal identity given in consciousness though the think- 
ing substance may change. (Ess. ii. 27). 

Other relations are proportional, natural, instituted, 
moral ; (to a law,) {yid. infr. ethics). 

(6.) Knowledge is the perception of agreement or 
disagreement of ideas, under the notions of (d) identity 
or diversity, (U) relation, {c) co-existence, {d) real existence, 
(iv. i). {a) is perceived at once in the individual ; 

{c) is of "ideas " in the same subject; 

{d) when the idea or complex of ideas represents reality 
out of the mind. 

Degrees of knowledge (iv. 3) are {a) intuitive, instan- 
taneous perception that two ideas agree or disagree ; {b) 
demonstrative, two ideas brought together by some inter- 
mediate, (admitting of doubt) ; {c) of particular, finite 
beings, by sens, and perc. Judgment is contrary to 
reason, when it implies contradiction, or is of ideas not 
clearly conceived ; it is true, if we think ideas to be related 
as they actually are. The mind cognizes by the interven- 
tion of ideas ; knowledge is real, if the idea (simple) con- 
form to the thing which produces it. Complex ideas are 
of the mind's own making and therefore subj ectively real, 
as in mathematics ; ideas of substance are from such 
qualities as are naturally united, (iv. 4, 5), {essentia realis^ 
unknown ; ess. notionalis, the ground of genera and 
species). Knowledge then can be true, without being 
real. Knowledge also of the supersensual must be impos- 
sible, according to L.'s principle, but herein L. holds back, 
and merely limits that knowledge. 

God IS proved from the world, His works (cosmological) ; 
but the idea is negative. 



170 DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. 

(D.) Psychology : The soul is, probably, an immaterial 
substance, but this cannot be proved (IV. 3.6 ; see letter 
to Bp. of Worcester) ; God may give a material substance 
the power to think, and what we call spirit may be a mode 
of body. 

The primary ideas of mind are {ci) perceptivity, (Jb) 
motivity. 

PF/Z/must be distinguished from desire, since they often 
oppose one another : actions, either thinking or moving, are 
free, when a man has power to think or act, or not to do 
so ; there is no liberty where there is no thought and will, 
but there may be thought and will without liberty. 

The question is not whether the will is free, which is 
nonsense, but whether the man is. A man is not free to 
will, because the thing presented determines his will. 

The will is nothing but a power of the mind to direct 
the operative faculties to motion or rest, the motive being 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Uneasiness determines the 
will, and not the greater good ; but the will (the man) can 
suspend decision for clearer judgment. (II. 21.) 

(E.) Ethics, (i) IndividiLal. Happiftess is the utmost 
pleasure, and we call good what produces it, and evil what 
produces pain. Men do not place it, indeed, in the same 
things ; the wrong judgment may prefer the present to the 
absent ; but men are responsible for their judgment. 

Moral good or evil is conformity to a law or violation 
of it, whereby good or evil, i. e., pleasure or pain, is drawn 
on us by the law-maker's will (II. 28) : law is 

(a) Divine, which measures sins ; 

{b.) Civil, which measures crimes ; 

{c.) Law of opinion, which measures vices. Moral recti- 
tude is relative, to one or all of these. One word is often 



LOCKE. 



171 



used for the positive act and the moral idea, which mis- 
leads : e. £■., stealing. (L. fails to show the obligation of 
obedience.) 

(2.). Political. L. may be called the father of mod. 
Pol. In his two treatises on Government, he {a) opposes 
the Patriarchal theory ; {b) inquires into the oiigiii, extent 
and end of civil Gov. 

The state of nature is (d) perfect freedom of action and 
property ; land originally common ; labor gives property 
in it ; 

{b) perfect equality ; 

{c) every man executive of the law of nature ; (not a 
state of war.) 

Civil Society originates when men voluntarily resign 
their natural rights to the community, the majority 
ruling, (" Contrat Social "). 

Its end is the preservation of property. 

Government is dissolved when the executive, legisla- 
tive, etc., act contrary to their trust. Tyranny is the exer- 
cise of power beyond right. 

All religious opinions should be tolerated, so far as 
they are not dangerous to the commonwealth. 

Locke's influence in Eng. during the i8th century is 
almost supreme, and many apply his empiricism to special 
investigations in ethics, etc. (See Gibbon's Autob. " Since 
phil. has exploded all innate ideas and natural propensi- 
ties." ) Three separate developments however must re- 
ceive attention : (i.) Idealism of Berkeley; (2.) Sensual 
ism in France ; (3.) Skepticism of Hume, etc., (vid. inf.) 



72 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 



CHAPTER XL 

DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

I. Descartes. 2. Cartesian School. 3. Spinoza. 
4, Leibnitz. 5. Idealism in England in the i/th and 
I 8th Centuries. 

\References : — Morell's Hist. Mod. Phil.; Cousin ; see also special ref. infr.] 
I. DESCARTES. 

(A.) Ren^ Descartes, (i 596-1650, A. D.) b. in Touraine, 
ed. by the Jesuits of La Fleche, for a time a soldier, travel- 
led extensively, (Eng., Denmark, Germ., It.) ; dissatisfied 
with traditional phil. resolved to investigate its principles 
anew ; retired to a village in Holland (1629) ; devoted 
himself to physics, math., medicine, optics, etc., in addi- 
tion to met. ; invited by Queen Christina to Sweden, 
shortly after died there. 

Works : Discours stir la MetJwde {iG^^j^^ (for guiding 
the reason in search of truth) with Dioptrics and Meteor- 
ology ; Meditationes de Prim. Phil. (1641); Principia Phil., 
(1644); Les Passions de V Ame, (1650), (physiological 
psychology), etc. 

D. may be called one of the founders of mod. sci- 
ence ; treating the laws of the universe as a mechanical 
problem, and verifying his solutions by experiment, apply- 
ing algebra to geometrical problems, (Anal. Geom.) etc. 



DESCARTES. 1/3 

His clear, simple style ranks him among the first 
(French) prose writers of his day. 

(B.) Method. While the Eng. school, devoting itself 
to the. phenom. of external nature, was developing sensual- 
ism, D., analyzing the internal phenom. given in conscious- 
ness,, was founding mod. idealism. 

Aristotle's method had proved unfruitful in the knowl- 
edge of things, for dialectics only teach us how to set 
forth what we know already. Like Bacon, he would find 
a new way ; for a true logic will lead to discovery ; (Ep. ad 
Voet.) Math, already point out the way ; consider (i) the 
Method ; (2) Metaphysics, which contain the principles of 
cognition concerning God and the soul from which we can 
deduce, (3) physics, the principles of nature. The meth- 
od, then, is (i) To begin with universal doicbt., even hold- 
ing for false what seems doubtful, e. g. sensuous impres- 
sions, but doubt as means only to a certainty not yet pos- 
sessed; setting aside all prejudice or hasty judgment, to 
receive nothing as true when obscurity or indistinctness 
in idea (vid. infr.), leaves reason to doubt or possibility of 
refusal ; (Princ. Phil. i. 1-6) ; for practice, meanwhile, 
to follow the probable, the commonly received. 

(2) To divide each difficult problem into as many 
parts as possible, (analytical) ; 

(3) To proceed from the simplest to the complex ; 
(geometry has proceeded thus with fruitful result) ; 

(4) To count up and review and see that nothing is 
omitted. 

In special investigations proceed from causes, from in- 
nate principles, to effects, by deduction, verifying in ex- 
periments, thus distinguishing the actual from the possible. 



174 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

(C.) Theory of Knowledge. Knowing {J)ercipere) is 
(i.) seittive^ (2.) iinaginare, (3.) intelligere. 

The objects of knowledge are (i) things, material or 
spiritual ; 

(2) Affections or modes, {a) of matter, as duration, 
order, number, (" clearly and distinctly conceived ") ; Qi) 
of spirit, knowing and willing ; {c) from union of the two, 
senses and passions ; 

(3) Eternal verities, existing in the mind only, com- 
mon notions, axioms innate, as that all properties are in a 
substance. (Note : No attempt to determine these pri- 
mary principles.) 

All these as thought in the mind are called ideas ; 
consequently, there are three classes ; (i) those which we 
create (images) ; (2) those which we acquire from exter- 
nal objects ; (3) those which are born with us (innate 
ideas). Innate ideas, at first regarded by D. as entities 
impressed by God on the soul, (^res cogitates quatenus 
objective sunt in intellectti), are, afterward, viewed as de- 
veloped from the soul itself in which they exist potentially ; 
sense-perception is the occasion of their actuality, they 
are not abstracted from what is thus given. They con- 
form to objective realities because so disposed by God. 

In judgment, the subjective knowledge (innate ideas) 
is turned to the objective reality, and this is an operation 
of the will, which assents in afifirmation or negation. 

Error lies in abusing this freedom of the will, and 
judging before the mind has clear and distinct ideas. 

The criterion of knowledge is the clearness and dis- 
tinctness of the idea, (i. 43) ; such we have of created think- 
ing substance, i.e., soul, of matter, of God, though the last 
inadequate, (i. 54) ; we may not be able to create images, for 



DESCARTES. 1/5 

these are only of the sensible ; but in sense is nothing cer- 
tain except what intellect supplies. (Denies " nihilin int. 
quod 71071 prius ift se7iS2c") In sensations and passions is 
the greatest difficulty as respects clearness and distinctness; 
they are referred to the things which produce them, an er- 
ror in judgment ; they are clear and distinct, <^i- sensa- 
tions, etc. ; if they are considered to be things, then no 
clear perception what they are. 

Supernatural truths are to be received by faith, not 
being discovered by reason, though not contradictory 
to it. 

(D.) Pri7iciple, is dogmatic, without criticism of the 
faculty of cognition and its limits, a pure rationalism ; 
phil. is perfect knowledge of all which man can know 
through clear and self-evident first principles ; the knowl- 
edge of other things being deduced from these ; this is 
man's highest good. (Ep. ad. Voet). 

(i.) To doubt is to think ; " cogito, e7go sum ;" (no 
syllogism, but the pure apperception of a mode in a sub- 
ject.) (cf. Kant. Crit. P. Reason, ii. 2-4.) 

(2.) Thought is action in ego ; this gives " clear and 
distinct notion" of S7ibsta7ice, which is therefore a pri- 
mary notion, self-evident, certain, (i. 11.) 

(3.) But ego^ 7776713, is known as distinct from body, 
unextended, etc. I could think away body, but not ego ; 
a clear, certain knowledge of the spirituality of the soul. 

(4.) Existence of mind, not -thinking, is absolutely 
inconceiveable ; the essence of mind is clearly and dis- 
tinctly known as simple, immaterial, thinking substance ; 
this is the fi7'st step in knowledge. 

(5.) Among ideas which are known in consciousness, 
is that of infinite, perfect being, the idea of omniscience, 



1/6 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

omnipotence, goodness, etc., an idea not originated by 
ego, for it is above the imperfect, limited soul, neither to 
be unmade nor modified by it : it is clear and distinct, 
therefore objectively real. 

The idea of this perfect being involves infinite fulness 
of reality, consequently the (limited) ego cannot produce 
it, for the effect cannot exceed the cause, nor contain 
what the cause does not {forfnaliter or eminenter ; princi- 
ple of causality.) 

The idea of perfect being embraces all perfections, among 
which is objective existence (i. 14 : vid. S. Anselm, and 
distinguish here psychological and ontological arguments). 
On this is based the possibility of Revelation (i. 25). 

We may not comprehend these perfections, we under- 
stand {intellig.) them as filling thought, clear, not obscured 
by limitations. (See further development in Fenelon, 
'^ De r Existence de Dieu," and Bos suet, '^ De la Connais- 
smice de Dieii et de Soi-meme!') 

(6.) Ego does not exist of itself, but from the cause 
which produces this idea ; it is not sufficient explanation 
to derive existence from parents, for regressus in injinitu^n 
is inadmissible, for continued existence is not caused by 
the ego. 

God's existence is the second step in knowledge. 

(7.) The senses in themselves give no certain 
knowledge of an outer world ; every hypothesis leaves 
room for doubt. But in the idea of God is absolute vera- 
city ; on this we base certainty derived from sense-percep- 
tion ; error, if it exist, is in our (voluntary) judgments. 

On the same ground is based trust in clear and dis- 
tinct ideas. 

Note : vicious logical circle ; the truth of God's existence rests on clearness of the 
idea ; and objective truth of ideas on the veracity of God ; (Gassendi)- 



DESCARTES. \JJ 

(^?) Metaphysics, (i.) Substance, "■ 3. thing which so 
exists that it needs no other thing for its existence," 
strictly taken, applies to God only ; but, equivocally, to 
created substances, which exist by the ordinary concur- 
rence {conctirsus) oi God. (i. 51, cf. Spinozism.) 

(2.) Infinite, as applied to God, is positive as well 
as negative ; and we must distinguish the indefinite in cre- 
ated things, e.g. extension and divisibility in bodies, from 
the proper infinite which can only be predicated of the 
Creator. 

God is also pure spirit, for the idea of matter or exten- 
sion involves divisibility, which is an imperfection. As 
such. He is intelligence and will, which constitute the idea 
of spirit ; but these are not modes of His being. With a 
single operation, he knows, wills and works all. 

(3.) Attribute belongs to substance ; in and through 
it we know each substance ; it constitutes the essence of 
the thing, it is essential to the concept of the thing, and 
to all ideas belonging to it (i. 53.) e. g. of matter, exten- 
sion ; of spirit, thought. 

All other properties are modes, modifications of sub- 
stance, and admit of change ; they pre-suppose the attrib- 
ute ; e. g. figure supposes extension, but extension does 
not pre-suppose figure. 

Qualities are only actual, present, not permanent. 

Note : The attribute of body being extension, space and body are not really distinct 
but only different in concept ; space being the same extension whatever body occupy it. 

(F.) Physics. Like Bacon, D. excludes all inquiry into 
final causes ; he relegates them to ethics. 

Denying vacuum and atoms, (cf. def. of body, ii. 16, 
seq.) he reduces all physical changes to motion, change 
(relative) of place. All phenom., consequently, are reduci- 

8^ 



1^8 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

ble to geometric and mathematical principles (ii. 64 ; iii. 4), 
and nature is viewed as a mechanism moved by God. 

Even the brutes are living automata ; in them there is 
no animal soul as their substantial form. They, like 
machines do some things better than we can, with our 
finite intelligence. 

The quantity of motion {i7ti^ imparted by God to a 
Hmited portion of matter is unchangeable ; finite will can 
only modifiy its direction (ii. 36). Since there is no 
vacuum, motion is rotary, and vortices account for the 
bodies of the universe. 

(G.) Anthropology, (i.) In thought, the attribute of 
soul, distinguish knowing and willing. Vegetative and 
sensitive powers belong to the body. The latter is a liv- 
ing automaton in which the soul inhabits (pineal gland). 

(2.) Sensation. The vital spirits, produced from the 
blood through rarefaction by animal heat in the heart, 
ascend to the brain, and thence are diffused through the 
nerves. The qualities (secondary) of bodies, except figure, 
motion, etc., are various dispositions affecting our nerves. 

When an object impresses a sense, the vital spirits con- 
vey the impression to the brain, and the mind takes note 
of the effect on the organ : this is sensation. 

Imagination 2J\^ memory are accounted for by inter- 
nal motions of the animal spirits ; so, also, all animal 
functions and bodily motions. 

(3.) Passions. The mind may affect the heart through 
the nerves, and, by reflex action, a passion be produced in 
the brain, a perception of an internal state. 

(4.) The soul passively receives sensations conveyed 
to the brain (perception), but is active in will, imag., 
thought, and so may act upon the body. 



CARTESIAN SCHOOL. 1/9 

How this mutual action is accomplished, D. cannot ex- 
plain : the concept of " occasional causes " is the nearest 
approach to explanation : the concurrence {assistentid) of 
God. (Br. Quarterly, Jan. 1874.) 

(5.) Distinguish will from desire (iv. 190) ; the 
former is known in consciousness as free ; we can volun- 
tarily affirm, (assent,) or we can abstain from believing 
(doubt). 

Our will is not determined by anything except as in- 
tellect shows it to be good or the reverse ; and this is 
freedom, for there is no constraining cause outside of the 
mind which assents to the good and chooses it. (Med. 4.) 
(intellectual determinism.) 

2. Cartesian School. 

Both the needs of the age and the analytical power of 
Descartes gave him a wide spread and permanent influ- 
ence ; the psychological method in phil. became the pre- 
dominating one, while a foundation was laid for pure ideal- 
ism. 

The Dominican and Franciscan orders, which in the 
13th and 14th cent, had taken the lead in phil., had lost 
their intellectual position, but while many Jesuits were 
active in opposition to Cartesianism on theological grounds, 
the Jansenists warmly supported it for similar reasons, 
while philos. questions agitated society itself (to a remark- 
able degree.) The universities were divided ; that of Paris, 
in 1 67 1, by royal decree, forbade the teaching of the new 
phil. Notwithstanding, it made great progress in France 
and the Netherlands, advocated, to a greater or less degree, 
by Arnauld, Pascal, etc., especially by 

(A) Geulincx, of Antwerp, (1625-1669, A. D.), taught 



l80 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

at Leyden, wrote on Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, and a 
Commentary on Descartes. 

Direct action of soul on body or body on soul is impos- 
sible. The essence of soul is in thought only, conse- 
quently it is not capable of any other activity, such as 
producing motion in body : the same reasoning applies to 
body. 

Bodily affections indeed may afford occasion for sen- 
sations, and vice versa, but the efficient and immediate 
cause of this harmony is God only (" occasionalism "). 

Hence a fuller development of the Cartesian principle 
which pointed to 2, passivity of nature in respect of God 
as the one efficient cause of all spiritual and physical 
operations. Secondary causes, so called, are but occa- 
sional, the only efficient cause is God. What we call laws 
of nature are this law of occasional causes which God 
follows. (Tendency to Spinozism.) 

(B.) Malebranche, (i.) ( 1638-17 15, A, D.) b. at Paris, 
ed. at the Sorbonne, priest of the Oratory : wrote De la 
Recherche de la Verite ; " " Traite de Morale; " " De V Avi- 
otcr de Dieu^' etc. His style is luminous and attractive. 

(2.) We know the ego . in consciousness, all beside 
through "ideas." Empirically we obtain only relations of 
objects to our ©wn bodies : ideas cannot originate with 
ourselves ; we see them immediately in God. (cf. Reid 
ii. 8.) He has in Himself all ideas, and the material 
world rests, for our knowledge of it, on revelation from 
Him. (cf. Berkeley.) He is always immediately present to 
our spirits, the universal reason, the light of all spirits : 
(tendency to mysticism : See Pref. to " Re'chcrche, etc.") 

But it is not God's essence which is seen, except in the 
limited relation which it has to limited things ; and a con- 



CARTESIAN SCHOOL. l8l 

dition, also, is our own voluntary attention. Sensuous 
experience is the occasional cause of awakening this 
attention. 

Thus also we discover the relations of ideas to one an- 
other, and arrive at truths. 

M. develops " occasionalism " in the same manner as 
Geulincx. (vid. sup.) The will is only the working of 
God in us ; each natural attempt to attain the good is 
caused by God only. 

But to particular goods the will is undetermined ; the 
intelligence judges between them which is the higher 
good, and to this the will is determined, but may with- 
hold assent, and in this consists its freedom. 

Evil in us is, consequently, limited to not doing what 
we can and should do. 

M. has a special value in tracing the causes of error, 
e.g., illusions of the imagination. 

Finally, abandoning Cartesianism, he finds a refuge in 
Christian dogma alone. 

3. Spinoza. 

[Ref. Cousin, Fragra. Philos, v. iii; Bayle ; Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit ; Ueber- 
weg's Notes on his Fundamental Propositions ; M. Arnold, in MacMillan's Mag., vol. ix.] 

Descartes' definition of substance and his theory of 
continued creation contained a germ of pantheism 
which found its full development in Spinoza. He should 
be thoroughly studied as a key to modern idealism, and 
even to some recent philosophical speculations from 
" scientific " ground. 

(A.) Life. Baruch Despinoza, (163 2- 1677, A. D.) b. in 
Amsterdam, of a family of Portuguese Jews who found a 
refuge from persecution in Holland, was thoroughly ed. in 



1 82 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

Hebrew literature, devoting himself for many years to the 
Bible and the Talmud. He then forsook the synagogue 
and theology for physics and metaphysics, adopting Car- 
tesianism ; was excommunicated by the Jews (1660) ; 
(changed his name to Benedictus de Espinoza) ; he lived in 
seclusion, though he received some flattering offers ; 
without family, he supported himself by making spectacle 
lenses. His life is represented as simple, of gracious man- 
ners, and unreprovable integrity. 

Works. '' Principles of Desc. geometrically arranged," 
(1663,) with appended " Cogitata Metaph. " In this S. 
for the most part, closely follows Desc. 

(2.) " Tj'actatus TJieologico-PoliticiLS ;'' which excited 
wide-spread attention and discussion : for his principles 
however, we must consider chiefly his 

(3.) Posthumous Works, " Ethics," which is chiefly 
metaphysics and psychology ; " Tract. Politiais ;" " De Em- 
endatione Iittellectus" (fragm.) etc. 

(B.) Method. S. adopts a geometrical method to de- 
velope his principles, (unattractive in form and injurious 
in results,) attempting to deduce, in strict logical order, a 
system from definitions and axioms. (Note ; assumption 
of a reality answering to thing defined ; but the criterion of 
reality, as with Desc, clearness and distinctness of the idea.) 

Knowledge is of three kinds : 

(i.) Opinio, imaginatio., confused, inadequate ideas 
from the words of others, or through the senses. 

(2.) Notiones communes, clear and adequate ideas 
through ratio. 

(3.) Intuitive knowledge, proceeding from the ade- 
quate idea of some one of God's attributes to adequate 
cognitions of the essence of things. 



SPINOZA. 183 

/ 

Falsity consists in inadequate, mutilated or confused 
ideas (2d class), otherwise ideas are true. 

The fundamental idea is substance = Being = God. 
His method then is a pfioid, beginning with the idea of 
God, deducing in logical order all resulting principles. 
The empirical is, as far as possible, avoided. 

(C.) Principle IS a rigid monism ; the mind, spirit, force, 
is identical with the material, the idea with the ideatuin, 
there being but one substance, one Being, mentally com- 
prehended in its essence = attributes, sc. extension and 
thought, infinite, eternal ; it is known in varied modes. 
Substance and cause are identified. Our chief attention 
must be given to 

(D.) Metaphysics, (i.) Substance is that which exists 
in se, and is conceived /^r se ; it is " catcsa sui^'i. e., its es- 
sence involves existence ; it is infinite ; i. e., it cannot be 
limited by another nature of the same kind, for there can 
be but one substance of the same nature or attribute ; it 
is one, indivisible ; necessary, eternal, it is God (Eth. i. 
Def., and Prop, i-io.) 

(2.) Attribute, is that which the mind perceives to 
constitute the essence of substance. Substance may have 
many infinite attributes (i. 11). Neither body nor soul 
are substances, but they are (i. 14.), 

(3.) Modes, affections of the attributes of God. 
(4.) God is being, absolutely infinite substance con- 
sisting in infinite attributes, '-^ constans infinitis attr.^' 
each of which expresses His eternal and infinite es- 
sence. 

(5.) No substance can be created by another (Eth. 
i. 6) ; therefore extension is one of the attributes of God 
(i. 15) ; infinite, eternal. Substance cannot h^ finite^ for 



184 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

then, by def., it would be limited by another of the same 
nature, which is impossible. 

(6.) ThoiigJit, also, is an attribute of God ; He is res 
cogitans, res extensa, 

(7.) God is free^ i, e. he exists from necessity of 
nature alone, and is determined to act by Himself alone. 
He acts by necessity of nature (freedom from external 
restraints) ; all things are determined by Him (i. 29). 

(8.) Nature, substance and cause are, by S., identi- 
fied ; iyid. 9, inf) Thought and will in God are one ; 
He is natiira iiaturans ; natttra naturata is all which follows 
from His nature and attributes, modes, or affections (i. 
24), at once the result of his decree, his thought, the ne- 
cessity of His nature (i. 29). Things could not be pro- 
duced otherwise than as they are (i. 33) ; they a,re infinite 
in number ; they are called contingent, only with reference 
to our own ignorance. 

(9.) Cause. God is cause of all, but causa irmnanens, 
not causa transiens ; He is the substance of all that which 
follows from his eternal and infinite essence, (essence = 
that which being given the thing is necessarily assumed, 
and the contrary,) i. e.^ particular things are the deter- 
minate affections of His attributes. 

The reason why He acts and why He exists, is one 
and the same ; as there is no final cause of existence, so 
none of His acts (i. 17). God needs nothing (i. 36). 

Finite things, which have determined existence, are de- 
termined in operation as well as existence, by other finite 
and determined causes, and so ad inf.^ (pre-existent modes 
of Div. attributes.) 

No attempt is here made to give S .'s strict logical sequence from def. and ax. ; or to trace 
his paralogisms ; but we must not overlook the iaXdiXpetiiio prijic. in the def. of substance. 



SPINOZA. 185 

(E.) Psychology, with S. is identical with physics, for 
man is a part of " nat. naturatay 

(i.) Bodies are the modes in which the Div. essence 
is expressed in determined ways, according to the attribute 
of extension. They are distinguished by the idea of motion 
in varying degrees, and this, in one body, is determined 
by another body, and so ad inf. 

(2.) Ideas are those modes in which the Div. essence 
is expressed according to the attribute of thought. The 
only object of our mind is body; and to each determined 
body answers its idea, which is "adequate" when it has 
all the properties of a true idea ; reality and perfection are 
the same^thing; and the more perfections the body has, 
the more in its idea. (Note : Distinguish idea from image.) 
The order and connexion of ideas answer to the order and 
connexion of bodies, and conversely. 

Man's essence is constituted by determined modes of 
God's attributes ; and body and soul are consequently one 
individtmm, being, so to speak, a part of God. As the 
body is part of nat. naUirata, in which is God's attribute 
of extension manifested, so is the soul, with its affections, 
will, desire, love, a part of nat. natnrata, as the manifesta- 
tion of God's attribute of thought, (i. 31.) To attribute 
affections to God, natnra natiirans, (i, 17, 31) is anthropo- 
morphic error. 

The two functions of the soul are knowing and willing. 

(i) Knowing, {a^ its own body of which it is the idea, 

in sensation having the idea of the body and all its parts, 

ip.) It perceives also the ''affections,'^ which arise from 
the action of other bodies on its own, and so also the 
affections, and, through them, the nature of other bodies ; 
(sense-perception.) 



1 86 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

(c.) The ideas of past affections can be represented 
(imagination) ; and if the body have been affected in two 
modes at once, when the mind imagines one, it will im- 
mediately recall the other, a " concatenation" of the affec- 
tions of the body, of those ideas which involve the nature 
of things ; the same thing is true of affections of the mind, 
(iii. 14.) 

(d.) Through these perceptions, arises in the intellect 
the idea of the thing in itself ; the confused, inadequate 
idea has become the adequate, perfect idea. 

(2) Willi?ig, only relatively differs from knowing 
(ii. 49) ; will and intellect are collective names for acts 
of willing and ideas, which are one and the same. Both 
these as determined modes are necessarily determined to 
existence and operation by other modes ad inf., and con- 
sequently freedom of choice does not exist, (ii. 48.) Error 
arises from man's being conscious of effort, but not of its 
cause. 

(F.) Ethics, (i.) Affections (affecttts) are transient states 
of the body as part of itatura natiirata, through which 
its activity is increased or diminished, aided or hindered, 
and ideas of these. When man is the adequate cause of such 
an affection it is actio ; when this is not the case, passio. 
The primary affections are desire, joy, and sadness. The 
passions proper are inadequate and confused ideas, in 
which man finds himself suffering ; attaining to the ade- 
quate, the mind becomes active, passion ceases ; a state 
never perfectly reached. 

(2.) The chief effort of man is to preserve his being, 
and he calls that good which contributes to self-preserva- 
tion and self-perfection, and evil the contrary: they are 
modes of thought, they are relative (iii. 39), for everything 
in nature is, in its degree, perfect. 



SPINOZA. 187 

(3.) The moral in man is this strife and opposition. 
Virttie is the power to accomplish the object ; it is action 
according to the laws of one's own nature ; but nothing is 
as useful to man as his fellow men, on whom he so much 
depends ; a rational life, a life according to nature's laws, 
includes justice, fidelity and honesty. 

(4.) But true knowledge, is the life, the activity, the 
perfection of spirit ; this consists therefore in having ade- 
quate ideas, and highest is the adequate cognition of the 
eternal and infinite essence of God. (ii. 47.) Herein is 
the highest good, the chief virtue of man, the perfection 
of his intellect, his beatitude ; (iv. app. c. iv.) : joy, love of 
God is the result of this cognition. 

(5.) Moral evil, sin ; man cannot sin against the will, 
the knowledge of God, for this is the same as the neces- 
sary laws of nat. naturata, which cannot be violated. All 
human affections, love, hate, envy, etc., are properties of 
nature (i. 31), inconvenient sometimes, but necessary, 
having determined causes ; for nature, of which man is a 
particle, regards many things besides his convenience 
(Tract. Pol. i. 4 ; ii. 8). Whatever we do, we do of necessity, 
being thereto determined ; but the consequences of the 
deed may be privative of some perfection. 

Repentmtce is sadness with the concomitant idea of 
some deed which we believe we have done freely; this 
sadness is due to education, etc. (Eth. iii. Def. 27.) 

(6.) Immortality is not personal ; it is in the Div. 
idea. 

(7.) Politics. Each man exists and 2iCts>jtire natiL- 
rce, necessarily, and, by the same right, judges what is 
good and evil for him, useful, etc. 

This natural right = natural power = power of God (Tr. 



155 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

Pol. ii. 4) ; i.e.^ the right of individuals extends by 
nature as far as their power does ; it is not determined by 
reason, but by desire. 

If harmonious, according to reason, to the law of nature, 
men would be most useful to one another ; but affections 
necessitated overpower virtue = power, and men oppose 
one another ; they must therefore give up natural rights 
for common security ; thus society or one man (better the 
former) receives the right of judging what is good and 
evil, of making laws, which it enforces, not by reason but 
by threat, of punishing, etc. This compact, based on 
utility and reason, or any other is void when the utility 
ceases. (Tr. Theol.-Pol. xvi. i6, seq.) 

In the natural state is no sin ; sin is (outward) disobedi- 
ence to the laws of the state, and by it punishable ; the 
contrary is merit. 

In the same state also is no property, therefore no jus- 
tice and injustice, (Eth. iv. 37.) Men therefore for secu- 
rity, though by nature enemies, agree to have collectively 
what each would have separately, of two evils choosing 
the less ; of two goods, the better. 

Impermm is in the community : the power transferred 
is absolute, (Tr. Th.-Pol. xvi. 27,) and the citizen must 
submit to unjust decrees ; the power of the state is limited 
only by that which belongs to him as man, which no com- 
pact can destroy, e.g. thought, speech, free interpretation 
in religion. 

In the externals of religion, the state is sole judge. 

Of special interest in connection with recent " scien- 
tific " discussion is S'.s. theory of 

(8) Miracles. (Tr. Th.-Pol. i. 6.) When men do not 
understand the cause of an operation, they call it God's 



LEIBNITZ. 189 

work ; they think His Providence is not concerned in what 
they can explain by nature's laws, and that natural causes 
are suspended when He acts ; and so they imagine two 
powers, {a) of God, {b) of nature ; the heathen view of in- 
constant, unstable gods. 

But nothing happens contrary to the immutable laws 
of nature, and in this we can know the existence and 
Prov. of God, not in miracles, which, as determined works, 
do not show infinite power; if there were works surpass- 
ing our understanding, we could conclude nothing from 
them ; " against nature" and " above nature" do not differ. 

All which God wills or knows, involves eternal necessity 
and truth ; the universal laws of nature are His decrees, 
following necessarily from His nature as '' nat. naULrajis!' 

A miracle, then, is a work of whose laws we are at 
present ignorant. 

4. Leibnitz. 

(A.) Life. Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibnitz, b. 1646, at 
Leipzic, studied there and at Jena, law, history, politics — 
learning an eclectic peripateticism. In 1670, he was in 
the service of the court of Mayence, producing some of 
his earlier works at the age of 24 and 25. As counsellor 
of his Prince, we next find him at Paris, for three years 
studying math., phil., theology; (he met Malebranche.) In 
1673, he was in Eng., meeting the R.S., then in Holland, 
conferring with Spinoza. In 1684, he published his Diff. 
Calc. (cf. Sir Isaac Newton.) In 1688, he was received with 
great distinction at Rome. In 1690, he entered the service 
of the Elector of Hanover ; about this time we find him 
corresponding with Bossuet and others upon a reunion of 
Catholics and Protestants, seeking also to unite the 



190 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

Lutherans and Calvinists. He founded the Acad, of 
BerUn (1700), and was consulted by Peter the Great upon 
his plans for the civilization of Russia. In 171 2, we find 
him imperial counsellor at Vienna. He died at Hanover 
in 1716. 

L. was a man of universal intelligence, of extraor- 
dinary penetration, of unbounded learning, devoting him- 
self with energy and wide-reaching liberality, to the most 
varied topics ; a metaphysician, mathematician, geologist, 
jurisprudent. 

Wo7'ks. Never systematizing his own views for publica- 
tion, he wrote voluminously as special points presented 
themselves. Most noteworthy for phil. are, among others, 
'' NoiLveaitx Essais sicr V Entendement Hiunainl' (1704, 
against Locke), " TJieodicee!' {\J\o) ; '' Piiiic. Phil.,'\i'ji/\., 
Moiiadology, etc.,) for Prince Eugene of Savoy. 

(B.) Method and Theory of Knowledge. L. seeks to 
avoid the extreme idealism of Spinoza and Malebranche, 
but still more the empiricism of Locke. (Nouv. Ess.) Like 
Desc, he seeks a math, method of demonstration from 
necessary metaphysical truth, whose certainty is not 
proved in experience, but in the soul itself. (Rationalism.) 
In general, he is eclectic ; the majority of sects are right 
in what they affirm ; error, for the most part, is in 
negation. 

Ideas are clear or obscure, distinct or confused, ade- 
quate or inadequate, sensuous or intellectual. The senses 
give indistinct representations of what takes place, not 
what necessarily is, or ought to be, neither causes nor 
reasons. Adequate ideas are from a priori concepts of 
the reason. Truths, accordingly, are contingent or neces- 
sary, empirical or rational. 



LEIBNITZ. 191 

All intellectual ideas and principles, being marked by 
universality and necessity, are innate ; we therefore assent 
to them as soon as they are presented to us. The empir- 
ical proposition " nihil in intellectii, qnod non prius in 
sensiil' needs, at least, the addition, " nisi intellectns ipse."" 
Not that the soul is conscious of these innate ideas and 
principles, but the soul virtually possesses them, as a con- 
dition of thought itself, conscious or unconscious. As 
perception, which is of the essence of the soul, becomes 
apperception by occasion of sensuous experience, so is this 
latter also the occasional cause which brings into con- 
sciousness the corresponding innate idea, and the virtual 
becomes actual. 

Impressions in sense also become empirical ideas in the 
same way ; for the soul " has no window " through which 
sensible objects can enter it. 

The fundamental /nV^a/Z^i" are (i) identity and contra- 
diction, for necessary matter; (2) sufficient reason for 
contingent matter. 

In finding a criterion, L. tries to avoid the imperfections 
of that of Descartes, sc. " clearness and distinctness." Ade- 
quate knowledge implies possibility of complete analysis 
of every thing that makes up the clear and distinct con- 
ception ; the ideas must involve no contradiction, and the 
proposition must be warranted by exact observation, and 
strict logical demonstration. (Cf. Kant's Critique, P. R.; 
"L. intellectuallized Phenomena.") 

L. does not attempt to discriminate and separate the 
subjective element in thought, nor does he distinguish 
well logical possibility from reality. 

(C.) Monadology. Unable to recognize matter as 
purely passive, and nature as lifeless mechanism, L. rein- 



192 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

states a dynamical theory. If matter's essence be exten- 
sion it is infinitely divisible, but this is inconceivable ; 
bodies are an aggregate of monads. These are not 
atoms, but simple elements, without extension, imperish- 
able from without, unchangeable, whose essence is force. 
Monads are analogous to th6 human soul ; their powers are 
(i) *^ perception " for representations of all in each individ- 
ual ; (2) " appetite " or tendency to new perceptions. 

Their perpetual changes are due solely to internal 
energy ; but each strives {appetitits) to represent the uni- 
verse ; and each is a microcosm, but in different man- 
ner from every other. (Note the " law of continuity," " every- 
thing in nature goes by steps.") Substances which differ 
can have no mutual influence ; but in creation a relation 
has been established between ideas in the monads and 
their motions, the 

Pi^e-established Jiarmony. God has made each monad, 
in its activity and internal changes, to answer to every 
other, (cf. the Clock-maker.) 

But this is in widely different degrees ; (i) in some 
monads, wholly obscure (inorganic bodies) ; (2) in others, 
with sense-perception ; (3) in others, (human souls) with 
clear and distinct apperception; 

Inorganic bodies are aggregates of (i), known empiric- 
ally as phenomena only {materia prima). Extensio7i, then, 
instead of being the essence of matter, is purely phenom- 
enal, and caused by the aggregate unity of monads. Mat- 
ter is ^^ phenom, bene fnndaUtm!' Space is purely ideal, 
the order of co-existing phenomena. Time is the order of 
succession in them. 

Organic bodies are constitutec^ by a central monad of 
the second class, the substantial form, around which are 



LEIBNITZ. 193 

gathered monads of a lower order. This central monad, a 
soul, (plant or animal) is the principle of unity. 

(D.) Psychology. L. considers human nat. in the light 
of his monadology. The human soul is in the highest 
grade of monads, possessing intelligence and will, the 
central monad of the human body. The ideal world in 
it expresses the actual world, and, confusedly, the perfect 
ideas which are in God, the Monas Monadtun. 

The mutual influence of soul and body, also, can only 
be explained by the "pre-est. harm.'' 

All monads, including human souls, were created 
at once ; but soul-monads, through God's power, pass 
from unconsciousness (" naked monads ") to consciousness. 
In death, monads of organic bodies lapse into the first 
grade, from which they came ; not so man's soul-monad ; 
it is immovtal. 

Freedom of the zvill, is not "freedom of indifference," 
which is irrational. It is analogous to the Divine : it 
chooses the higher good, by moral necessity, and this does 
not annihilate the will's freedom. 

(E.) Theodicea and Ethics. God is the monad of 
monads, the necessarily existing essence, the sole, un- 
limited cause of all, producing by His will the best, the 
most perfect world (optimism) ; other worlds, in Divine 
Intellect, are metaphysically possible, but morally impos- 
sible, because God's perfection, a law unto Him, is the 
ground of determination in Him to the best world. 

L. combines the mechanical theory of nat. with the 
teleological ; the principles of physics and mechanics 
depend on Supreme intelligence and forethought ; and all 
efficient causes with their results in the kingdom of na- 
ture, the world-machine, answer to the final causes and 

9 



194 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

their results in the world of spirits, where God is ruler, 
rewarding the good, and punishing the evil. 

Morality is grounded in the object of man's being, 
eternal happiness in God, and ever-increasing felicity ; on 
this is founded the obligation of virtue and righteous- 
ness. 

Evil must be distinguished as (i) metaphysical, the 
necessary limitations of finite beings ; 

(2) physical, the defects and pains incident to this 
life; 

(3) moral, the violation of the Divine law. 

(i) is the root of (2) and (3) ; God's will is not the 
efficient cause of evil; for it is grounded in (i), which re- 
sults from the very nature of the best possible world ; and 
power of choice, from which results (3), is the very foun- 
dation of morality. 

(F.) Lcibnits School, L., as might be expected, had 
numerous followers, and, whether among friends or op- 
ponents, he exerted an immense influence on German 
thought, which, at least until the middle of the i8th Cent., 
took an idealistic direction. Chief in importance is 

Chfistian von Wolff, b. at Breslau, (1679, A.D.) ; prof, at 
Halle and Marburg ; d. 1754. Without originality, he 
yet gave to the thoughts of his master what they lacked, a 
clear, logical and consistent system. He modified only 
minor points, e. g. more clearly distinguishing material 
and spiritual monads ; the former do not possess percep- 
tion. 

He distinguishes more clearly than his predecessors 
the various subjects of philosophical investigation. 

Phil, is, (i) speculative ; (2) practical : 
(i) is {(i) logic ; {b) metaphysics : 



LEIBNITZ. 195 

(b) is {a) ontology ; (/5) rational psychology ; {y) 

cosmology ; {<^) natural theology : 

(2) is (a) ethics ; {b) international law ; {c) politics : 
Empirical psychology precedes all parts of phil. 
The Leibnitz-Wolff School gradually lost its credit 

through its own pedantry, and the prevailing empiricism 

of Locke. 

5. English Idealism in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries. 

[Ref., Dr. Porter's App. to Ueberweg's Hist. Phil.; Burnet's "Hist, of His Own 
Time ; " Tulloch's " Rational Theol.," etc.] 

Here for convenient study we may consider a suc- 
cession of thinkers who opposed more or less successfully 
the prevailing empiricism of Eng. thought, with a more 
or less decided tendency to find the ground of truth in 
the innate principles of the soul itself, a modern Platonic 
school. 

(A.) Edward Herbert, Lord Cherbury, (i 581-1648, 
A.D.) espoused the Parliamentary cause in the civil war ; 
wrote " i7^ Ve^itate^' '' De Religione LaicV,' etc. Innate 
cognitions are directly given in intuitive reason ; the mind 
is not a " tabttla rasa,' but a closed book. 

H. lays the foundation for the Eng. " deistical school " 
in a religion of reason, resting on original immediate 
knowledge in all men. (See Dr. Porter's App. to Ueberweg, 
vol. ii.) 

(B.) Ralph Cudworth, (1617-1688, A.D.,) Professor of 
Hebrew at the Univ. of Cambridge, where he spent his life. 
Besides his " Treatise on Eternal and immutable Moral- 
ity " and on Free-will, against the Fatalism of Hobbes, 
his " Intellectual System of the Universe," worthy of 



196 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

special note, is a work of vast erudition, directed against 
atheistic cosmology. He claims final causes for physics ; 
to explain motion in matter, he maintains the necessity of 
assuming a " plastic nature," the medium whereby God is 
the cause of individual things : thereby all .things, even 
the evil, are made to contribute to the good, the end of the 
universal whole. 

C, with Henry More (vid. infr.) and others, founded a 
school of Platonism at Cambridge, which, however, was 
devoid of permanent influence. 

(C.) Samuel Clarke, D.D. (1675-1729, A.D.) wrote on 
the " Being and Attributes of God," " The Obligations of 
Nat. Religion, etc." His attempt at a priori demonstra- 
tion in the first treatise received general attention and 
caused wide-spread controversy. Immutable, absolute 
Being must eternally exist, one, self-existent, omnipresent. 
C. supplements his demonstration by a post. args. con- 
cerning the attributes of God. These, not mere decree 
or utility, are the foundation of moral obhgation. Ac- 
tivity of the soul is, as such, spontaneous, ne.cessarily 
free. 

(D.) Joseph Butler, (1692-1752, A. D.) preacher at the 
Rolls chapel, bishop of Durham, (1750), pub. (1726) his 
fifteen sermons, preached at the Rolls chapel, and in 1730, 
aq essay on the Nature of Virtue. (App. to the Analogy.) 
Although unsystematic, practical rather than speculative, 
and carefully avoiding scientific terminology, he yet 
asserts the existence of a Moral Faculty whose judgments 
are independent of the consequences of actions, ruling 
the affections and passions and directing them to definite 
moral ends ; e. g. settled Resentment is naturally directed 
to the administration of justice against vice and wicked- 
ness. (See Whewell's Lect.) 



ENGLISH IDEALISM. IQ/ 

(E.) George Berkeley, though he set out from the em- 
piricism of Locke to develop its conckisions against 
materiaUsm, (phenomenahsm, ideahsm,) yet reached a 
stand-point which assimilates him in many respects to 
the rationalistic or the Platonic School. (See Prefaces, in 
Frazer's Ed.; Reid ; Br. Quarterly, Jan. 1874.) 

(A.) Life. b. 1684, in Ireland ; distinguished for 
math, attainments ; fellow at Trin. Coll., Dublin : his 
early Philos. works at the age of 25, among the most re- 
markable contributions ever produced at so early an age : 
associate of Pope, Swift, etc. In 1728 renounced pros- 
pects of promotion for a mission in Am. Failing, returned 
and was made Bishop of Cloyne, (1734); d. at Oxf. 1753. 
Works. " New theory of Vision," (1709) in which appears 
already his reduction of Locke's theory of ideas to phe- 
nomenalism : *' Principles of Hum. Knowledge," (1710) 
on a basis of nommalism and sceptical acosmism ; founding 
positively a duality, subjective, of ego and ideas ; ob- 
jectively, of sensations and Deity : (cf. changes in 2d ed. 
1734)5 "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous ;" 
(17 1 3) defending B.'s theory of matter; "DeMotu" 
(1721) ; " Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, " (1732), 
seven dialogues written in R. I., in defence of Chris- 
tian ethics and theism; " Siris," (1744) Platonic Ontology. 
B.'s style clear, vivacious, glowing with warmth and fancy, 
together with the precision of his reasoning, and his re- 
lations to more recent positivism, makes him one of the 
most attractive and important of Eng. Metaphysicians. 

(B.) Method \2X^2.y?, empirical, and originally following 
Locke almost implicitly, nominalist and skeptical, he yet 
proceeds at length from psychological ground to pure on- 



igS DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

tology, as demanded by reason, which alone can give true 
science. (Siris, § 264; Theory of Vis. Vind. § 11.) 

(C.) Pri7iciple. (i.) Negative. Material substance 
is a mere empty abstraction ; its qualities are sensible, i. e. 
in the mind (Princ. §§ 16 seq.). Its esse=percipi. 

(2.) Positive. A dualism of spirit and ideas ; (in his 
earlier works the latter examined ; in his later more fully 
the concepts of reason.) the subject-object in the ego 
given in consciousness. Infinite spirit the cause of ideas. 

(D.) Ideology. " Ideas ":=sensations or sensible images, 
are, 

(i.) Ideas imprinted through special senses ; there is 
no communis sensus ; (Th. of Vis. § 127;) accompanying 
ideas are indicated by one name ; (Princ. § i) ; 

(2.) Ideas perceived in the passions of the mind ; 
(3.) Ideas formed by memory and imagination, com- 
pounding, dividing, or representing (i) and (2), suggesting 
those which previously existed. (Th. Vis. Vind. § 9.) 
Ideas become general only when a particular one stands 
for others of the same sort. (Introd. Princ. § 15.) They 
can exist only in a mind which perceives them. 

Primary and secondary qualities are equally ideas ; e. 
g., extension, motion (relative). 

Ideas can be only like ideas, and could give no notion 
of objects, if such existed. 

Physics is only concerned with phenomena (§ 102). 
What we call cmises in nature are only the invariable con- 
nexions of phenom., the rules and method of motion. {Dc 
MotiL ; Siris, § 261 seq. ; cf. Martineau, Cont. Rev., Jan. 
Feb., 1876.) 

The senses indeed are to be trusted, but their only pro- 
duct is ideas. 



ENGLISH IDEALISM. 199 

What we call nature is the series of sensations in our 
minds. 

(E.) Metaphysical Principles, (i.) Substance = spirit : 
something perceives the ideas, sc. spirit, ego ; it is one, 
simple; (a) perceiving, it ^ is the understanding; {b) pro- 
ducing ideas, etc., it is the will. Of it we have no "idea," 
for the passive cannot represent that which acts, but we 
have in consciousness the notion of an agent, perceiving, 
knowing, willing, etc. (Hylas and Phil. iii. p. 328.) 

(2.) Cause ; reason derives the concept from our 
consciousness of the active power of the will in producing 
effects ; (ideas, etc. ; Princ. § 28 ; Siris, §§ 155, 160.) 

(3.) God. In ideas excited through sense, the mind 
is passive recipient ; therefore some other will or spirit 
produces them, hence arg. a post, to the Being of God ; 
their connexion shows foresight, His Providence ; their 
order, etc., shows wisdom, power and goodness. The ma- 
terial world is a sensible language in which He speaks to 
our spirit. (Princ, § 146, seq.) All things exist " in God," 
as eternal ideas, seen by pure reason through phenomena. 
(Siris §§ 231-368.) Thus B. arrives empirically at trans- 
cendental realism. There are, revealed in the Logos, self- 
existent, necessary, uncreated principles. 

(4.) Force, residing in bodies, is a mathematical hy- 
pothesis (§ 234) ; senses tell us only of motion, but power 
or force is a metaphysical concept of reason derived from 
consciousness of volition. 

Time is succession of ideas. 

Space is the sensation of unresisted motion of our 
body. (Princ. §§ 97, 116.) 

Extension, also, is an abstract idea, and as such, non- 
existent ; we can divide to the limit of our perception ; 
but ideas are not infinitely divisible. (Princ. § 123.) 



200 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM. 

(5.) We infer the existence of other spirits from 
phenomena, referring ideas produced in us to other agents, 
supposed to be Hke ourselves. (Princ. § 145.) 

(F.) Ethics. In " Alciphron," dialogues in the Platonic 
manner, B. opposes the selfish theory of Mandeville and 
the sentimentalism of Shaftesbury, (vid. infr.) Belief in 
immortality, deity, a future life, is not of custom or educa- 
tion, but grounded in human nature. The rule and measure 
of good is its tendency to promote the general interests 
of mankind. 

Freedom of will is an activity of the soul known in con- 
sciousness. (Ale. VII. § 19, seq.) 



CONTINENTAL SKEPTICS. 20 1 



CHAPTER XII. 

SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES. 

I. Continental Skeptics. 2. English Skeptics be- 
fore Hume. 3. Hume. 4. Mysticism. 

I. Continental Skeptics. 

Philos. Slcepticism, a despair of human reason, may 
take two unlike forms ; (i) a negation of all dogmas, as in 
the New Academy ; (2) a reception by faith of dogmas 
wholly undiscernible by reason ; (note mystical tendency in 
2). To the second class of skeptics belong Httety (163a- 
172 1, A. D.) Bishop of Avranches, and 

(A.) Blaise Pascal, (i) b. 1623, at Clermont, early dis- 
tinguished for his attainments in math, and physics, an 
earnest adherent of the Jansenists, (" Lettres Provin- 
ciales,'') ; d. 1662. 

(2.) P., in part, follows Descartes, (e. g. Pens6es, ii. 
15, ed. 1867) ; but reason can give no certainty, although in 
our nature lie an irresistible searching after truth, and a 
tendency towards certain principles. " We cannot escape 
from both these sects (sc. Pyrrhonists and Dogmatists), nor 
subsist in either." 

" Les grandes ames qui, ayant parcouru tout ce que les hommes 
peuvent savoir, trouvent qu'ils ne savent rien, et se rencontrent en 
cette meme ignorance d'ou ils dtaient partis." (IV. 15, 17, 18.) 



202 SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM. 

The knowledge of truth comes from another source, 
revelation, received by faith, an immediate illumination 
from God, which has its seat in the heart ; one must love, 
in order to know. (cc. xi, xii.) 

(B.) PierreBayle, (i.) (1648-1706, A. D.) b. in Foix, a 
Protestant, then a Catholic, then Protestant again ; to 
avoid persecution under Louis XIV. took refuge in Hol- 
land at Rotterdam, and wrote his Dictionnaire Historique et 
Critique. 

(2.) Of immense erudition, enlivened by satirical wit 
and elegance of style, B. is skeptical in spirit, rather than 
with a system. He contents himself with exposing the 
weaknesses, imperfections and inconsistencies of all dog- 
matic systems. Reason is clear sighted enough to detect 
errors, but not to arrive at truth. In the same spirit, he 
points out the apparent antagonisms between phil. and 
Christian dogmas, 

(C.) Voltaire, (i.) (1694-1 778, A. D.) b. in Paris, a pu- 
pil of the Jesuits, a friend of Lord Bolingbroke, in London 
(1726-9,) followed the R. S. in physical researches with 
the phil. of Hobbes as a basis ; in England changed his 
name from Arouet by an anagram ; from poetry turned his 
attention to philos. questions, but without earnestness or 
depth. He returned to France, introducing there the phy- 
sics of Newton and the empiricism of Locke. (See Mor- 
ley; Soirees de S. Petersburg, vol. i, p. 186; Blackwood's 
Mag., Mar., 1872.) 

(2.) His only guide to truth seems to be good sense 
under the inspiration of Locke ; he turns the polished shafts 
of his brilliant wit, and sarcastic ridicule equally against 
the ideas of Plato, the Cartesian demonstration of the ex- 
istence of God, and Leibnitz's theory of matter, and his 



ENGLISH SKEPTICS. 203 

optimism {Candide). He ridicules equally virtue and vice, 
Aristotle and Rousseau : " Most men are wolves and 
foxes, with a few sheep among them." 

V. is, ail fond, sensualist; all knowledge is through the 
senses. Yet he believes that the existence of a creator 
is, a post., demonstrable. "If God did not exist, it would 
be necessary to invent Him," for the support of a moral 
order : future rewards and punishments, however, are 
doubtful. 

2. English Skeptics. 

[Ref . Mackintosh, Eth. Phil, in 17th and i8th Cent. ; Hallam's Lit. ; Morell's Hist. 
Mod. Phil. ; Whewell's Lect. Moral Phil.] 

We have alfeady seen the skeptical element in Berkeley's 
earlier phil, and have now to glance at a succession of emp. 
thinkers in a narrow, sphere of thought, with their oppo- 
nents, terminating in the greater genius and more search- 
ing analysis of Hume. 

(A.) yosepk Glanville, (i 636-1 680, A.D.) (i.) F. R.. 
S., Court-preacher to Chas. H., wrote " Scepsis Scientifica, 
confessed Ignorance the way to Science, etc. ;" " Sadducis- 
mus Triumphatus'' (posthumous), etc. 

(2.) He opposed all dogmatism. Causes are the al- 
phabet of science ; but since experience gives only phe- 
nomena, we can only resort to hypotheses : " Post illud, 
ergo p7'opter illud!' 

(B.) Henry Do dwell, (1641-1711, A. D.), of Trin. Coll. 
Dublin, Prof. Hist. Oxf., gave a new impulse to discussion 
upon the immortality of the soul. It is naturally mortal, 
but made immortal in Christians by the gift of God (cf . 
" body, soul and spirit." N. T.) 



204 SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM. 

(C.) Antony Collins, (1676-1729, A. D.) of Cambridge 
Univ., a friend of Locke, wrote " Reason in Theology," 
" Free Thinking," " Liberty and Necessity," etc. 

Liberty is "a power in man to do as he wills and 
pleases," but he is determined by reason and senses ; 
" moral necessity ;" an exhaustive arg. for " Philos. Nee." 
Collins is one of a group of writers who endeavored to es- 
tablish the relations of Rev. to phil. by denying all super- 
natural truths, accepting the empiricism of Locke, but 
denying the limitations by which he had surrounded it. 
Other writers (" deistical ") are Toland, (1669-1722, A. D.) 
'' Christianity not Mysterious," and TmdaL (1657-1733, A. 
D.) '■' Christianity as old as the Creation," (cf. Bishop But- 
ler's Anal.) etc. 

(D.) Bernard de Mandevilte, (1670-1733, A. D.) b. at 
Dort, Holland, resided in Eng.; pub. (1714) ''Fable of the 
Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits." 

Setting out from Locke's denial of innate practical prin- 
ciples, and from the "utilitarian " theory of morals, he shows 
•that there is no essential distinction between vice and vir- 
tue, and that the former may be beneficial to society. All 
natural impulses are legitimate, and restraints upon them 
by priests and magistrates are a usurpation, (cf. Berkeley's 
Alciphron.) 

(E.) David Hartley, (i.) (1704-1757, A. D.) ed. at 
Cambridge, a physician, produced in 1 749 his " Observa- 
tions on Man," etc. (See Coleridge, Biog. Lit. cc. v.-vii.) 
(2.) He is the founder of the '' Associational Psy- 
chology." ' Following Locke, he offers a physiological sen- 
sualism which abandons any attempt to bridge the gulf be- 
tween mind and matter, by reducing phenom. of the form- 
er to terms of the latter. Sensation is explained as vi- 



ENGLISH SKEPTICS. 205 

brations in the nervous system : they leave vestiges, ideas 
of sensations : repeated, they create a disposition to cer- 
tain vibratiuncules. Simple vibrations may combine into 
the complex. 

Association of ideas = "any combination of thought or 
feeling which is capable of becoming habitual by repeti- 
tion." As the vibratory movement acquires a tendency to 
repeat itself, so one may tend to produce another naturally 
associated with it. Three things are associated, sensa- 
tions, (include emotions,) ideas, muscular movements ; any 
oifb of associated sensations. A, B, C, may recall the ideas, 
a, b, c. Volition is explained as muscular action excited 
by an idea. 

Passions, affections, are caused by assoc. of pleasure or 
pain with ideas. All reasoning is to be explained by assoc. 
of ideas ; it is the ground of assent 

Note, also, the "law of transference," with its ethical 
applications. (Obs. on man, iv. 4-6.) 

It may be so old and habitual as to seem innate in- 
stinct. H. disclaims the materialist consequences of his 
principle. 

(cf. Bain etc.) 

(F.) Joseph Priestley, (i 733-1 804, A. D.) of wide 
reputation in physics and chemistry, and for his liberal 
politics*. He wrote (1777) " Disquisitions relating to Mat- 
ter and Spirit ;" "Materialism and Philosophical Neces- 
sity," etc. He adheres to Locke against Hume's skepti- 
cism, while controverting also Reid's appeal to intuitive 
beliefs. He expands Hartley's principles into material- 
ism, philos. necessity. Utilitarian ethics. Thought = sen- 
sation, (cf. Condillac). Yet he tries to reconcile his views 
with "natural religion," recognizing a Divine spirit, and 



206 SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM. 

looking for a future state in the resurrection of the 
body. 

(G.) Erasmus Darwin, (i 731-1802, A. D.) ed. at 
Univ. of Cambridge and Edinb., physician, botanist, poet ; 
wrote "Zoonomania," (1794) attempting a still further sys- 
tematizing of Hartley's Psychology, leaving out the theo- 
logical element of Priestley. 

At this point might be considered the ethics of Paley ; 
but, deferring their consideration for a subsequent chapter, 
before examining the most complete skeptical develop- 
ment of empiricism, we may glance briefly at some leading 

Opponents. (A.) Richard Cumberland, {\6^2-\'ji(^, K. 
D.) fellow of Magdalen Coll., Camb., Bishop of Peterbor- 
ough, wrote " Disqnisitio de Legibus Natures,'' (^167 2) in 
which, against Hobbes, he seeks to establish inductively 
the existence of a universal ethical rule founded on human 
nature, the law of universal benevolence ; the proof of it is, 
it tends to the highest happiness of all. This is evidence 
of a Divine purpose, of the law of a Supreme Lawgiver. 
Moral rules are discernible by right reason, the capacity to 
discern first principles as well as practical laws by which 
to attain the ethical end. He lays a foundation for utili- 
tarianism, though we see an element of rationalism in his 
phil. 

(B.) Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, 
(1671-1713, A. D.), author of the "Characteristics of Men, 
etc." (i 711), wrote also "Inquiry concerning Virtue and 
Merit," (1699.) He takes essentially the same ground, 
seeking to avoid injurious practical inferences from Locke's 
empiricism. Virtue consists in harmony of our social and 
selfish propensities, so that each individual may regard the 
good of the community. 



HUME. 207 

Nature and reason give rise to some moral conceptions, 
a " moral sense." Morality does not require a religious 
basis. 

In general, of these opponents of skepticism it may be 
said that unable to rest ethics on immutable a piiori prin- 
ciples, yet unwilling to accept the epicurean morals of ex- 
pediency, or extreme utilitarianism, they offered a "moral- 
ity of consequences." (Whewell, c. vii.) 

3. Hume. 

[Ref. T. H. Green's Introd. ; Reid ; Sir W. Hamilton's Disc. ; McCosh, Scottish 
Philos.] 

Hume marks a most important stage in the Hist, of 
Mod. Phil., especially of empiricism. By his bold, clear, 
logical development of Locke, and his searching and uni- 
versally destructive analysis, he impelled other minds to 
renewed and deeper search for truth (cf. Kant). Empiri- 
cal principles, vanishing in feeling, "perception," were 
reconstituted as generalized experience transmitted from 
the past. 

{A.) Life. David Hume, (171 i-i 776, A. D.) b. at 
Edin. ; abandoned law for phil. and belles lettres ; in 
France (1734-7). His Treatise on Hum. Nat. in 1739 
received but little attention. In 1747 he was Sec. to the 
Embassy at Vienna and Turin. His position as librarian at 
Edin. in 1752 gave him facilities which he employed in 
producing his Hist. Eng. (i 754-1 762) ; was Sec. to Emb. 
at Versailles (1763), and Under-Sec. of State (1767). 
(Note his quarrel with Rousseau). He died at Edin. 

Woi'ks : (i) "Treatise on Human Nature ;" v. i, of 
the Understanding ; v. 2, of the Passions ; v. 3, of 
Morals (1739-40). 



208 SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM. 

(2) " Inquiry concerning the Hum. Understanding 
and Principles of Morals" (1748): (chiefly abridged from 

(I). 

(3) " Essays, Moral, Political and Literary " : (1742). 

(4) " Dissertation on the Passions ;" (principles of 
morals) : (175 1). 

(5) " Nat. Hist, of Religion" (1755) ; " Dialogues on 
Nat. Rel." (Posth.) 

Hume is distinguished for depth, consistency, and 
correct and elegant style. 

(B.) Method. H. aims at strict empiricism, accepting 
without question or proof Locke's theory of ideas ; but, 
with greater logical consistency, (cf. Treat, on Hum. Nat. 
" being an attempt to introduce the experimental method 
of reasoning, etc.,") he aims to investigate thus the ex- 
tent and force of human understanding, the nature of 
ideas, and of reasoning. 

(C.) Principle. " After the most accurate and ex- 
act of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I should 
assent to it ; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to 
consider objects strongly in that view, under which they 
appear to me." (Hum. Nat., i. iv. 7). Experience is a prin- 
ciple for the past ; habit creates expectation concerning 
the future. (Note " propensity to feign.") 

All knowledge is reduced ultimately to subjective trans- 
itory impressions ; it exists = it is felt. (Sensualism.) 

(D.) Theory of knowledge \?> based on Locke's ideology. 
" Perceptions " are (i) impressions produced in feeling (= 
thinking) ; 

(2) "Ideas" reproduced by memory and imagination 
from precedent impressions : these may produce (a) sec- 
ondary impressions, desire, or aversion, (reflection); (<^) 



HUME. 209 

secondary ideas of these, in mem. and imag. Thinking 
is a less lively feeling. Mem. and imag. differ only in 
liveliness ; the latter less lively and may admit a different 
order of impressions. 

The understanding (= reason) judges of 

(i) The relations of ideas, (Geom. Alg., etc.): but 
science never attains precision or certainty (i. ii. 4.) ; 

(2) The relations of objects, of facts (sc. feelings). 
" Reason is and ought to be the slave of passions, 
to serve and obey them," (ii. iii. 3), merely combining, 
separating, etc. 

Perceptions are associated, by natural " propensity," 
according to three relations ; (i) resemblance; (2) conti- 
guity ; (3) cause and effect : (i. iii. i). 

Philosophical relations are also (4) identity, (5) pro- 
portion, (6) degrees, (7) contrariety. (H. does not show 
that " impressions " give relation of impressions, or a syn- 
thesis of them : he falls back on " propensity to feign." He 
re-introduces unity under the name of ** relations.") 

Belief is the vivacity of an idea, a quality conveyed 
to it from the vivacity of a present impression ; {e, g, belief 
in the continued existence of unfelt phenom.) (i. iv. 2). 

A ge7ieral term raises the idea of a particular thing, 
"along with a custom," /. e. associated ideas of resem- 
blance, (extreme nominalism). 

(E.) Speculative Metaphysics, (i) Principle of Causal- 
ity, is not known a priori, nor a post. (i. iii. 3). A cause is 
an object precedent and contiguous when all resembling 
objects hold the same relation ; or when the idea of the 
one determines the mind to the idea of the other. This 
determination is in the sensitive nature ; custom induces 
a propensity of passing from the idea of a past impression 



210 SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM. 

recalled in the presence of a similar impression, to the 
associated image, which we name ejfect, (i. iii. xiv). 

From this habit arises expectation of similar relation 
in the future ; of necessary connection we have no idea, 
because we have no " impression " ; the expectation rests 
on a natural " propensity " ; but anything may produce 
anything, since cause is only conjunction of perceptions, 
(i. iii. 3 ; i. iv. 5). " Laws of Nature " are assured habits 
of expectation. 

(2) Identity, i. e. continued existence, is a fiction of 
the imag. ; we discover similarity of impressions, and " un- 
easiness" leads us to suppose existence of perceptions 
when not perceived, (i. iv. 2). 

(3) Substance is a collection of ideas, capable of being 
indefinitely enlarged ; our knowledge is, of course, purely 
subjective. 

Its " primary qualities" are as much feelings as its 
secondary, (i. iv. 2). 

(4) Time and space, are impressions of the manner 
in which impressions appear in the mind. 

(5) The idea of God, then, disappears as an outward 
reality ; ideas of human wisdom, goodness, etc., are mag- 
nified in imag. We cannot go from the finite to the in- 
finite ; all ideas are anthropomorphic. 

(6) Mind or sonl is but " a heap or collection of dif- 
ferent perc. united together by certain relations, and sup- 
posed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect sim- 
plicity and identity." (i. iv. 2). We have neither idea 
nor impression of self, of soul. 

The materiality or immateriality of it is an unmean- 
ing question. Spiritual substance = Spinozism. (i. iv. 5). 

(7) Senses do not reveal an outer ivorld ; nor does 



HUME. 211 

reason, which simply discusses relations of perceptions. 
The beUef rests on the " propensity to feign" continued 
existence when perc. have a certain degree of coherence 
and constancy in repetition. Extension is feeUng, and 
motion is perceived change in bodies. 

But yet a natural instinct and the liveliness of the im- 
pressions make us act as if the out^r world were real. 

(F.) Practical PhilosopJiy. 

(i.) Passions, are impressions of reflection, produced 
by ideas which cause pleasure or pain, (include emotions 
and desires.) 

Will is included in these, the internal impression we 
feel when we give rise to new motions of body, or perc. of 
mind, (ii. iii. i), in order to attain a good (pleasure), or avoid 
an evil (pain). 

" Direct passions " (violent impressions) are desire, joy, 
hope, with their opposites. Yet beside passions founded 
on pain and pleasure, are some, (revenge, benevolence 
etc.,) which rest on a natural impulse. (H. breaks down 
in explaining pride, involving self?) 

(2.) Freedom of will. Necessity in material things 
is a determination of the mind to pass from one perc. to its 
usual attendant ; actions of matter have no other necessity, 
and this is equally true of mind (uniformity ::= necessity) ; 
man's mind is conditioned as nature is. Will is not guid- 
ed by reason ; that is the " slave of passions." 

(3.) A moral sense is a feeling of pleasure in what is 
pleasurable or useful in the general. Sympathy is an 
original inst-inct (ii. ii. 7), whereby the same test of pleas- 
ure or pain is extended to others, so that moral approba- 
tion is extended also to what is agreeable or useful to 
them. 



212 SKEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM. 

(4.) Justice, like other obligations, civil and moral, 
arises from interest and sympathy ; it is an " artificial vir- 
tue " produced by the general sense of common interest, 
which creates society. 

(5.) Beauty is either the sensuously pleasurable, or 
grounded in the useful, the anticipation of the former, 
(ii. i. 8.) 

Leaving Hume, we might pass to that continental " ilhiminism," 
with which he is so closely allied, and thence to the attempt to re- 
establish phil. on an empirical basis ; but this would lead us into our 
own century, and as mysticism often has its roots in the same soil 
with skepticism, we will first retrace our steps. 

On the reaction to spiritualism, cf. Cousin ; LeMaistre, 
Soirees deS. Pet. p. 293 seq. ; Wordsworth's Exc. ii. " They 
the wisest, etc." 

4. Mysticism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries. 

As sensualism developed into skepticism, so Platonism 
produced a mysticism, most frequently the " mysticism of 
sentiment." (See Cousin, the True, the Beautiful and the 
Good : Lect. v.) 

(A.) Henry More. (1614-1687, A.D.) Fellow of Christ's 
Coll. Camb., with Cudworth and others, the *' Latitudina- 
rians." (Tulloch's Rational Theol.) He began his philos. 
course by opposing Hobbes and defending Descartes from 
skepticism ; he took refuge in Platonism terminating in 
(Neo-Pl.) mysticism, from Ficinus, etc., and wrote " Immor- 
tality of the Soul," " Defejisio Cabalce tJiplicis,'' etc. All 
knowledge is from direct and divine intuition. Phil, is a 
Divine Rev., whence Pythag., Plato and the Cabala obtained 
it. 



MYSTICISM. 213 

(B.) Fenelon, (1651-1715, A. D.) tutor of the Duke of 
B. (1689), then Archbishop of Cambrai, defended Mad. 
Guyon against Bossuet ; his opinions at last condemned 
by the Pope, to which decision he instantly and unhesita- 
tingly submitted ; he wrote " De V Existence de Dieu^' and 
" Les Maximes des Saints^ Contemplation is preferable 
to thought and action, love to virtuous piety : (quietism.) 

(C.) Poiret, (1646-iyig, A.D.) a Prot. min., d. in Hol- 
land ; wrote many myst. works, opposing all spec phil. 

(D.) Emanuel Swedenbo7'g, (1688-1772, A. D.) b. in 
Stockholm, lived many years in London and died there : 
at first devoting himself to physical sciences, from 1745 
he turned his attention to the spiritual world. A portion of 
his voluminous works, (" Prodromus," " Econ. of the An. 
Kingdom," etc.) have a philos. bearing. (Note also " Ar- 
cana Coelestia," etc.) He taught a doctrine of series, of 
degrees : the material world is a key to the spiritual, cul- 
minating in God, whose type is the sun ; heat and light = 
Love and Wisdom. 

Man has a threefold nature; (i) spirit; (2) soul = 
spiritual body ; (3) material body. Mind is, (i) the spiritual 
principle communicating directly with God and the celes- 
tial hierarchy ; (2) the rational, intellectual princ. ; (3) the 
sensuous, for the material world. 

(E.) St.Maitin, (171 3-1 804, A. D.) b. in France, 
trans. Boehme, opposed, ineffectually, the sensualism of 
Condillac, etc. ; in himself and in God of whom he is a 
type, he discovers all truth. 



214 FRENCH SENSUALISTIC SCHOOL. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

FRENCH SENSUALISTIC SCHOOL OF THE EIGH- 
TEENTH CENTURY. 

I. Empirical Political Philosophy. 2. Condillac, 
3. Materialism. 

[Ref. — Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus ; Cousin, Phil. Sens. i8me Siecle ; Morell.] 

I. Empirical Political Philosophy. 

Under this title may be considered a class of writers, 
inspired by the empiricism of Locke, and distinguished 
for " liberal" opinions in politics and religion, although dif- 
fering more or less widely from the sensualism defended 
by Condillac. 

(A.) Montesquieu, Baron de M., (1689-175 5, A. D.) in 
his " Lettres Persannesl' ( 1 72 1 ) opposed absolutist principles 
in church and state ; and in '' V Esprit des Lois,'' marked out 
a constitutional form of government, separating the legisla- 
tive, executive and judicial functions, the aristocracy and the 
democracy, for mutual limitations and safeguards ; yet 
this form, though resting on nature, may not always be 
expedient. 

(B.) yeait J^acques Rousseau, (1712-1778, A. D.) (i) b. 
at Geneva, met with distinguished literary success at Paris ; 
retired to Geneva ; returning to Paris, produced ^w//^, and 
Contrat Social, (Note, in Emile, the ''profession de foi du 
Vicaire Savoyard^ against the sensualism of Helvetius). 



EMPIRICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 5 

R., for a time in Eng., quarrelled with his friend Hume. 
He presents his own life and character in the most 
repulsive light. 

(2) R. defends spiritualism against the prevailing 
materialism of France. Matter cannot move itself ; its 
changes show will ; its laws, intelligence, sc. God. 

Will and reason in man evince that he has a soul. 
A moral instinct, conscience, is innate ; it is our natural 
guide, and its guidance leads to happiness. Morals and 
rel. rest on needs of the heart. (Nat. rel.) R.'s chief 
philos. relation is to 

Politics, {a) The state of nature is not, as Hobbes 
describes it, a state of war ; it is one of savage isolation 
and freedom, guided by natural instincts. A sense of 
needs leads' to voluntary association, the social compact, 
the state. 

{b) Natural rights, unlimited freedom, are given up. 
" Volonte ginerale'' aims at the good of the community. 
An unlimited sovereignty is thus transferred to the State, 
enunciated in laws, which regulate moral right. 

For an executive, the people must appoint their officer, 
their servant (cf. Hobbes) ; this is no new compact ; the 
sovereign people may appoint one to execute laws in their 
name, may limit or take away his power. If he assume 
powers not given to him, e. g. making laws, he is a despot ; 
ipso facto, he loses his authority. A republic is best, as 
least liable to this danger. 

The people retain the law-making power. 

2. CONDILLAC. 

(A.) Etienne Bonnet de Condillac, (1715-1780, A.D.) b. 
at Grenoble, Abbe, friend of the Encyclopaedists at Paris, 



2l6 FRENCH SENSUALISTIC SCHOOL. 

produced his '' Essai siir V Origiiie des Connaissances Hil~ 
maines,'' (1746); " Traite des Systemes,'' (1749) ; " Traite 
des Sensations,'' (1754) ; ' '' Ti'. d. AniviaiLX^' '' Logique,'' 
etc. 

C. was the ablest French metaphysician of his century. 
At first following Locke with comparatively few deviations, 
we must look to his Tr. d. Sens, for his perfected system. 
(See Cousin, Phil. Sens, de i8me. Siecle.) 

(A.) Method. Locke's empirical theory is developed, 
systematized, rendered consistent, not by observation, but 
by rigid analysis. C. proposes to go back to the origin of 
our ideas, and so to fix the extent and limits of our knowl- 
edge (Pref. to Essai sicr rOr.) ; professing to follow strict- 
ly observation and experience, regarding phenom. in every 
point of view, analyzing and comparing, his object leads 
him to imagine a process of development. 

(B.) Theory of Knowledge. To show that all knowl- 
edge is " transformed sensation," he imagines a marble 
statue, organized as man, receiving the sense of smell. 

The order of knowledge is : 

(i) Sensible impression, sensation; perception = 
consciousness of sens. ; (Ess. sur I'Or. ii. i. 3) ; (he con- 
founds the active and the passive). 

(2) Attention, is continued active sensation, vivid 
consciousness excluding all perc. but one ; (note passivity). 

(3) Memory, is feeling when the sens, impression is 
ended. Ideas thus originate, (images) ; they are feelings as 
viewed objectively; sensations are the same viewed sub- 
jectively; sensible ideas represent the present; intel- 
lectual, the past feeling. 

(4) Conscionsness of the ego arises from memory 
of changed feeling. 



CONDILLAC. 217 

(5) Comparison, originates in two sensations, or, a 
past and a present idea, " attention to two ideas" ; (Tr. d. 
Sens. ii. 10). Memory (passive) may recall a succession 
of ideas ; imagination is a lively retracing of them (ii. 1 5) ; 
\iQ.xi(i^ judgment, 

(6) Reflection is carrying our attention from one ob- 
ject (collection of qualities = sensations) to another, con- 
sidering them separately ; attention passing from the 
present to the remembered. 

(7) Abstraction is attention fixed on one quality of an 
object. 

(8) Reasoniiig is a double judgment. Imagination, 
reflective, may combine images. Pleasure accompany- 
ing sensible impressions suffices to call out this chain 
of '* transformed sensations." (Pref. Tr. Sens.) Under- 
standing is a collective name for the above processes ; 
reason = orderly conducting of these steps to knowledge. 
Judgments are identical propositions ; and true science is 
based on a succession of these (algebraic, Tr. d. Syst.) ; 
it is well-constructed language ; by use of the latter grow 
up judgment, reasoning, etc., its (arbitrary) signs assisting 
mem., imag., etc. 

Hearing, taste, etc., are added to the statue ; through 
touch, idea of body and space, (ii. 4). 

(C.) Speculative Metaphysics, (i) Substance is the 
unknown ground of qualities (sensations) ; of it we 
have no idea (Tr. d. Syst. ii. x. i). 

(2) Self and Body are collections of qualities pres- 
ent or remembered. (Tr. d. Sens. vi. 3). 

(3) The infinite = indefinite ; eternity = indef. du- 
ration, sc. succession of ideas ; immensity = indef. space. 

C. does not follow out his one princ. to its conse- 



2l8 FRENCH SENSUALISTIC SCHOOL. 

quences ; he believes a first cause because effects cannot 
be in an inf. series. He recognizes (inconsequently) God, 
immortality, of the soul (indivisible subject of perc), free 
will, virtue ; knowing nothing of substance he may rather 
be called phenomenalist than materialist. 

(D.) Practical PhilosopJiy. (i) C. lavs a foundation 
for ethics in tracing the origin of ideas, without expressly 
discussing morals. As all intelligence is transf. sens., so 
all principles of action originate from pleasure or pain, 
(thus based on the passive), which produces 

Desire; a passion is a dominant desire; all forms of 
pass., love, hate, etc., are forms of self-love, desire of plea- 
sure, aversion from pain. (Tr. d. Sens. i. iii. i). 

The Good, primarily, is what pleases smell and taste ; 
the beaiUiful, sight, hearing, and touch. 

Secondarily, the good is a sensible action conformed 
to a (sensible) law. 

^/F///= desire, when the thing desired is in our power. 
(Tr. d. Sens. i. iii. 8). 

Thus unity of principle is attained, for attention and 
desire = feeling. (Tr. d. Sens, vii.) 

(2.) In a State of Nat tire, not absolutely savage, but 
simply agricultural, property originates in division ; and 
a contract, expressed or implied, arises which binds each to 
contribute to the common good. 

3. Materialism. 

Condillac laid down the principles of sensualism, 
but was restrained by religious feeling or other causes 
from their ultimate consequences, and an absolute consis- 
tency. Materialism, however, joined to the ethics and 



MATERIALISM. 219 

politics of the Revolution, seemed, for a time, to absorb 
all phil. in France. 

(A.) Helvetius, Claude Adrien, (1715-1771, A. D.) b. at 
Paris, produced in 1758 '' L Esprit:' It was condemned 
by the Sorbonne and the Parliament ; whereupon he made 
formal retractation. '-^ De L Homme',' (pub. 1772), was a 
more extreme statement of the same views, (cf. Rousseau; 
ubi siipra^ and see Cousin; Phil. Sens. i8me S.) 

(I.) The mind has two passive powers ; {a) to re- 
ceive impressions from exterior objects, physical sensi- 
bility ; {b) to preserve those impressions, memory = con- 
tinued, weakened sensation. Every capacity reduces to 
these ; ^' je juge ^je sens!'' 

(2.) Men, in this regard, are by nature equal ; dif- 
ferences are due to education, etc. ; man's superiority over 
the brutes is due to his physical organization ; his mind 
also is the result of it : men,^. ^., without flexible fingers 
would have no arts, no civilization, would be wild beasts. 

(3.) Passions are the cause of all human activity ; 
liberty is free exercise of man's limbs, etc. 

(4.) Pleasures, physical in origin, are what all men 
seek according to their various passions. (" Ethics of in- 
terest," egoism.) To actions useful to a man he gives 
the name of virtue ; to those injurious, vice ; so also socie- 
ty. The vicious are to be pitied ; for, through ignorance^ 
they do not understand their own true interests, and so- 
ciety should, by educating, enlighten them. 

The compassionate and the inhuman both seek their 
own pleasure. " 'Tis a man who has told everybody's se- 
cret." 

(5.) The state can appeal only to the enlightened 
self-interest of the people. 



220 FRENCH SENSUALISTIC SCHOOL. 

(6.) He revives the calculus of probabilities of Car- 
neades ; it is applicable to all subjects, to the existence of 
the body, the spirituality of the soul. 

(B.) Diderot, Denis (i 713-1784, A. D.), with D'Alem- 
bert, editor of the Encyclopedie des Sciences, etc., (1753- 
1782, A. D.), to which contributed Voltaire, Rousseau, 
d'Holbach, Turgot, etc., wrote '-^ Pensees snr rinterp.de 
la NatiLre^' etc., (1754.) 

Atoms have sensations, which become conscious in 
animal organisms ; from sensation thought is awakened. 
D., eventually rejecting rev. truth, finds God, (pantheisti- 
cally) in natural truth, beauty, and goodness. 

(C.) DAlembert, Jean (1717-1783, A. D.), author of 
the admirable preface to the Enc, skeptical in phil, can 
form no idea of matter or mind, although the union of 
parts in organized beings seems to be the work of intelli- 
gence. 

(D.) D'Holbach, Baron PaulHeinr., (i 723-1 789, A.D.) 
b. at Heidelsheim, friend of Diderot, d. at Paris, produced 
in 1770 his " Systeme de la Nature',' a complete gospel of 
materialism, its most systematic statement. 

(i.) All that exists is matter, endless, necessary ; 
its essence is motion, endless, necessary. 

Nature is the result of its motion, producing different 
combinations. The activities of things are likewise the 
(necessitated) motions of their atoms. 

(2.) Fears and ignorance on one side, and abstrac- 
tions of theologians and metaphysicians on the other, have 
personified these energies as World-soul, Spirit, God. 

(3.) Man is an organism material and sensible ; soul 
is body considered relatively to its sensitive activities and 



MATERIALISM. 221 

functions. Soul, in concreto = brain ; otherwise, a meta- 
physical abstraction. 

(4.) All nature strives for self-preservation : this in 
man is self-love, love of what aids, hatred of what injures. 
This is the determining principle of all action. 

(5.) The good = useful ; the evil = hurtful. Virtue 
is the art of making one's self happy, by advancing the 
happiness of others, and of governing the passions. Civil 
law by threats and punishments restrains them, or pre- 
vents their injuring. 

(E.) Condorcet^ Marie Jean Ant., (i 743-1 794, A. D.) 
marquis, mathematician, friend of D'Alembert ; proscribed 
by the Convention, he poisoned himself. 

In his "• Tableau Histoidqne des Progrh de V Esprit 
Humain^' as an epicurean sensualist, he maintains the 
perfectibility of mankind. Progress is through educa- 
tion and physical improvement. 

(F.) St. Lambert, Chas. Fr.^ (1716-1803, A. D.) in 
his " Catechisnie UniverseV (1797) developed, in practical 
ethics, the princ. of Helvet. with general applause. (Note 
the Acad.) 

Man is an organized and sensitive body ; from pleasure 
and pain his knowledge and actions ; but his happiness is 
bound up with the happiness of all. Vices are injurious 
passions ; virtues, useful ones. Belief in God is dismissed 
as an arbitrary superstition, not concerned in " Principes 
des MceursT 



222 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

I. Period of Development. 2. Reid. 3. Period of 
Criticism. 

[References: — McCosh, Scottish Phil.; Porter, App. Ueberweg; Cousin ; Hamilton's Notes 
on Reid; Morell's Hist. Phil. 19th Cent.; Mackintosh.] 

I. Period of Development. 

(A.) Introduction. Here we may find, with few ex- 
ceptions, a general unity of method, and even of matter. 
An inductive method, from facts observed in conscious- 
ness, with observation of the acts and words of others, of 
universal language, a method applied especially to psych ol. 
and ethics, may entitle this school to be called the " phil. 
of consciousness," or, of " the common sense." (Sir Wm. 
Hamilton's App. to Reid. A). It may incline toward the 
empiricism of Locke, rarely accepting it unqualifiedly, or 
be influenced by the criticism of Kant ; it may not be 
thorough and profound ; yet principles are obtained which 
are not mere products of observation and experience, but 
are, partially at least, supplied by the mind itself ; 
(Hutcheson, '' senses " ; Stewart, '' laws of thought " ; 
Brown, " Original intuitions " ; Hamilton, from Kant, " a 
p'^iori forms.") 



PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT. 22^ 

(B.) Francis HiLtcheson, (i) (1694- 1746, A. D.) b. in 
n. of Irel., of a Scotch family, ed. at Univ. of Glasgow, 
min. in Irel., prof, of Mor. Phil, at Glasgow (1729), wrote 
" Iiiqinry into the Oinginal of our Ideas of Beauty " (1725) ; 
on the '^ Nat. and Cond. of Passioiis and Affections — The 
Moral Sense''- (1728); ''Moral Phil.;' (posth.) (1754.) 

(2.) H. finds in man certain cognitive powers, 
^ inenti cono^enita intellio;endi vis ; " and internal ''senses;' 
" determinations of the mind independent of will, and of 
the pleasurable or painful." 

Senses are (i) bodily ; (2) of beauty, which is (objec- 
tively) a compound ratio of uniformity and variety ; (3) 
of sympathy ; 

(4.) Moral Sense, which has for its object actions 
which tend to give happiness, (eudsemonism). 

Moral goodness is an " idea of a quality in actions 
which procures approbation and love towards the actor " 
independent of utility ; moral evil, the idea of the oppo- 
site, (cf . " honor and shame, etc.") 

The civil power rests on an implied contract, etc. 

(C.) Henry Home, Lord Karnes, (1696- 1782, A. D.), 
lawyer and judge, wrote, in 175 1, "Essays on Principles of 
Morality '^ ; in 1762, " Elements of Criticism;' 

Man has a " moral feeling " by which he judges of his 
various motives, self-love, benevolence, utility, etc. 

He has intuitions of truth. 

Like Hume, Kames argues for phil. nee. ; will is de- 
termined by desire ; but motives do not destroy responsi- 
bility. 

Beauty is intrinsic and relative. 

(D.) Adam Smith, (i 723-1 790, A. D.) (i) b. in Scotl., 
ed. at Univ. of Glasgow, a pupil of Hutcheson's-; at Oxf. 



224 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

seven years ; Prof, at Glasg. ; in France (1764-6) ; spent his 
last years in Edinb.; author of " Theory of Moral Senti- 
ments,'' (1759); " Wealth of Nations',' (1776.) Style, flu- 
ent, discursive. (See Stewart's Life.) 

(2.) S. develops the " Ethics of Sympathy'^ ; the objects 
of moral perc. are, primarily, other men's actions ; if one 
feel himself affected in the same manner as another is, he 
approves that other ; secondly, " we suppose ourselves the 
spectators of our own behavior." 

With sense of " propriety," is sense of merit, arising 
from sympathy with the agent and the recipient of benefits, 
considering also the tendency of the action to promote 
happiness. 

Hence, the rules of morality originate in society. 

2. Reid. 

(A.) Life. Thomas Reid, b. 17 10, near Aberdeen, 
ed. there, min. of the Kirk, Prof, of Phil, at Aberd. (1752), 
at Glasgow, (1763), d. 1796. (See Stewart's Life.) 

Works : " Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Princi- 
ples of Common Sense',' (1764) (chiefly analysis of sensa- 
tions, against Hume, and Locke's Theory of Ideas.) "In- 
tellectual and Active Powers of Man' ( 1 785-8), etc. Rarely 
profound, or critical, often superficial, Reid's shrewd com- 
mon sense gave him great power in detecting prevailing 
errors based on partial inductions. 

(B.) Method, is induction from facts given in conscious- 
ness (its veracity assumed), confirmed by observation of 
men, their universal language, their common acts. " The 
whole of phil. consists in discovering the connection 
between natural signs and the things signified, and re- 
ducing them to general laws." (Inq. v. 3.) 



REID. 225 

R. does not attempt a ^' prima phil. ; " neglecting meta- 
physics, the laws of the human mind and its faculties are 
to be established from unquestionable facts, from data ad- 
mitting no question, requiring no criterion. 

(C.) Principle. Intuitions, self-evident truths, are the 
basis of higher knowledge ; our senses testify to what is, 
not to what must be. (Int. P. ii. 19, 20.) 

The testimony of sense, memory, etc., must be re- 
ceived without questioning their veracity. 

Some propositions may be distinctly apprehended, and 
reason see no necessity of believing ; others must be 
assented to by " common sense." These have no apo- 
deictic proof, but admit red. ad abs. ; they have the consent 
of all men. If rejecting an opinion lead to a thousand 
absurdities, that opinion is a first principle. (Int. P. vi. 4.) 
{vid i7if.) 

All knowledge obtained by " reason " {ratiocinaiio) 
rests on these. 

(D.) Theory of Knowledge, {\) There 2.x^ no '' ideas'' 
(Locke) intermedia between the mind and external objects ; 

(2) No process of reasoning in conceiving them. 

(3) Sensation " suggests " the notion of present 
existence, by a law of the mind which compels assent. 

(4) Memory suggests past existence in the same 
manner. 

(5) Sensation and thought thus testify to the exist- 
ence of self ; change, to a cause ; power, to will ; touch, 
to extension, etc., etc. 

Mind and body are not known in their essences, but in 
their powers and operations. 

Powers of the mind are (i) intellectual, (2) active; or, 
(i) natural ; {a) active = faculties, {b) passive = capaci- 
ties requisite to acquire habits ; (2) acquired = habits. 



226 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

(E.) Intellectital powers, (i) YQ)^Q.x^\)y external senses. 
R. distinguishes {a) sensation, which is only in the sen- 
tient mind ; our sens, are not images of bodies ; they are 
" signs " of an outer world. ( Inq. vi. 21) ; ■ 

(b) Perception ; it has an object which may exist, 
whether perceived or not. Distinguish (a) original perc, 
given by " the constitution of our mind ;" (/5) acquired 
from custom, of which original perc. are only signs ; (j) 
perc. gained by inference. 

Both primary and secondary qualities belong to ex- 
ternal things, and sens, suggests both. (Inq. v. 6 ; vi. 20.) 

Observe that in attention the mind is active. 

(2) Memory, giving belief of past realities. 

(3) Cojzceptioji, apprehension of individuals, or of 
the meaning of general terms. 

R. does not distinguish cone, clearly from imagina- 
tion ; the latter is limited to " pictures of the visible." 
(Int. P. iv. I.) Consciousness tells us the difference 
between perc, imag. and remembrance, therefore they 
are not one. 

(4) Analyzing and combining ; common terms are 
(d) attributes, by abstraction ; 

Qj) general, for collections of attributes, by generali- 
zation (Int. P. V. 3), (conceptualism). Distinguish exten- 
sion and comprehension in terms. (Int. P. v. 2.) Realities 
are complex. Simple and distinct notions are gained by 
abstraction ; the most distinct complex ones, by combin- 
ing these ; and others again are necessary for reasoning 
or language. Brutes have them not. (Int. P. v. 5.) 

Space is an empirical notion given in perc. of bodies, 
not by sens. 

Time is given similarly, in memory. (Int. P. iii. 3.) 



REID. 



227 



Eternity is time unlimited ; immensity, space unde- 
fined. 

Notion of power is derived from consciousness (rela- 
tive, a quality,) from our voluntary activity. (Act. P. i. 5.) 

(5) yudgment. Here distinguish {ci) contingent 
truths depending upon some effect of will and power, and 
capable of change ; they rest upon some other mental 
operation, as sense, memory, etc. ; 

R. gives twelve examples of these ; (Int P. vi. i, 5) 
e. g. existence of what is given in consciousness and of 
self ; the validity of our faculties ; power over actions and 
determinations of will, etc. ; 

{b^ Necessary truths, in " pure judgment ;" these 
are («) grammatical ; (/5) logical ; {f) mathematical ; (^)) 
aesthetical ; (s) ethital ; (Z) metaphysical ; (i) substance ; 
(ii) causality, (against Hume) ; (iii) design, final cause. 
All these first principles rest upon " common sense." 

(6) Reasoning. 

(7) Taste, power of relishing the agreeable, while 
discerning (judgment) the excellent, is applied to (a) 
novelty ; {h) grandeur, that degree of excellence which 
awakens admiration ; {c) beauty, the agreeable with judg- 
ment of perfection or excellence. (Int. P. viii. 4.) 

(8) Moral Sense. There are intuitive princ. of morals, 
self-evident, from which, by reasoning, contingent, prac- 
tical truths are derived. 

(9) Consciousness is knowledge of the operations of 
our own minds. R. makes it a special '' power," distin- 
guishing it, e. g. from remembrance. (Int. P. i. i, 2.) 

Reid considers " social principles " in the original 
constitution of the mind, for language, (i) truth-telling ; 
(2) belief of others' words ; 



228 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

For nature, the " inductive principle," expectation of 
the continuance of past experiences. 

(F.) Active powers, (i) We have no idea of power 
apart from voHtion ; active power is an " attribute of a 
being by which he can do certain things if he will." 
(Act. P. i. 5.) 

(2.) Will, has reference to our own actions, and to 
what is believed to be in our power ; desire may not so 
refer, and may oppose will ; therefore they are different 
in kind. Voluntary operations are {a) attention, {b) delib- 
eration, {c) purpose, resolution. 

(3.) Principles of action are {a) mechanical, involun- 
tary, («) instincts; {f) habits; 

ifi) animal, voluntary, but without judgment ; 

(«) appetites, periodical, not moral, neither social nor 
selfish ; 

if) desires^ constant, unlimited, (i) of power ; (ii) of 
esteem ; (iii) of knowledge ; 

(/') cijfections, having persons for their objects, are (i) 
benevolent, agreeable feelings, and desire of others' good : 
e. g., of parents and children, gratitude, compassion, es- 
teem (.?), friendship, sexual love, public spirit, social affec- 
tion ; 

(ii) Malevolent, emulation and resentment. 

Passions may be defined, as veh-ement desires and affec 
tions, sensibly modifying the body, controlling the will and 
biassing the judgment. (Act. P. iii. ii. 6.) 

(c) rational, determining the ends we pursue ; 

(a) What is good for us upon the whole (enlightened 
interest) ; 

(/5) duty., moral obligation, a relation of the agent to 
the act, determined by " moral sense." 



REID. . 22g 

There are self-evident principles on which moral rea- 
soning is grounded, on which particular duties rest. (Act. 
P. iii. iii. 6.) These are the ground of moral approbation 
and disapprobation. 

(G.) Ethics, (i) Liberty of a moral agent is " power over 
determinations of the will," with cone, and judgm. of what 
is willed as useful or good. On this is based the power 
to do well or ill, and without this no praise or blame, no 
accountability. 

The proof of moral liberty is the consc. that we are ef- 
ficient causes in our deliberate and voluntary acts ; {a) 
natural conviction (consider (a) conscious power, (,5) 
deliberation, (/') promises, {p) blame) ; (b) accountability, 
choosing means (design.) 

Rational being-e, indeed, are and ought to be influ- 
enced by motives, but these are not causes, they do not 
act, (iv. 4). 

The law of necessity supposes an inert, inactive being, 
which, like matter, is only acted upon. To say that be- 
cause rational beings act from motives, they have not lib- 
erty, is to confound the rational with the irrational, (the 
brute.) 

On this is based moral government of those who have 
power to obey or disobey ; criminality supposes not only 
voluntary action, but moral liberty. 

(2.) Moral principles ; some are intuitive (no com- 
plete analysis), e. g., omission may be culpable, obligation 
to inquire our duty, and to do it, to "do to others, etc." 

Justice is a natural virtue, etc. (against Hume, v. 5-7.) 
Noticeable throughout all Reid's works is his polemical 
attitude. 

With Reid may be mentioned, 



230 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

yames Beattie, (i 735-1 802, A. D.), author of " The 
MinstreV,' Prof, at Ab. (1760), who wrote '' NattLve and 
Immutability of Truth " (against Hume) ; superficial and 
popular, not widely differing from Reid. 

Geo. Campbell, (1709-1796, A. D.), min. of the Kirk; 
(1746); Prof, at Ab. (1771), author of '' Dissertation on 
Miracles''' (against Hume); '^ Phil, of Rhetoric',' (1776) 
recognizing as sources of knowledge, consciousness, intui- 
tion, common sense ; distinguishing necessary from con- 
tingent truths, like Reid. 

Adam Ferguson, (1723-18 10, A. D.) ed. at St. An- 
drew's, Prof, at Ed., wrote " Ess. on Hist, of Civil Soc.^'' 
(1761) ; '' Moral and Pol. Science^' (1792.) 

3. Period of Criticism. 

(A.) Dugald Stewart, (i) (175 3-1 828, A.D.), b. at Edin., 
ed. at the Univ. there, spent a year at Glasgow under Reid ; 
Prof, of Moral Phil, at Edin., (1785), of Moral and Political 
Science, (1792). His technical skill, elegance of style, 
and scholarly tastes form a marked contrast with the un- 
polished simplicity of Reid. He illustrated the doctrines 
of his master with a wide range of attractive and interest- 
ing facts, and exerted a marked influence on many of the 
most prominent men of the age. 

Among his distinguished pupils were Brougham, 
Palmerston, Russell, Jeffrey, W. Scott, Sydney Smith, 
Brown, Chalmers, Alison, etc. 

Among his voluminous works are, " Elements of the 
Phil, of the Human Mind," (v. i, 1792; v. 2, i8i4;v. 3, 
1827); "Moral Phil.," (1793); "Philos. Essays," (1810) ; 
"Act. and Moral Powers," (1828) etc. 



STEWART. 231 

(2?) Method. Disregarding ontology, "a most idle 
and absurd speculation," he proposes to " rise slowly from 
particular facts " given in consciousness, proceeding by 
strict Baconian induction '* to general laws." (EL Phil, i.) 
Cautious and critical, always turning from metaphysics to 
the concrete, modern psychologists offer us no more attrac- 
tive or valuable guide. 

(3.) Theory of knowledge. The mind for discovery of 
truth employs various faculties whose authority is indisput- 
able, guided in their exercise by "fundamental laws of 
belief," "constituent elements of human reason" (" com- 
mon sense " of Reid) ; these are {a) Math, axioms ; ifi) 
Laws of belief in consc, mem., and reasoning ; these are, in 
consc, of («) the ego, our existence, an (indirect) ^' sugges- 
tion ; " (/5) of personal identity, similarly given in mem- 
oi"y > W of the material world, and the uniformity of na- 
ture (El. ii. I.) These being merely laws, no inference 
from them is possible. 

Like Reid and Campbell, S. criticizes the Aristotelian 
logic ; the syllogism is nugatory (cf. Whately) ; he at- 
tempts, (not very successfully), a logic of inference. (El. 

ii. 3-) 

Notions of mind and matter are " relative " merely ; 
we know these only in sensible qualities, which give "irre- 
sistible " conviction of self, mind, body. 

(4.) Intellectual Powers. Classification is based on 
Reid's, improved. 

{a) consciotisness, made a separate faculty, by which we 
are cognizant of our other mental operations, " suggest- 
ing," a post., self ; personal identity is an acquired convic- 
tion ; 

(b) perception; 



232 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

(c) attention, made " an act of the mind," the active 
exertion of the will apparently overlooked ; 

(d) conception = " simple apprehension," i. e. of ab- 
sent objects of perception, the representative faculty ; 

(e) abstraction. S. places himself with the nominalists ; 
conceptualism is not intelligible ; names are originally 
individual, applied to many on the ground of resemblance, 
so expressing qualities common to a genus ; 

(/) association of ideas, — i. e. of thoughts of all kinds ; 
this, and the resulting power of habit,' are discussed at 
length with admirable illustrations in taste, morals, etc. ; 

(^g) Memory is spontaneous, recollection voluntary ; 

(K) Imaginatioit, (far in advance of Reid,) is the " power 
of modifying conceptions, combining, etc." (El. i. 3 ; i. 
vii. i) ; it is a complex of conception, abstraction, judg- 
ment, taste and fancy (presenting different materials) ; 

it) 'judgment. 

On the whole div. we must remark an unscientific 
grouping of powers, laws, exertion of will, etc. ; the divis- 
ions are plainly not co-ordinate. But varied illustrations, 
good sense, and scholarly taste, render him none the less 
interesting and instructive. 

(5.) Active Pozvei's. Still following Reid, though 
rejecting the "mechanical," {a) appetites; {b) desires, 
(add to Reid's des. of society and of superiority, R.'s 
" malev. aff.," emulation) ; (c) affections ; (^d) self-love ; (e) 
moral faculty. Will is relegated to an App., and not thor- 
oughly examined ; duty, obligation implies free-will. 

(6.) Ethics. S. follows Reid, though with wider re- 
search : he makes no attempt to inquire what is " the 
good," why it is good : but, (a) negatively, it is not given in 
judgments based on utility, nor on positive law ; (b) there 
is in the mind a moral faculty which gives, 



STEWART. 233 

(a) perception of an action as right or wrong, (a qual- 
ity of action) ; 

(/5) accompanying emotion of pleasure or pain ; 

(r) perception of merit or demerit. 

Duties are carefully examined ; 

{a) To God. His existence is not given intuitively 
but by two " first principles," a post. ; 

{;>) everything which begins to exist has a cause ; 

(/5) combination of means to an end implies intelli- 
gence. On this foundation he builds a Nat. Theol., the 
existence and attributes of God and a future life, with re- 
sulting duties. (Moral Phil. ii. 2.) 

{b) To fellow-creatures ; benevolence, justice, veracity; 

if) To ourselves. 

(7.) Esthetics are considered at length, but, as 
ethics, in subjective -view ; the pleasurable leads to our 
confounding sensuous beauty with pleasures intellectual, 
in assoc. of ideas, utility, fitness, relations, design, etc. In 
these he can find no unity. (Phil. Ess. ii. i.) The term 
beauty, primarily applicable to the agreeable in objects of 
sight (color, form, motion,) is transferred to sounds, etc... 

Taste is partly nat. sensibility, partly acquired intel- 
lectual power, derived by induction from the agreeable. 

The pleasure is due to (ci) organical adaptation of the 
human frame to the external world ; (b) associations from 
experience, («) common to mankind ; if) custom and 
fashion, " arbitrary beauties," classical, local, personal. 

But S. gives many interesting and valuable observa- 
tions. 

(B) Dr. Thomas Brown, (i) (1778-1820, A. D.) stud- 
ied law and med. at Edin., associate Prof, with Stewart, 
(18 10) ; his chief works are " Inquiry into the relation of 



234 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

Cause and Effect," (1818); "Phil, of the Human Mind," 
(1820) ; marked by diffuse and ornate style and acute analy- 
sis. 

(2.) He departs widely from Reid, giving far more 
value to assoc. and relation. 

The mind has original intuitions, " irresistible beliefs " 
of identity and causation. 

Of mind we know nothing but states or feelings which 
form our momentary consciousness; consc.^the series 
of states of mind, of feelings ; although they give the be- 
lief of pers. identity, etc. (Hamilton's Cosmothetic or Hypo- 
thetical realism). 

These states or feelings are, {a) external affections 
(sensations) ; "a muscular sense" and touch give belief in 
an external world. 

(b) internal affections, are («) intellectual states ; (/?) 
emotions. 

Intellectual states are explained by — 

(i) simple suggestions,^=associations of resemblance, 
contrast and contiguity ; these will account for conception, 
mem., imag., habit ; 

(ii) "relative suggestions," of relations between two 
objects, which will account for generalization, classification, 
judgment, reasoning, (from particulars to particulars ; cf. 
Mill's Logic Ind.) 

Relations are {a) of co-existence; position, resem- 
blance or difference, degree, proportion, comprehension, 
(whole and parts) ; (b) of succession, causal priority. 

Catcsation. Disregarding the knowledge of power 
given in conscious volition, B.'s tendency to physical in- 
quiry leads him to resolve the notion of cause into invari- 
able succession (Hume), but he refers it to intuitive belief. 
(Hamilton, Met. xxxix.) 



HAMILTON. 235 

Volition is permanent and prevailing desire after de- 
liberation. 

The Moral Faculty is a class of emotions of approba- 
tion and disapprob., into whose cause or ground he does 
not inquire, (cf. Hamilton's Disc.) 

(C.) Sir yames Mackintosh, (i 765-1 832, A. D.) b. 
near Inverness, ed. at Aberdeen, in the midst of his ac- 
tive political and literary life, found time for philos. 
thought. In ethics he follows Brown and Hartley ; con- 
science is explained as a class of feelings guided by assoc, 
having authority from the element of voluntary disposi- 
tions and desires ; the common quality in their objects 
causing appjrobation, is beneficial tendency. 

(D.) Sir William Hamilton, {i) (i 791-1856, A. D.) b. 
at Glasgow, ed. at Univ. there and at Baliol Coll., Oxf. ; 
soon distinguished for varied and profound learning ; in 
181 1, advocate at Edin. ; Prof, of Univ. Hist, there, (1821) ; 
later, Prof, of Logic and Met, (1836). In 1852 were col- 
lected his "Discussions;" in 1856, appeared his ed. of 
Reid, with notes and extended App. ; his Lect. on Met. 
(chiefly cognition, little on the Feelings, "conation" 
nearly a blank) and on Logic were pub. (1858) by Mansel 
and Veitch. (see Mill's "Exam, of Sir Wm. H.'s Phil.") 

His vast learning, and deep and logical analysis of pre- 
vious views, his scientific method in division and def., sug- 
gest Aristotle (note his study of A.) and S. Thom. Aq., 
though his works give us but a fragment of a completed 
system. Based on Reid, his phil. shows a marked influ- 
ence from Kant, (but cf. H.'s Reid ; Note A, § vi. %6). 

(2.) Principle, Phil, is "the science of mind"= 
psych. Met. The primary data of consc. are to be 
received without question ; they are {a) incomprehensible, 



236 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

(" that it is," not " why it is ; ") {b) simple, (c) necessary and 
universal ; (d) certain. He calls himself a " natural 
realist," or, " natural dualist." (See his div. of phil.) 

(3.) Theory of knowledge. Divisions of Phil, are (a) 
Phil, of Facts, (empirical Psych.), (a) cognitions, (/5) 
feelings, (j) conative powers, (will and desire) ; 

(b) Phil, of Laws, (rational Psych.), («) logic (of cogni- 
tions) ; (/5) aesthetics, (of feelings) ; (r) Moral Phil., Political 
Phil. ; 

(c) Phil, of Results, Ontology. 

Mind is a common name for states of knowing, seeing, 
feeling, etc., which the thinking subject recognizes : 
(consc. no " faculty ; " there may be latent mental modi- 
fications) : an unknown substance is an inference. So also 
matter. Knowledge, then, is " relative." 

Relativity of knowledge, {a) Existence is not cogni- 
zable in se (ding an sich), but in special modes ; 

ib) these modes are known only to our own faculties ; 

ic) and under modifications determined by the mind 
itself (sense or intelligence). (Met. viii.) 

Theory of the Conditioned. The Absolute and the 
Infinite are a negation of the thinkable ; (read letter to 
Calderwood, App. to Met.) " Positive thought lies in the 
limitation or conditioning of one or other of two oppo- 
site extremes, neither of which as unconditioned can be 
realized to the liiind as possible ; and yet, of which, as 
contradictions, one or the other must, by the funda- 
mental laws of thought, be recognized as necessary ; " 
(Reid, note A § i. n.) ^. g., space finite and inf., time, etc. 
To think = to condition, (to think as limited or related.) 

The sphere of our beliefs, however, is more extensive 
than the sphere of our knowledge. 



HAMILTON. 237 

The non-ego is not only conceived, but directly per- 
ceived as external, but only as existing in relation to self. 
(4) Cognitive Powers : {a) Presentative, («) external, 
sc. perception of non-ego under the form of space ; 

(/S) internal, sc. self-consciousness, of spirit under 
the forms of time and self. This power is intuitive, im- 
mediate, (natural realism.) Distinguish sens, which 
belongs to the feelings, subjective; as perc. to knowledge,- 
objective ; they are co-existent, but their energies in 
inverse ratio. 

Perception is of what is present to the subject; of dis- 
tant objects it is not immediate. 

Primary qualities of matter are attributes of body as 
body, and may be deduced a priori from the notion of 
substance {a) as occupying space (extension) ; (a) divisi- 
bility, (/5) size, (r)^ figure, {0) incompressibility ; ((^) as 
contained in space ; {<') mobility, (,5) situation. 

Secioido-primary qualities are given by induction, d, 
post., sc. attraction, repulsion, inertia (accidents). 

Secondary are known as subjective affections, color, etc. 

ip) Conservative, memory, acting out of consciousness. 

{c) Reprodtcctive, (a) suggestion, (involuntary) ; {f) 
reminiscence (voluntary): {o) is thought suggesting thought 
under the laws of assoc, "simultaneity" and affinity. The 
one law of " redintegration " will explain all the phenom. 
" Those thoughts suggest each other which were parts of 
one " entire act of cognition." (Met. xxxi. xxxii.) 

{d) Representative, imagination ; distinguish concepts 
from images; (Begriffe, anschauungen.) Imag. (popularly) 
adds to this comparison, etc. (H. makes little of creative 
imagination.) 

{e) Elaborative, the faculty of relations, comparison,= 



238 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

conception or simple apprehension, judgment, reasoning, 
(Met. xxxiv. See also Logic.) 

In (a) is contained the ego and non-ego, a primary, 
native notion of existence, awakened in the first act of 
experience ; here is duahty ; then follows phirahty of 
phenom. with resemblance and difference ; next, as con- 
ditions of thought, substance and causality ; by act of will 
abstraction is made of common properties ; then follow 
general notions, under which plurality is recognized as 
unity; so far as objects resemble, they are, relatively, the 
same. 

Distinguish extension and comprehension of general 
terms. 

{e) is, next, the discursive faculty in its two processes 
of deduction and induction from judgments. 

(/■) Regulative, reason, common sense, cognizing laws 
by which the mind is governed in its operations. (" Phil, 
of the conditioned," in H.'s opinion, his most important 
contribution to phil.) 

He adds to laws of identity, contradiction, and exclu- 
ded middle, the law of reason and consequent (logical, 
L. vi.), the principle of the conditioned. This is applied 
as {ri) princ. of cause and effect ; (/5) of subst. and phenom. 

Causality. " All that is now seen to exist has pre- 
viously an existence under a prior form ;" effect previously 
existed in its causes, it is " the sum of all the partial con- 
curring causes." The mind is unable to think commencing 
existence. That there is a cause is a judgment from 
** impotence of the mind ;" causation = mutation. (Met. 
xxxix.) Similar are the notions of God and free will, 
nee. beliefs beyond the sphere of knowledge. (App. to 
Met., and Mill's Ex.) Moral liberty is inconceivable, be- 



HAMILTON. 239 

cause we can only conceive the determined, the relative, 
(" phil. of the cond.") 

(5.) Logic, {vid, sup. e) is an a priori science ; the 
laws of thought as thought, (cf. Thomson s Laws of 
Thought). Distinguish immediate inferences without a 
middle term. H. attempts an extension of the sphere of 
the science by " quantification of the predicate." He fails 
to analyze the laws of induction, only recognizing purely 
logical ind. 

(6.) FeelingSy {a) pleasurable, accompanying the 
unrestrained energy of any mental power, e. g. sensation ; 

{b) painful, from excessive or restrained energy. 
" Pleasures of the imag." are accounted for in the same 
way ; order and symmetry facilitate the acts of reproduc- 
tion and represent. : hence variety with unity is called 
beautiful, as giving free play to mental energy (Met. xlv.)> 
the understanding judging the whole to have unity. 

Of Hamilton's school may be mentioned : 

(E.) Henry Longueville Mansel, (1820-187 1, A.D.) 
fellow of St. John's Coll., Oxf., Prof, of Eccles. Hist., 
Dean of S. Paul's, author of " Prol. Logica'' " Limits of 
Rel. thought," (Bampton Lect. 1858), "Metaphysics," 
(i860), etc., who adopts the "phil. of the conditioned," 
although he maintains an immediate knowledge of the egOy 
and rejects Hamilton's explanations of causality, (cf. 
Calderwood, " Phil, of the Lif.," McCosh, " Intuitions, 
etc." See notes to " Limits, etc." against German " phil. 
of the Absolute.") 

(F.) James Frederick Ferrier, (i 808-1864, A.D.) b. in 
Edin., ed. Edin. and Oxf., Prof, of Hist. Edin., of Moral 
Phil., St. Andrew's ; pub. " Institutes of Metaphysics" 
(1854,) in bold re-action from the psychological school. 



240 SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY. 

Few Eng. met. have so clear and lively style, remarkable 
equally for vigor and precision. 

Absolute existence is the synthesis of obj. + subj., 
the ego -^ the 7ion-ego = substance. Matter /^r se cannot 
be known at all ; nor can the ego. The particular {e. g. 
sens, exp.) is only known with the general, and conversely ; 
and every cognition, and therefore every concept, must 
contain these two elements. 



KANT. 241 



CHAPTER XV. 

GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

I. KANT. 2. FICHTE. 3, SCHELLING. 4. HEGEL. 5. OPPO- 
NENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 

I. KANT. 

Kant's influence has been so great, second only, if second, to 
Aristotle's, that references must include the great majority of sub- 
sequent writers on spec. phil. or its hist. But see, as most accessi- 
ble, Cousin, Ueberweg, Morell, McCosh's thorough criticism in 
" Intuitions etc.," and, as Illustrating K.'s influence on Eng. thought, 
Carlyle, Misc. Ess. v. I ; De Ouincey, Biog. Ess., Ch. Oly Rev., Oct., 
1875. 

(A) Life. Immanuel Kant, of Scotch descent, b. at 
Konigsberg (1724), ed. and taught there ; Prof, of phil. 
at the Univ. there (1770-1797). He took a lively interest 
in the political questions of the day ; a liberalist. His 
"Religion within the limits of Pure Reason" (1794) in- 
curred a prohibition from King Wm. H. At the King's 
death he published " Strife of the Faculties ;" his un- 
eventful, retired life gradually became the centre of an 
ever widening circle of disciples, but he declined all 
invitations to leave his philosophical seclusion at K. He 
died in 1^4. 

Of chief import among his works are : 
(i) " Critique of Pure Reason " (1781) ; 



242 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(2) " Critique of Practical Reason " (1787) ; 

(3) " Critique of the Judgment " (1790). 

(B) Object and Method. Empiricism had terminated 
in the skepticism of Hume, or in a materiaUsm which was 
equally the negation of phil. Rationalism had produced 
pantheism, or empty hypotheses. It was necessary to 
inaugurate a " criticism " of the human faculties, in order 
to ascertain if phil. were possible, and, if so, what its 
limits were. K.'s process is equally independent of the 
historical development of phil., and of christian Rev. 

It is certain that all knowledge begins with experience ; 
but whence is that knowledge derived ? It is necessary 
to analyze cognitions, to determine critically the functions 
and the limits of human faculties, and so to secure right 
use of the '' organon " for. phil. (Pref. ist and 2nd eds. 
Crit. P. R.) ^ 

(C) Principle, a dualism of realism and idealism, 
" transcendental idealism." 

(i) Empirical intuitions, valid in their sphere, sup- 
ply all the materials of knowledge, (contingent, variable) ; 
the forms of thought are supplied by the mind itself ; their 
criteria are universality and necessity. 

(2) " Things in themselves," though as such they 
are unknown, affect an internal sensibility, and then are 
known, but only as conformed to the laws of our own 
mind. 

Reason impels us to think the unconditioned (trans- 
cendent), but it cannot be thought without contradiction. 

Synthetic judgm., a pr., furnish a ground of certitude, as 
in Logic and Math. 

Before proceeding to the Crit. of the Mental faculties, 
a word may be needed of Kant's 



KANT. 243 

(D) Terminology, (i) Cognitions are {a) intuitions, {b) 
conceptions. 

{a) are singular, Individ., immed., of phenom. ; 
{b) are free from all emp. elements (concepts, notions), 
from understanding alone. 

(2) Ideas are nee. concepts of reason for which no 
real object is found in the sphere of the senses. 

(3) A priori knowledge is that which is independent 
of all experience (cf. Arist.) ; a post, has its source in exp. 

(4) Analytic propositions or judgments are amplifi- 
cations of the identical, giving, e. g., one or more elements 
of the subject in the jDred. 

In Synthetic prop, and judgm. the pred. adds to the subj. 

(5) Transcendental knowledge is the knowing how 
cognitions are applied a pr. ; (transcendental in passing 
over from intuitions to concepts. K. fails to harmonize 
these,) transcejident is that which is beyond all possible 
experience, though reason may find it necessary to be as- 
sumed, (unconditioned, absolute). 

(6) Before criticism^ it is necessary to observe that 
in the mind are three faculties ; 

{a) Sensibility, a passive receptivity ; the mind is af- 
fected by phenom., possesses intuitions ; 

{b) Understanding, (Verstand) an active spontaneity, 
judging of phenom., of experience ; the faculty of concep- 
tion by means of intuition ; 

{c) Reason, (Vernunft) which gives unity to the variety 
of concepts, reduces particulars to the general, and deduces 
the part, from the general, (ratiocination). Understanding 
gives rules ; reason gives principles. 

(E) yudgments are (i) i priori, from the mind itself, 
universal, necessary; 



244 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(2) A posteriorly from experience, particular, contin- 
gent. They are also 

(i) Analytic, explicatory; {e.g., the whole = the sum 
of all its parts) ; resting on the principles of identity and 
contradiction ; 

(2) Synthetic, augmentative, adding to the concept 
of the subject. These are 

(a) A post., from experience, (e. g., gold is ductile) ; 

(J)) A priori, univ. and nee, found in math, and physics ; 

{e. g., a line is the shortest distance between two points). 

Some are, {a) pure, absolutely independent of experience ; 

{h) relatively pure, concepts deduced indirectly from 
exp. 

How are synth. judgments a pr. possible t Ans. ; the 
matter is given in exp., a synthesis of perceptions, not things 
in themselves, but phenom. existing in consciousness ; the 
pure form comes from the mind. This is the condition 
of all experience, which the ego, the " transc. synthesis of 
apperception," supplies. Abstract the thinking subject, 
and all phenom., all qualities, all relations of objects disap- 
pear. 

(F) Transcendental Esthetic. The essential forms of 
sensibility, separating what "the understanding thinks, iso- 
lating sensib., then separating sensation, are, 

(i). Space, for external sensib., the co-existence of 
intuitions ; hence the possibility of geometric judgments ; 

(2) Time, for internal sensib., succession in phenom. 
These are the formal conditions a pi^. of all phenom. 
Transc. objects are related neither to space nor time. 
Magnitude, extension, duration, are thus in the subject, 
the mind ; they are limitations of our knowledge of things. 

(G) Understanding. Its essential function is judgment. 



KANT. 



'%^. 



245 



reducing the plurality of intuitions to the unity of the con- 
cept, in the unity of apperception. Judgments are ren- 
dered possible by the categories, pure, a pr., concepts of the 
understanding, not applicable to things in themselves, but 
to phenom. in our consciousness ; for understanding is lim- 
ited to the finite and conditioned. In the categ. is nothing 
known, for thoughts without percepts are void of meaning, 
(cognition = intuit.+concept). Abstracting all contents of 
judgments we find twelve forms of judgments under four 
heads : 



(i.) Quantity. 
[a) universal. 
[h] particular. 
[c) singular. 



(2.) Quality. 
{a) affirmative. 
[b] negative. 
{c) infinite. 



(3.) Relation. 
[a) categorical. 
\b) hypothetical, 
(t) disjunctive. 



(4.) Modality. 
{a) problematical. 
\b) assertory. 
[c) apodeictic. 



In the same manner, taking the synthesis of represen- 
tations which the imag. provides, the understanding gives 
unity to this pure synthesis, by the concept, the third re- 
quisite for the cognition of an object. Pure concepts, ap- 
plicable to objects, a pr., are the Twelve Categories. 



(i.) Quantity. 
{a) unity. 

{b) plurality. 

{c) totality. 



(2) Quality. 

[a) reality. 

[b) negation. 

[c) limitation. 



(3) Relation. 

[a] inherence, sub- 

stance. 

[b] causality. 

[c] reciprocity. 



(cf. Hamilton's Disc.) 



(4) Modality. 

{a) possibility ana 
imp. 

[b) existence, non- 
ex. 

{c) necessity, con- 
tingence. 



In order to apply pure concepts of the understanding 
to empirical intuitions a '-'schema'' is needed ; the transc. 
determination of time serves this purpose. The schema is 
a product of the imag., but distinct from an image. 

The schema of (i) quant, is number; of (2) qual., in 
reality, time filled ; in negation, vacuum in time ; in limita- 
tion, transition in time ; of (3) relation, in substance, per- 



246 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

manence in time ; in causality, succession ; in reciprocity, 
co-existence ; of (4) modality, in possibility, existence at 
miy time ; in reality, existence in determined time ; in ne- 
cessity, existence at all times. 

The Principle of judgments, (i) analytical, is con- 
tradiction ; 

(2) Synthetical, of pure understanding, 

{a) axioms of intuition, " all intuitions are extensive 
quantities ; " 

ib) anticipations of perception, " in all phenom. the real 
has intensity," /. e., degree ; 

{c) analogies of exp. ; " it is possible only through the 
representation of a necessary connection of perceptions ;" 
(a) permanence of substance ; 

{y) all change according to law of cause and effect ; 

(r) all substances in space at the same time exist in 
reciprocity. 

{d) postulates of empirical thought ; 

(a) that which agrees with formal conditions of exp. is 
possible ; 

(/5) that which coheres with the material conditions is 
real ; 

(j) that whose coherence is determined according to 
univ, conditions of exp. is necessary. 

(H) Reason, (i). We must dist. phenom. from notmienoUy 
negatively, the latter means a thing so far as it is not 
an obj. of our sens. int. (ding-an-sich) ; but intellectual 
int. of noumena is a faculty not possessed by man. But 
reason, the principle of a pr. knowledge, strives to rise to 
the noum., the unconditioned ; and by a " transc. illusion " 
we convert its regulative princ. into objective realities, as if 
they were constitutive. (" Transc. dialectic") 



KANT. 247 

The proper function of reason is only to give unity to 
our conceptions, to regulate the understanding ; beyond that 
it is powerless. For this purpose it uses the three forms 
of syllogism (logical reason, faculty of mediate judgment), 
categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive. By these it attains — 
(2) Ideas, necessary concepts of reason for which no 
real object is found in the sphere of sense : 

(d) by the categ. sylL, as resting on the categ. (3. a^ of 
absolute subj., soul, the psychological idea ; {b) by the hyp. 
syll. (categ. 3. <^.), absolute connection of parts in a whole, 
the world, the cosmological idea ; {c) by the disj. syll. (categ. 
3. c) absolute union of all realities or perfections, God, the 
theological idea. 

These ideas have no objective validity, being produced 
by reason according to its own laws ; as noumena they serve 
as regulative princ. We have indeed no right to assert 
their non-existence (objective) ; on the contrary they give 
conceivable suppositions, possibilities of objective reality 
which practical reason rejiders nee. By dialectical (soph- 
istical) inferences, they are converted into constitutive 
princ. Let us examine more closely ; 

{a) Ego, which is conceived only as subject, is thus 
made objective ; sc, *' I am a thinking substance, simple, 
immortal, etc.," which is a synthetic judgment, and an 
illusion ; proofs which are pure paralogisms, the intuitions of 
experience in consc, under the forms of time and space, 
having been, by the understanding, under the forms of its 
categories, embraced in the unity of the concept, are, 
by illusion of the reason, regarded as transcendent objects 
of cognition. Hence rational psychology, whether in the 
form of spiritualism or materialism, involves contradictions 
— is impossible. 



248 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(i?) In the intuitions of natui^e, the same process, the 
same illusion. In attempting to regard the world as real in 
a transc. sense, arise four antinomies : 

(a) The world has a beginning in time, a limit in 
space : Antithesis ; The world is infinite in time and 
space : 

iji) Every composite substance consists of simple parts : 
Antith. ; There is not in the world any simple substance : 

{r) A free causality is necessary to account for phe- 
nom. : Antith. ; Everything in the world happens accord- 
ing to nat.'s laws : 

(^3) Absolutely necessary being is either a part or a 
cause of the world : Antith. ; Abs. nee. being does not 
exist. 

The proofs of each of these are unanswerable, but each 
regards the transcendent, and becomes meaningless when 
we regard intuitions of exp. as the limit of cognition. 

{c) Ens realissimiLm^ the ideal of pure reason, is made an 
object, hypostatized, personified, 

(a)The onto logical arg. for God's existence is a paralo- 
gism : in the prop. " God is," we substitute a synth. for an 
anal, judgm. (cf. Anselm and refut.) 

(/?) The CO smo logical arg; of nat. theoL, from contingent 
to nee. being, when analyzed proves to be the ontological 
with additional paralogisms ; e. g., the contingent must 
have a cause. 

(j) The "physico-theol. arg. " has authority, deserves re- 
spect, but is not scientific. If the Supreme Being is a link 
in an empirical chain, then a member of it ; if not, how to 
bridge the abyss } At most, this arg. might lead to an ar- 
chitect, of limited power, not to a creator, of absolute power. 
These three ideas of reason, then, are regulative ; our 



KANT. 249 

thought is conditioned, we are compelled to think as 
if (a') a simple substance, the ground of personal, id., 
exists ; 

(<^) the world must be considered as a totality ; 

(<;) we must view the content of all concepts as if a 
perfect, etc. Being made and orders the Universe. 

But the language of a firmly rooted faith is permissible 
in the presence of reason, even where knowledge has been 
renounced. 

( I ) Critique of the Practical Reason. Here also 
proceed as with spec, reason, and distinguish the material, 
empirical, a post., from the formal, rational, a priori. Na- 
ture and freedom, inclination and duty, are opposites. 
The former is directed to emp. ends, to personal happi- 
ness ; it opposes morality ; the matter of desire is indeed 
the concrete object of the will, but 

(i) Moral law is distinguished by its universality ; 
principles by virtue of their form, are universal ; and con- 
sciousness attests the " autonomy " of the will, as free to 
be determined by the power of univ. law ; while the ma- 
terial element is purely subjective and grounded in self 
love. 

Hence, the highest law of morality is, " act so that the 
maxim on which thou actest would admit of being adopted 
as a law by all rational beings." 

Actions are m.oral, not by reason of the good sought 
for, not by reason of the pleasurable, or outward law, but 
only through the form of obligation, law fulfilled for the sake 
of the law. The subjective motive in the moral is not in- 
clination, not even the love of God ; it is pure regard for 
the law given in reason (not empirically, but a simple 
fact of pure reason, to man, as also a sensuous being, in 



250 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the form of the '' Categorical Imperative ;" (self-interest is 
the hypothetical imp.). 

The aim of the will, the sum. bon., is virtue as the con- 
ditioning, happiness as the conditioned. The concept 
has these two elements nee. and inseparable. 

(2) Postulates of pure practical reason are 

{a) Moral freedom, from the natural law of causality ; 
this is contained in the concept of the will's "autonomy," 
without which no morality ; 

(Ji) im7nortality of personal existence ; for the moral 
idea involves an endless progression ; 

{c) God as moral ruler of nature, and reconciler of it 
with reason, giving that harmony to happiness and moral- 
ity which nature does not provide. This postulate also 
nee. to morality. These postulates are given by practical 
reason, not as cognitions, not in the relations of phenom. 
and noum., but as realities serving practical ends. Ra- 
tional faith is a necessity of man's nature. 

Legal duty ajid idght, though., like the moral, taking 
their form from pr. R., have reference only to the outward 
act. Right is the " collection of the limitations, under 
which the free will of one can accord with the free will of 
every other under the univ. law of freedom." 

Legal duties being outward, are compulsory ; and this 
postulates the state with power to that end, a union of 
men under civil laws made by their united will. In 
this they are sovereign ; the executive acts in the name 
of the people ; the judicial power is in the hands of their 
chosen representatives. 

Religion is the moral in its relation to God as the law- 
giver; a need of pract. reason ; it is not the source, but 
the result of the moral. The Son of God is the ideal of man. 



KANT. 



251 



( K ) Critique of the judgment. By this the particular 
is conceived as contained under the universal ; 

(i) The univ. (rule, principle, law) given, the fac- 
ulty of judgm. is determinative, ''subsuming" the par- 
ticular. 

(2) The part, given, in order to find the univ., it is 
reflective ; (this the subject of the " critique " ;) (i & 2) be- 
long to the understanding ; but in (2) theor. and practical 
reason find a connection. 

The univ. laws of nat. have their ground in our under- 
standing ; the particular are empirical, contingent ; the 
latter assume the former as given by some intelligence, 
(not ours) ; for the reflective understanding needs an 
a pr. principle, the concept of final cause, giving unity to 
the emp. laws when the univ. law does not determine 
them, a regulative principle. 

Thus, in thought, the uniformity of nat. becomes com- 
patible with ends sought by free intelligence. 

The two-fold moment in the concept of final cause, is 

(i) subjective, formal, (Esthetic judgment of the har- 
mony of the form of the object, with the faculty of intuition, 
which excites a feeling of pleasure and satisfaction, disin- 
terested, univ., nee, (the beautiful ; cf. Schiller, and dis- 
tinguish the agreeable, sensuously pleasurable). 

The sttblime awakens the idea of the infinite, and 
pleases through the contrast between the thought and the 
merely sensuous. 

(2) Teleological judgment, *(objective or material), 
considering nat. in the fight of adaptations, the agreement 
of the form with a given concept of an end ; 

{a) external, the relation of one thing to another, the 
mechanism of nat. ; 



252 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(b) internal, in organic products, the parts, ends, and 
means reciprocally for one another. 

Art is free production ; fine art, the art of genius, the 
work of human freedom delighting in the beautiful. 

In teleology we ascribe obj. causality to concepts, bor- 
rowing for nat. phil. a causality from the analogy of our- 
selves. But our reason has no power to unite the mechan- 
ical relations of nat. with its final causes ; both mechanical 
laws and ends, are regulative princ of thought, the result 
of the constitution of our understanding. 

(L) Among the numerous followers of Kant, most 
prominent are 

(i) Reinhold, (i 758-1 823, A. D.) prof, at Jena, 
which became a centre for Kant's phil. ; he wrote " Letters 
on Kant's Phil.," and " New Theory of Human Thought :" 
(2) Beck, (i 761-1842, A. D.) ; in his "Princ. of the 
Crit. Phil." he endeavored to dispense with Kant's Ding-an- 
sich, leading to " subjective idealism," which found its 
chief defender in Fichte. 

2. FiCHTE. 

(A) Johann Gottlieb Fichte, (1762— 18 14, A. D.) b. in 
Lusatia, his life a remarkable contrast to the calm un- 
varied career of Kant. Of humble parentage, a most pre- 
cocious child, meditative, imaginative, sensitive, he at- 
tracted the attention of influential friends, through whose 
means he was educated. He studied theol. at Jena (1780), 
was private tutor in Switz. At first Spinozist, he em- 
braced Kant's phil. with great enthusiasm, and sought his 
acquaintance with his "Critique of all revelation," (1791). 
He succeeded Reinhold at Jena (1794), and made known 
his doctrine of science ; but, incurring the charge of athe- 



FICHTE. 253 

ism, retired to Prussia (1799), lecturing at Berlin before a 
numerous circle of educated men. In 1809, he was prof, 
at the univ. there; but in 18 13, dismissing his students, 
he enlisted with the volunteers ; he died of a fever the 
next year. 

His numerous works are marked by energy, eloquence, 
and a vigorous logic ; most prominent may be mentioned, 
those on the " Wissenschaftslehre," " On the Destination of 
the Scholar," " On the Dest. of Man," " The Sun-clear State- 
ment" of the latest phil. ; " The Way to the Blessed Life," 
etc. 

(B) Science demands a rigid methody assuming noth- 
ing beyond its first principle. Scientific truth must have 
self-evident basis, and proceed by demonstration. Kant 
fails to harmonize phenom. and noum., subj. and obj. ; he 
takes for granted the ^ obj. reality of sense-intuition, but 
there is no logical nee. of assuming the Ding-an-Sich. 

(C) The first principle is the ego, given with absolute 
certainty in consciousness (subjective idealism) ; its repre- 
sentations are unquestionable ; their verification can be 
only other repres.; we cannot transcend our own thought. 
" Thou art thyself the Ding-an-Sich — all that thou seest 
without thee, thou art ever thyself ; in all consc. thou 
beholdest thyself. — Consc. is an active hinschaiien of that 
which thou gazest at (anschauest), an herausschauen of thee 
without thyself." (Best. d. Menschen.) 

The ego is absolute, infinite. But it is active, and be- 
comes conscious of itself as both agent and product of its 
activity. 

(i) Thesis. The ego posits itself, and exists in and 
through this act ; being = thought ; existence = consc. 
This primitive act of the mind is the principle of identity, 



254 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

A = A ; ego = ego ; obj. and subj. are identified. This 
gives the categ. of reaHty. 

(2.) Ajttithesis. While the absolute ego seeks to 
posit itself, it finds in itself a barrier, an opposition, 
(Anstoss) and is obliged to posit a non-ego, without which 
it cannot be self-conscious : not-A is not = A ; non-ego is 
not = ego ; the categ. of negation, the second condition of 
thought = existence. 

(3.) Synthesis, the ego opposes to the divisible ego, 
a divisible non-ego ; the categ. of limitation. 

{a^ Theoretical, the ego posits itself as conditioned 
by the non-ego. 

(<5.) Practical, the ego posits the non-ego as condit. by 
the ego. 

The " inexplicable absolute limitations " we objectify 
and call matter. Substance is a mental synthesis of acci- 
dents. 

(D.) The problem of theoretical science is to explain 
the phenom. of the mind's activity, /. e., relations of subj. 
to self-affirmed object, (i) So far as the ego posits itself 
as conditioned and determined by the non-ego, so far is it 
intelligence. Sensation = ego, produces this limitation of 
its own activity ; understanding = power of fixing a sen- 
sation. 

(2) So far as the ego posits the non-ego as conditioned 
and determined by the ego, so far is it zvill acting freely. 

Reason = ego, is raised above all limitations in its free 
producing power. 

(E.) Practical science (cf. Kant) concerns itself both 
with rights and morals, on the basis of ext. and int. free- 
dom. 

(i) The abs. ego while determined by the non-ego, is 



SCHELLING. 255 

also obliged to posit a plurality of det. egos. As det. it 
j^osits itself one of many ; its own freedom involves the 
freedom of others, and these limit one another. The right 
is the sum of these limitations ; " thou must limit thine 
ext. freedom in such manner and measure that thou with 
others, and others with thee, can make a community." 

(2) The ego strives endlessly after self-development, 
freedom from the limitations of the non-ego. This is the 
essence of morality. 

The moral order of the world is the result of the 
activity of the will in thus freeing itself from the deter- 
mination of the finite. This is the Divine ; what we 
name God is this moral order of the world. 

To seek for this we need fat't/i in this moral order, in 
the reality of ego and the outer world ; but this faith is a 
resolve of the will. 

Fichte, in his later works, inclined to abs. idealism, 
(cf. Schelling) a theory of identity ; the ego and non-ego 
are equally real, but identical =^ the absolute, the subj.-obj., 
= God, who ever reveals Himself in and through human 
consciousness. (Note Fichte's five eras of history, and see 
Coleridge, Biog. Lit. c. viii ; Carlyle's Hero- Worship, 
Lect. V.) 

3. SCHELLING. 

Fichte's spec. phil. tended to nihihsm (Hamilton's 
Reid, i., p. 129). He had argued from the subjective, e^-o, 
to the objective, the former producing the latter; why is 
it not equally valid to proceed otherwise, the objec- 
tive producing the consc. ego ; laws of consc. = laws of 
nature ? 

(A.) Fr. Wm. Joseph von Schelling, b. in Wiirtem- 
berg (1775), ed. at Tubingen, Leipzic, pupil of Fichte at 



256 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Jena, succeeded him there (1798) ; member of Acad. Sc, 
Munich (1807- 1842); Prof, at BerHn, opposed by the 
Hegehans, soon retired to Switz., d. 1854. 

(B.) The reahty of nature is to be re-estabhshed against 
subj. ideahsm, by a phil. of nature (obj. ideahsm). Pro- 
ceeding subjectively we obtain a transcendental idealism ; 
but both are limited and rest on a higher principle, the 
absolute as the identity of subj. and obj., given in immedi- 
ate intuition of abs. existence (Sein), (phil. of identity). 
Schelling himself did not lay down and adhere to an exclu- 
sive system ; his imaginative genius maintained a continu- 
ous progress, in which three distinct periods appear; (i) 
Phil, of identity ; (2) of Neo-Platonic intuition (Plotinus) ; 
(3) of theosophic mysticism (Boh me. Gnosticism). 

(C.) Philosophy of Identity. (" Phil, of Nature," 1797; 
" System of Transc. Idealism," 1800; " Zeitschrift fiir spec. 
Physik," 1 801, etc.) 

(i) A valid /;/^/'//6'<^ must be pure <i /n*(?/7, grounded 
on immediate intelL, intuition of the Abs.; this alone 
gives an absolute science in which all things, secondarily, 
are known in their eternal ideas. 

(2) Principle. The subj. or ideal, and the obj. or 
real, are only two poles of the same abs., which recipro- 
cally posit and manifest one another ; they are the differ- 
entiated revelation of one and the same intelligence, their 
only substance. All knowledge rests on the harmony of 
these two ; hence, two fundamental sciences ; 

(^.) Of nature^ " spec, physik," how the ideal originates 
fijom the real. " How does the subj. arise from the obj., 
spirit from nature } " 

{b}f Transcendental ; one assumes the subj., and in- 
quires, "how an obj. arises from it, nature from mind V 



SCHELLING. 257 

(a) Dead nature is a crude intelligence reaching 
towards self-consc, which in its highest and last reflection 
is man, or universal reason, whereby nat. has w^holly 
turned back on itself and its identity with intell. and 
consc. is established. 

(^•) C'^) Theoretical. Matter is mind viewing itself 
making itself obj. ; e. g., sens, is mind's activity producing 
a distinct image ; in reflection mind contemplates the pro- 
cess of its own productions : self-consc. produces thus the 
concept (Begriff). 

(/3^) Practical. The ego, self-consc, freely produces a 
kingdom of freedom, the moral order, the order of rights 
in the State. 

(r) Phil, of Ait, is founded on the unity of the real 
and the ideal ; its task is the bringing before intuition the 
identity of the conscious and the unconscious. In the 
teleology of nature the ego beholds this identity externally ; 
in art, in the ego itself. The ego is thus at once consc. 
and unconsc. in this free production. These two activities 
are represented as united in the product : the Inf., finitely 
represented, = beauty. This is the norm of nat. beauty. 
(3.) Identity. S. seeks a principle on which to found 
the duplicity of the ego and non-ego, of spirit and nature 
This princ. is the absolute, in which they are identified ; 
knowledge ^= being ; abs. ideal = abs real ; abs. = ego_ 
= inf. all == mind. It is manifest in the forms of 
ego and non-ego, which are relative concepts. 

(<^.) God is the absolute indifference of contraries ; the 
unity of being and thought, of subj. and obj., of ideal and 
real ; this is the potentiality of the actual from which the 
two opposites differentiate themselves without losing 
their unity in the absolute. 



258 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(b.) In nature, the Abs. diff. its own essence as form, 
making the subjective objective. 

(c.) In the world of spirity the Abs. ''subsumes" the 
form into its own essence, the objective becoming subjec- 
tive. These are only separated in concept. The difference 
is only quantitative ; the whole abs. ident. being in the 
one in the form of reality, in the other, of ideality. In 
nature the Inf. veils itself in the finite ; in the ideal is a 
regress to the Inf. The Abs., reflected in being, is the 
eternal body ; in thought, the eternal soul of the world. 

•Distinguish, then, in knowledge and being, two poles 
and an indifference. 

The Three Potencies (" Poterizen") ; 

{a}) expansive, progress outward, reflective, the inf. 
becoming finite ; 

{b}) attractive, regress inward, " subsumption," the 
effort of the abs. in the finite to return to the Inf. ; 

(r) Indifference, potency of reason, blending of {a) 
and {b). 

In Natnre (obj., real) : {a) matter, {])) dynamics, {c) 
organic union ; 

In {a) («) expansion, {f) attraction, (r) gravity ; 

In ib) («) magnetism, (/5) electricity, (r) galvanism ; 

In ic) («) reproduction, (,S) irritability, (r) sensibility. 

In Mi7td (subj., ideal) : {a) knowledge, (Jb) action, {c) 
reason ; 

In {a) («) feeling, {f) reflection, (r) freedom ; 

In {b) (a) individuality, (/5) the state, (r) history ; 

In {c) art. (See Morell). 

Finite things then differ only relatively ; in the abs. 
all are identical (Pantheistic idealism). 

The soul is the ideal of the body, finite relatively to it, 



SCHELLING. 259 

inf. as one with the Abs. Morality is grounded in that free 
life in which the soul exalts itself by immed. intuit, of the 
Abs., which lives in us and we in it. 

The state is not a work of chance or free choice ; it is 
a special manifestation of the Abs., a harmony of univ. ne- 
cessity with the freedom of the individual, a moral organ- 
ism. 

(D) Second {Neo-plat.) Period. ("Phil, and Rev.," 1804, 
etc.). The Abs. is pure ideality, eternally intuiting itself ; 
it renders this ideal real ; this reality is its form, its image, 
to which it gives power to change its own ideality into 
objective forms, ideas. How then to pass to the finite .'' 
There is a gap, only conceivable as a falling off, through 
the freedom (selbststandigkeit) of the ideas. But ideas can 
beget only the images, unreal, the ruins of the higher 
ideal world. 

This is the case with the human soul, not as it is in itself, 
but so far as it is related to the sensible world, and this is 
its individuality ; and thus the soul may, in its freedom, 
turn to the abs., or set its limited ego against the univ. 
and inf. In the former case it raises itself, by immediate 
intellectual intuit., to the absolute ; this is its true freedom, 
its true morality. 

Immortality of the soul is not ever-enduring individu- 
ality ; it is a turning back and reconciliation with its 
source. This at length accomphshed in all souls, and the 
sense-world lost in the ideal, difference will terminate in 
identity, the union of the real and ideal. 

The eternal Son of God is the finite itself as it exists 
in the et. intuit, of God, manifested as a God suffering 
and subjected to the fatalities of time. The Incarnation 
is an eternal fact. 



260 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(E) Third, Theosophic Period. (" Nat. of Human 
Freedom," 1809). The princ. of imm. intell. intuit, of the 
Abs. was by S. finally developed under the influence of 
Bohme and St. Martin. He seeks to construct a cosmogony 
which is also a theogony, based on the " self-realization " 
of God in the process of creation of the world. 

Existence = will. In God are three momenta : 

(i) Indifference, the primordial basis, incomprehen- 
sible, of His reality. 

(2) Duph cation of this indiff., as cause and exis- 
tence, nature, blind, unconscious, and intelligence, the 
Word. His actuality is thus conditioned ; the primordial 
basis is differentiated as two eternal contradictories. 

(3) The reconciliation of these, as Love, Spirit. 

To this theogony corresponds the development of the 
world : from the illumination of dark, unconscious matter 
by thought, of the real by the ideal, originates the world. 
Thus God reaches perfect actuality. Man is the consum- 
mation of nature ; in him God is manifested as spirit, /. e.y 
as become actual. But in him the two principles are 
separable, and the particular will can oppose the universal 
will ; hence the possibility of good and evil. Man at pres- 
ent is subject to necessity, having made himself what he 
is, in an " intelligible act before time." 

God is at once transcendent and immanent with re- 
spect to the world. " Positive phil." begins with God to 
prove the divinity of the existent. In " the unpremedita- 
ting, blindly necessitated being" of God are three 
potencies : 

{a) Unconscious will, r<^//^<^;?2<^/m(^/2>. (Nature in God.) 

{b) Conscious will, causa efficiens, the Word, the Light, 
in God. 



HEGEL. 261 

(c) The unity of both, catcsa finalis, "secundum quam 
omnia fiant." 

To. examine how S. pantheistically developes his theogony, 
applies it to the dogma of the Trinity, and derives the principle of 
evil from the concept of God, would detain us too long. We need 
only add that S., as Fichte, distinguishes a Petrine Christianity, a 
Pauline, and a " church of the Future," Johannean. 

S. is the head of a numerous school. (Here note the relations 
of idealism to art, politics, lit., morals, etc.) 
4. Hegel. 

[See Ueberweg ; Morell ; Sterling's " Secret of Hegel," 1865.] 

(A) Geo. Wm. Frederick Hegel, b. (1770) at Stuttgart, 
ed. at Tubingen, tutor at Berne and Jena, then prof, at the 
latter place ; ed. " Crit. Journal Phil. ; " director of a 
gymnasium at Nuremberg until 1816 ; prof, at Heidel- 
berg until 1818, then lectured at BerUn ; d. 183 1. 

His works were edited, after his death, by his pupils ; 
most important are "Phenomenology of Spirit," (1807: 
battle of Jena) ; "Science of Logic," (i8j2-i8i6) ; "Encyc. 
of Phil. Sciences," (18 17). 

(B) Hegel gives to idealism its full systematic develop- 
ment ; adopting at first the nrinciples of Schelling, he 
avoided his mystical " imm. intuitions," and soon separ- 
ated himself, by his strict dialectical method. The work 
of phil. begins with the logical concept, and its method is 
a priori (ontological). The development of thought is the 
development of being. True logic is the very process of 
the abs. itself. (Absolute, logical idealism.) 

(C) The real is the absolute, the universal, but not 
motionless, blank existence ; it is a perpetual process, 
thought (denken = Sein) unfolding itself as two opposites, 
and their reconciliation by a second negation : understand- 
ing views the finite as distinguished from its opposite — (A 



262 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is determined by not-A)' — separates subj. and obj. ; reason 
unites them in the concept, whose essence is negation and 
negation of that negation. This is thought, but it is also 
being, and actual finite things result from the mutual 
relations which the abs. contains; the universe is a universe 
of relations. The finite out of the inf., the limited out of 
the abs., is for understanding only ; in the idea of the 
reason they are one. 

In the absolute everywhere, in thought, in sens., perc, 
in reflection, we find a three-fold movement : (i) the 
thought in itself (an sich) ; (2) it passes over into its 
opposite (aussersich sein) ; (3) it turns back upon itself, 
the union of the contradictions (in sich sein): (i) God, (2) 
Nature, (3) Spirit. 

(D) Logic is the science of the pure idea, the abs. = 
God (in ansich sein) ; it includes ontology, since thought 
and being are one. 

The abstract concept sets limitation to itself, and so 
denies its universality, and then, through negation of that 
negation, becomxcs the perfect, concrete "idea." 

We begin, then, with pure being, indeterminate,^^ 
nothing : their unity = becoming (Werden), whence results 
determinate being (Dasein). 

(i) Science of <^^/;^^= thought ; it embraces three 
steps : {a) quality, being limited by negation, through the 
three steps of sein, dasein, fiir-sich-sein, the reconciling of 
the first two, independent being, the ideal of the deter- 
minate ; {b) qiLantity, the outward form, in its three 
momenta of pure quantity, particular quantity, and degree ; 
the union of quantity and quality = "Mass," measure the 
relation of one to another. 

(2) Science of the essence, or the concept reflected 



HEGEL. 263 

on itself by negation, being " sublated " (f iir-sich- 
sein). 

{a) Ground of existence : (a) pure notion of existence 
(identity, difference, ground) ; (/5) essential existence ; (/-) 
the thing. 

{b) Phenomena : ('/) phenomenal world ; (/5) matter 
and form ; (r) relation. 

{c) Totality, reality, union of (a) and (b) : (a) relation 
of substance ; (/S) rel. of cause ; (y) action and re-action. 

(3) Science of the concept, (in-sich-sein), the union 
of being and essence, thought returned on itself. 

{a) Subjective, in its three momenta; (a) universality; 
(j3) limitation ; (/-) unity. 

This gives us (a) the concept as such, (/5) the judg- 
ment, (r) the inference. 

{b) Objective; (a) mechanism ; (/S) chemism ; ij) tele- 
ology. 

(r) Idea, union of subj. and obj. as concrete reality : 
(a) life ; iy) cognition ; {y) abs. idea ^= God. 

(E) Philosophy of Nattire is the science of the idea 
as passing over to " other ; " the abs. in its determined 
being by free movement externalizing itself. Logic is 
thus the princ. of the phil. of nat% and nature itself is a 
system of successive steps ; it is the process by which 
union with the idea is recovered, which union is accom- 
plished in spirit, the goal, the end. The first step, ans- 
wering to Being, is : 

(i) Mechanics, of empty, indeterminate forms ; 

{ci) Abstract mathematical properties of («) time, (/5) 
space, (/') matter, their union ; 

{b) Concrete, mechanical, (a) attraction, (/5) repulsion, 
(j) gravity, weight, the union of (a) and (/5) ; 



264 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(c) Absolute, of free motion in space : 
{2) Physics, of matter individualized in 

{d) General forms of matter, sun, and planets, 
elements, meteorology ; 

ib) Relative forms, specific gravity, cohesion, heat ; 

{c) Total individuality, specific forms, properties, 
etc. : 

(3) Organism^ combining the other two movements, 
nat. elevated above the chemical process ; 

(<^.) Universal organism of the earth (geological) ; here 
the idea of life appears as the result of a past process of 
life ; 

(^.) Vegetable organism, from present life ; 

(<:.) The plant is not a totality, a unity ; the organizing 
unity is the animal process, as soul, self-feeling (selbst 
gefiihl). 

In man nature becomes self-conscious, the ego : thus 
the idea, from its " otherness" becomes conscious of itself. 

(F.) PJiilosophy of Spirit, Mind (Geist), the science of 
the idea returned from "otherness," developed from 
natural determination into freedom, the independent idea 
(fiir-sich-sein), which is conscious of self. 

Man's spirit is united with his body in the unity of 
the concept. Soul and body are one ; body is the reality 
of soul, soul the ideality of body. 

Spirit becomes manifest to itself in negation of uni- 
versality and negation of that negation ; this develop- 
ment is called its faculties : it is not spirit, but the 
abs. idea is spirit in the dialectic process of contradiction. 
The three momenta are, 

(i) Subjective spirit (an sich) ; it is at. first 

{a^ Blended with natural determination, the soul in its 



HEGEL. 265 

relation to the body, the object of Anthropology (Natur^ 
geist), which is («) purely natural, the immateriality of 
nature ; (/5) sensitive soul ; (r) actual, the union of (a) 
and (/5) ; distinguishing the world from it and itself from 
the world, it becomes 

(^.) ConscioiLsness ; it frees itself from the form of mere 
being, gives itself the form of essence, and becomes ego, 
(a) consciousness ; (./5) self-consc. ; (y) reason. This is 
the object of phenomenology. Finally, reconciling the 
contradiction of {ci) and {b), the soul arrives at consc. of 
its unity with the world, and becomes, 

(r.) Proper spifit, the unity of subj. and obj. ; its three 
momenta are {«) theoretical, Intelligence, giving to separ- 
ated and contingent objects a subjective, univ., necessary 
and rational princ. ; (/5) practical, will ; (r) free spirit, the 
actual, the union of int. and will. This is the object of 
Pneuinatology. 

(2.) Objective spirit, free will producing from itself a 
world of freedom ; this freedom of the abs. consc. is the 
univ., rational will which produces in the Individ, will the 
consc. of rights and morality. Its three momenta are 
{a) Pure indeterminateness, rights (jurisprudence) ; 

(a) Property, (/5) contract, {y) penalty, (strafe,) vindi- 
cation of rights ; 

(b.) Morality (subjective), will reflected on itself, de- 
termined against the univ. ; (a) purpose in the action, and 
responsibility, (/5) aim, intention, and well-being (general 
advantage), (r) good, the unity of the univ. and the par- 
ticular. Evil is the inmost reflection of subjectivity upon 
itself against the obj. and univ., the asserting of the finite 
against the infinite. 

{c) Social morals the unitv and truth of (a) and {b), 



266 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

regard (a) the family relation raised to a spiritual deter- 
mination ; (fi) society, spirit abstracting itself in many 
personalities ; (y) the state, the actuality of the moral idea 
(politics), " the self-consc, ethical substance developed into 
organized actuality ;" divine will as present spirit. The 
highest duty of individuals is to be fellow-members of the 
State. 

History is the development of the consc. of freedom 
following the momenta of (y)- 

(3.) Absolute spifit, the unity of subj. and obj., has 
its three momenta : it knows itself in 

(^.) Art, in intuition and image ; 

ib^ Religion, in the form of emotion and imagination; 

(r.) Philosophy, in the form of thought and concept. 

(a) The beautiful is " the actuality of the idea in the 
form of limited manifestation." Its two inseparable fac- 
tors are idea and material ; hence three art forms, («) 
symbolic art, in which material preponderates over idea; 
(/5) classic, content and form being adequate to one an- 
other ; ij) romantic, in which spirit overmasters material ; 
(divide thus the fine arts, object., subj. and reconc.) 

(^.) Religion is the form which abs. truth assumes for 
feeling and imagination; it is man's knowledge of God 
and God's knowledge of Himself in man, one and the 
same act. 

if) Abs. Phil, is the idea thinking itself, truth knowing 
itself, reason comprehending itself, the self-consc. of the 
abs. in man, in the form of thought and concept. The 
Hist, of Phil, is the strife of the abs. idea to arrive at 
adequate conception of itself ; all previous systems are mo- 
ments ot this process, now perfected in the Phil, of the 
Absolute. 



OPPONENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 26/ 

(G) School of Hegel. His numerous followers soon 
divided into what may be termed a " right," a " left," and 
a " centre ;" the first endeavoring to reconcile his logical 
system with " orthodoxy ;" the second developing on the 
same basis a logical pantheism, e.g., Strauss, Bauer, 
Feuerbach. 

5. OPPONENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 

Here we may conveniently introduce those philos. of 
Germany who, though basing their princ. on Kant or 
Schelling, yet introduced mystical or empirical elements, 
or a psychoL method, which rendered their philos. systems 
inferior in systematic form to those mentioned above. 
We may select 

(A.) Ft. Heinr. Jacabi, (i) (1743-1819, A. D.,) b. at 
Diisseldorf, held an office under government at Munich, 
afterwards Pres. of the Acad, there, devoting his leisure 
to philos. questions, producing occasional papers, the 
(philos.) romance "Waldemar," etc. ; "the Plato of Ger- 
many." 

(2.) J. detects a radical defect in Kant's system, the 
need of a connecting link between the thinking subject 
and the transc. obj. Sensations are not caused by phenom. 
for they are in the mind ; nor, according to the " Critique," 
by things in themselves (transc), for cause and effect are 
only in the phenom. world. Thus the Crit. is self-destruc- 
tive. Fichte's subj. idealism is logically valid. Phil, ends 
in Spinozism, for demonstration may lead up to the world 
as a whole, not to its author ; it passes from the condi- 
tioned to the conditioned, not to the unconditioned. 

But the obj. of perc. is believed real, though this can- 
not be proved. Faith is an immanent conviction, a rational 
intuit, of the supra-sensible ; this gives direct conviction 



268 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of God's existence, etc. God is present to man through 
the heart (" myst. of sent."). " There is Ught in my heart, 
but when I try to bring it to the understanding it is ex- 
tinguished." 

(B.) Jacob Fr. Fries, (i.) (i 773-1 843, A. D.) Prof, of 
Phil, at Heidelberg and Jena ; his chief work is " New 
Critique of the Reason" (1807); but he wrote also, " Wissen, 
Glaube und Ahnung" (1805), etc., etc. 

(2.) Psychol, is the basis of phil., for only through 
internal experience are we conscious how we possess a 
pr. cognitions. With Kant he recognizes space, time, the 
categories, as subj. a pr. forms. As with Jacobi, the sphere 
of the understanding (Wissen) is merely subj. phenom. 
Things in themselves, the ideas, are the object of direct 
intuition of the higher faculty (Vernunft). This is faith. 

Boutertvek, (1766-1828, A. D.,) adopts essentially the 
same principles ; (" Nat. Realism ; " see copious quotations 
from Jacobi, etc., in Hamilton's Reid, p. 793, seq.) 

(C.) Fr. Em. Dan. Schleiermacher (i) (i 768-1 834 A. D.), 
b. at Breslau, at first a Moravian preacher at Berlin, etc.. 
Prof, at Halle, Prof, of Theol. at Berlin ; his numerous 
works discuss religion, ethics, politics, phil., etc. ; they ex- 
ercised a great and lasting influence on the Lutheran rel., 
and on German ethics, (see a highly appreciative review in 
Ueberweg.) 

(2.) Following Kant, S. tried to avoid the extreme 
idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. There are two 
factors in thought, the a pr. and the empirical. Distinguish 
the matter and the form of cognitions ; the former is given 
in sense-perc, the latter by thought, but both are real 
obj. ; space, time, the categories, are forms of things 
themselves. 



OPPONENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 269 

The forms of development of knowledge are induc- 
tion and deduction, but the latter must proceed from 
princ. given by the former. 

The plurality of objects has obj. unity. The totaUty 
of them is the world ; their unity is Deity (Spinozism). 
Reason and consc. in us are God. In the idea of God is 
the abstract unity of the ideal and the real ; in the con- 
cept of the world, on the other hand, is their relative 
unity ; it embraces (as opposed to one another) nature, 
in which the real preponderates, spirit, in which is more 
prominent the ideal. 

In God is no difference between power and will. The 
div. causality is complete in the world. He is for us not 
thinkable, as the abs. ; we can use only negation and an- 
thropomorphic expressions. 

(3.) " Science is tHe existence of things in human rea- 
son, and the exist, of human reason in things ; " religion 
is the consc. of the unity of reason and nature. Every 
part of the world is related to the rest in action and pas- 
sion. From the latter in us results our feeling of de- 
pendence in which religion is rooted ; from the former a 
feeling of our freedom, which is the ground of inorality. 

{a.) We have a feeling of entire dependence on the In- 
finity of the universe: " to feel one's self in the imm. unity 
of intuition and feeling one with the eternal is the aim of 
religion " (subjective side). This feeling is manifested in 
religious ideas and dogmas : objectively, religion is the 
being of God manifested in our feeling. Rel. can and must 
take definite forms in reaching perfect actuality. These 
are the positive religions, each based on some one of the 
many relations of the finite to the Inf. To make obj. the 
subj. feeling is mysticism and mythology. 



2/0 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(b) S.'s specialty is ethics: the moral task of man is 
the reconciliation of nature and reason, the latter becom- 
ing the conscious lord of the former. 

(a) Theory of goods. A good is a partic. unity of na- 
ture and reason ; the sum. bon. is the univ. unity of these, 
of the real and the ideal. 

(/S) Virtue is the force from which issue moral actions. 

(r) Duty is progress towards the highest good : its 
most universal law, " Act constantly with thy whole moral 
force, striving to fulfil thy whole moral task." 

(D.) Arthur Schopenhauer, (i) (i 788-1 860, A. D.) b. at 
Dantzic, ed. at Gottingen, under Schulze (^Enesidemus) ; 
taught at Berlin (i 820-1 831) ; his career cannot be called 
successful, though he had followers. His principal work 
is, " The World as Will and Representation," (Notion, Vor- 
stellung.) 

(2.) No subject without object, no obj. without subj.; 
" The world is my notion, my represent.," (Vorstellung.) 
But this is the subj. aspect of the world, in which all is 
relative ; (princ. of suff. reason.) Kant's Ding-an-sich is 
a mere assumption ; universal forms of existence are, a 
^r., in our consc, and can be discovered there. Space, 
time, the categories, are subjective, valid only for phenom. 
The innermost essence of the world is something most 
known by us ; it is Will, Univ. Will, which is known to 
us through int. perc. in our own will. It includes con- 
scious desire, unconscious instinct, natural forces. 

The objectivity of the will = represent. (Vorst.) ; but 
will everywhere is one. Between will and represent, is 
the eternal unchangeable idea, will in its primary objective 
form. In cognition of it the subject ceases to be merely 
individual. 



OPPONENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 2/1 

In man, volition and its result are one and the same. 
The body itself is objectified will. This is the key to the 
essence of all other things. Abstracting their limited 
being (Dasein) as notions, represent., there will remain 
their essence as will. 

Ai't is the work of genius, the highest step in the ob- 
jectification of will, in which the eternal idea is known 
and repeated. 

(3.) The world is not the best, but the worst possi- 
ble, (pessimism). Will, existence, is perpetual suffering. 
It must cease to affirm, to will itself, in order to escape : 
as simple represent., in enjoyment of the beautiful, it is 
free from torment ; this is the aim, imperfectly accom- 
plished, of genius. 

Conscious, then, of the identity of our will with the 
Univ. Will, the first point in ethics is sympathy with suf- 
fering ; but next, the mortification in ourselves of the will 
to live, so that volition may cease. (Nirvana.) 

Hartmann follows in S.'s steps. 

(E) John Fr. Herbart, (i) (i 776-1 841, A. D.) b. at 
Oldenburg, studied at Jena under Fichte, tutor in Switz., 
(Pestalozzi), Prof, at Gottingen, (1805,) at Konigsberg, 
(1809) ret. to Gottingen, (1833) ; besides writing on " Ped- 
agogik," he produced numerous philos. works, e. g., " Psy- 
chology, founded on Exp. Metaph. and Math." 

(2.) He offered a system of realism grounded on 
Kant and Leibnitz. The basis of phil. is the sum of all 
emp. phenom., its aim is to " elaborate concepts ; " for, as 
derived from exp. and the ego, they involve contradictions 
{e. g., extension, action in time, many attributes in one 
subj.) which need to be explained ; the emp. concept must 
be explained, methodically transformed. This is the prov- 



2/2 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ince of Metaph. Phil, then, has three parts; Logic, 
Metaph. ^Esthetics. 

(3.) Exp. gives us the materials of knowledge, but 
not what things are ; but its forms are objective, for we 
have no control over them. Logic aims to render distinct 
its concepts, to render them co-ordinate. Met. then cor- 
rects and transforms as 

{a) Ontology. There are a multiplicity of real essences, 
each with a simple quality. The real is abs. position, 
(monad, math, point), neither in time nor space, (phenom- 
enal, in the mind) ; " intelligible space " is that in which 
it is conceived as existing. Things are complexes of 
these, standing in diff. relations to one another ; all sup- 
posed qualities or properties are these relations. 

How comes it to pass, then, that exp. seems to give us 
unity in things .'* One of the many simple essences has a 
central position, and the others appear in relation to it. 
The real cannot change ; but their relations in a thing 
may ; we may view the thing in diff. rel., e. g., a l-ine in 
Math. This activity of the real is due to the effort of 
" self-preservation " against disturbing influences from 
without. 

{b.) Synechology, explaining the contrad. involved in 
the idea of matter. The real essences by internal energy 
interpenetrating one another and re-acting, a sort of at- 
traction and repulsion arises from which the atom, the 
mass, matter. 

Time, space, motion are not actual, (obj. phenom. only) 
but relations of obj. : thus the relation of the monads gives 
the line ; then follow the surface, extension in three 
dimensions, space. 

(<f.) Eidology, elucidating the phenom. of the human. 



OPPONENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 2/3 

mind, its multiplicity and unity. The central real of the 
ego, as a thing, a limited being, is soul. Faculties are log 
ical names in classifying psychical phenom. Its one ac- 
tivity is " self-preservation." The soul is affected by the 
real essences which surround it ; its act of self-preserv. is 
the notion (Vorst.). 

The " Stun of arrest " is found in the uniting of several 
notions (Vorst.) in the soul ; continuing to exist, then, if 
opposed, each loses part of its intensity, and the math, to- 
tal is " the sum of arrest : " and thus, where there are 
several, the weakest may be forced out of consc. On 
this is based his application of Math, to psychology not 
to the abs. but the rel. intensity of the Vorst.). H.'s 
psychology of will, desire, etc., applies these princ. The 
orderly relations of the simple, real essences imply a Div. 
Intelligence. (Teleology.) 

(4.) Aesthetics y set forth the ideas on which are 
based the satisfaction or dissatisfaction produced by rela- 
tions : they include ethics, when relations of will are con 
cerned ; the moral is based on the int. satisfaction from 
harmony between will and judgment ; this is the morally 
beautiful, virtue as ideal. 

Benevolence is harmony between one will and that of 
others. 

Legal right arises from dissatisfaction at conflict of 
will. 

Herbart had a widely extended school. 

(F.) Fr. Ed. Beiieke, (i) (1798-1854, A. D.) b. at Ber- 
lin, added to his studies in Germ. Phil., Eng. and Scotch, 
forbidden to lecture at Univ. of Berlin, (which interdict he 
attributed to Hegel,) he taught at Gottingen, (1824-1827), 
then returned to Berlin. His works give special atten 



2/4 GERMAN CRITICAL AND IDEAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion to Psych., e.g., " Elements of Psych." (1833) ; " Nat. 
System of Pract. Phil." (Ethics, etc.) (1837-1840) ; '' Meta- 
physics," (1840). 

(2.) Against Hegel and Herbart, he proposes to base 
Metaphys. Phil, on Psych. We have direct knowledge of 
our own psychical activities, of our own psychical being 
as it is, by sense-perc. of our own bodies ; and sense-perc. 
of other bodies, by analogy, gives us the idea of other souls 
like our own. 

Emp. consc. does not involve contradictions ; but int. 
sens, and perc. must be elaborated by the inductive meth- 
od, analyzing the complex contents of consc, and synthet- 
ically uniting them in a system. 

(3.) Psychology. The soul is active powers, for a 
thing is the sum of all its forces. "• Faculties " are ele- 
ments of the soul's substratum, not zji a substanoe ; what 
bear the name are " hypostatized " class-concepts of com- 
plicated phenom. 

The soul is the totality of these united powers ; but 
analysis gives four primary groups of psychical pro- 
cesses : 

{a.) Various elementary powers in each sense appro- 
priate excitations from without (Reizaneignung), whereby 
are formed sensations and perceptions ; 

(b.) New elementary powers are developed and added 
to these ; 

(c.) Adjustment (ausgleichung) or transfer of "excita- 
tions ; " some of the exc. remain as " traces," in unconsc. ; 
in various psychical combinations they may unite with 
others and elevate them to consc, etc. ; 

{d) Mutual attraction and blending of homogeneous 
psychical products. 



OPPONENTS OF PURE IDEALISM. 2/5 

Powers of the developed soul are from *' traces " of 
previously excited psychical products of sense-perc. ; e. g,^ 
instead of a faculty of memory, each representation has 
its own memory, the effort at reproduction. 

(4.) Metaphysics are based on psychology. From 
psychical powers having inferred an immaterial soul, by 
analogy we infer the being, an sick, of our own body : 
then, similarly, of other souls, and other bodies ; so also 
the concepts of substance and accidents, space and time, 
etc. 

(5.) Ethics, are based on the relative worth of the 
psychical functions as given in feeling ; morality requires 
that we choose the higher, the more worthy, as subjec- 
tively felt and objectively desired. 

(G.) German Idealism, as will be seen, has run its course ; some 
of the Hegelian school, like Feuerbach, have adopted materialism ; 
others (as J. H. Fichte ; see Morell), have endeavored to apply its 
methods to realism. Or else, in despair of Phil., German thought, 
on an empirical or materialist basis, has devoted itself to the Nat. 
Sciences. (Biichner, " Form and Matter," Lond. 1864.) 

Among opponents is, especially worthy of notice, Ulrici. (Con- 
sult Erdmann, and see trans, in Am. Ed. Ueberweg.) See also 
Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus. 

Others have tried to reconstruct phil. ; as Trendelenberg on the 
basis of Aristotle ; Lotze after Leibnitz. (See Erdmann, ubi. sup.) 



276 ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM IN THE NINE- 
TEENTH CENTURY. 

\,Ref. Morell ; Cousin; Whewell; Mackintosh.] 

I. Utilitarian Ethics. 2. Speculative Empiricism 
IN England. 3. French Ideology and Positivism. 

I. Utilitarian Ethics. 

We resume Eng. phil. at a period when the influence 
of Locke was almost supreme, and begin with a writer 
who, though unsystematic, yet through his temperate good 
sense and his practical views has exercised a remarkable 
control of English thought. 

(A.) William Paley, (i) (i 743-1 805, A. D.) Fellow of 
Christ's Coll., Camb., in 1765 defended Epicureanism in 
a prize essay ; in 1785, produced his " Principles of Morals 
and Politics." (See Dug. Stewart.) 

(2.) He denies a " moral sense," because it would 
involve innate ideas ; obligation is founded on the will of 
a superior ; the supreme law-giver is God, whose will aims 
at the production of happiness among His creatures. 

Virtue is " the doing good to mankind in obedience to 
the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." 
But what is duty is to be determined by the criterion of 



UTILITARIAN ETHICS. 2/7 

universal happiness ; whatever is on the whole beneficial 
is right. 

(B.) ye7'einy Bentham, (See Mill's Disc. vol. i, and 
Autob. (x.), and Whewell's Hist. Moral Phil, Lect. xiii- 
xviii.) (i) (i 748-1 832, A. D.) ed. at Queen's Coll., Oxf., 
wrote " Fragment on Government," "' Principles of Morals 
and Legislation" (1789); Dr. Bowring published in 1832 
his *' Deontology." More consistent than Paley, of great 
analytic power, of witty and sarcastic style, he became the 
leader of a school of liberal thinkers in politics, the school 
of " Philos. radicalism." A man of fortune, he founded 
the Westminster Rev. (See J. S. Mill's Autob. c. iv.) 
His chief influence, however, has been on jurisprudence. 
(2.) Man is governed in practical conduct by — 

{a) Selfish passions, (b) sympathy and antipathy 
towards others. The good = pleasure measured by {a) 
magnitude of intensity and duration, {F) extent, i. e.^ num- 
ber of persons. On this is based B.'s ethical criterion, " the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number," as the sum 
of remaining pleasures, after subtracting pains, {a) of 
ourselves ; hence the virtue of prudence which is (a) " self- 
regarding prudence," (/5) "extra-regarding prudence," for 
others ; ib) of others, whence is derived the virtue of ben- 
eficence. 

(3) B.'s jurisprudence condemns the "compact" 
theory as a mischievous fiction ; it is especially notable in 
its classification of offences with minute subdivisions ; 

id) Private, against individuals; (a) person, (/5) property, 
(r) reputation. (0) condition, (e) against (a) and (r)^; (C) 
against («) and (/5) ; 

{b) Semi-public, offences against a class ; 

{c) Self-regarding off.; 



278 ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM. 

{a) Public, against the community ; 
(c) Multiform ; (a) by falsehood, (p) against trust 
Punishment has for its object to prevent offences, to 
prevent the worst, to keep down the mischief, to act at 
the least expense, in fine, to prevent suffering and, to pro- 
mote happiness. 

2 Speculative Empiricism in England. 

Here we find no new principle, but a development in 
certain directions, {e. g., assoc. of ideas, (Jas. Mill), a far 
wider induction from phenom. ; an attempt to pass from 
physiology (and even craniojogy, under the influence of 
Gall, Spurzheim, Combe), to physiology ; the new impulse 
given to phys. investigation creates a tendency to " natur- 
alism," sometimes restrained by the influence of Scotch 
and German systems, (J. S. Mill), while again material 
phenom, are used almost exclusively as the key to funda- 
mental princ. of Phil. (H. Spencer) ; sociology and politics 
occupy a more prominent place in spec. phil. than in any 
previous age- 

(A) James Mill. (See J. S. Mill's Autob. ; Moll.) 
(i.) (1773-1836, A. D.) b. at Montrose, Scot.,ed. at 
Univ. Edinb., min. of the Scotch Kirk, gave up his profes- 
sion, entered the service of the E. Ind. Co. ; he wrote 
"Hist. Br. India," (1818), " El. Pol. Econ.," (1821)," Ess. 
on Gov." (1828), ''Anal. Phenom. Human Mind," (1829). 

(2) The only objects of knowledge are {a) sensations, 
(J)) ideas, copies of {a) ; sensation and " ideation " are the 
two ultimate mental processes. Consc. is a generic name 
for these. " To be conscious of the prick of a pin = to 
have the sensation," (Anal. c. iii). ; conception is a generic 



SPECULATIVE EMPIRICISM IN ENGLAND. 2/9 

name for ideas only ; imag. for trains of ideas. Memory 
is complex, {a) the idea of past sens., {b) present self, past 
self, and the train of consc. (c. x.). 

In Classification, naming at first an individual, we apply 
the name to another like it, and so on : abstract names are 
concrete names with the " connotation " dropped. 

JiLdgment is recognition that two names stand for the 
same things, (analytical .^) (c. xi.) ; this explains ratiocina- 
tion. 

(3) Association of ideas will explain all terms ; some 
of the latter denote sens., others connote the associated 
ideas. Sens., ideas, are coincident or successive ; succes- 
sions are fortuitous or constant. Hence 

{a) cause and effect, constant antecedence and sub- 
sequence ; 

ib) Substance, coalescence of a certain number of sens,: 
this " concomitance " is between color and figure, solidity 
and form, etc. ; 

{c) Time, an abstract for three abstracts, past, present, 
future, given in successive sensations ; 

{d) Muscular sens., and those of touch, in a certain 
order, are named line ; assoc. of ideas gives the idea of 
added length, and lines in every direction, extension ad 
inf. 

(4) Active powers are analyzed as pleasurable and 
painful sens. The idea of pleasure is desire (c. xix.) ; will 
is desire of means to an end. 

Moral sentiments begin with assoc. of pleasure to 
ourselves with certain ideas, then of pleasure from praise. 

(B) Alex. Bain., Prof. Univ. Aberdeen, (" Senses and 
the Intellect," 1864 ; "Emotions and the will ;" " Mental 
and Moral Science," 1868; etc.,) adopts the same princi- 



280 ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM. 

pies, with special applications of physiology. Solidity, ex- 
tension, space, exist in our minds as sensible impressions 
with feelings of force. The idea of extension originates 
in the duration of muscular effort, as given in muse. sens. 
" Belief in ext. reality is the anticipation of a given effect to 
a given antecedent." Self is a complex of feelings, actions 
and intelligence. Will is the name for collective im- 
pulses to action. 

The moral sentiment is due to education and experi- 
ence ; remorse and self-approval, by assoc. of ideas, are 
transferred from experience of results to -the inward ante- 
cedent disposition. (See J. S. Mill, Disc. v. iv.) 

(C) yohn Stuart Mill. (See Autobiography, Mansel, 
" Phil, of the Cond. etc." ; McCosh, " Examination, etc." ; 
" Intuitions, etc." ; Porter, " Human Int." on causation, 

§§ 591-3.) 

(i) (1806-1873, A. D.), son of Jas. Mill, clerk in the 
India House, ed. West. Rev. (i 835-1 840) ; distinguished 
as a writer on the " Liberal " side, (" Pol. Ec," " Lib- 
erty," " Subj. of Women," etc.). His most important 
philos. works, are " System of Logic," (rejecting ontol- 
ogy, but arguing for his phil. theory,) " Ex. of Sir Wm. 
Hamilton's phil." " Utilitarianism" in " Discussions," 
" Comte," " Three Essays on Religion," (posthumous) ; 
Note especially the last, " Theism," (1870). 

Mill's transparent clearness and precision of style, ap- 
parent fairness and sincerity, render him one of the most 
attractive and influential of his school. 

(2) His theory of knowledge \^ strictly empirical ; all 
general propositions and concepts come from experience 
according to the laws of induction, which he develops with 
great skill in his Logic. In his " Exam, of Sir Wm. 



SPECULATIVE EMPIRICISM IN ENGLAND. 28 1 

Hamilton's Phil." having, with his usual precision and 
clearness, exposed the weak points in the " phil. of the 
conditioned," he proceeds, (c. xi.) to lay down the 
" psychol. theory " (associational) of belief in an ext. 
world. 

{a) The idea of " substance or matter' is reduced to 
"permanent possibilities of sensation;" z. e., the mind 
not only receives sens., and associates their ideas, but is 
capable of expectation, of forming the concept of possible 
sens. An existing sens, brings up, by the law of assoc. 
of ideas, the ideas of others as possible, and this collected 
group, with the idea of permanent possibility, is the con- 
cept of body. 

These groups of possibilities are thought of as diff . from 
the actual sens., as the cause of it. This theory cannot be 
proved, but the law of parcimony gives it the preference 
over that of intuit, of a non-ego. (cf. Idealism of Berkeley). 

Extension would* be a complex of successive Sens, if 
given by touch only, but through sight they are thought of 
as simultaneous, (cf. Bain.) 

In primary qualities of body, the predominating idea 
is these possibilities ; in secondary, the actual sens. 

ib) Self, ego. We know feelings, i. e. sensations, emo- 
tions, thoughts, volitions, (the last three are not in groups, 
are of the Individ.); the belief of the existence of mxind is a 
belief of the permanent possibility of these states. (Ex. c. 
xii.) But M. confesses that memory and expectation are 
inexplicable on this theory ; feelings have " a thread of 
consc." 

{c) The idea of cause and effect, of power, activity, is due 
to a fixed order of sequence in these groups of possibilities 
of sens. The idea, like all others, is formed from exp. of 



282 ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM. 

these sequences ; but yet, in his " Logic," causation is un- 
conditional relation of succession. " Efficient causes — not 
phenomena-^are radically inaccessible to the human 
faculties." 

(yd) Axioms, general principles, are due to ind. from 
exp. " All inference is from particulars to particulars ; 
general prop, merely register such inferences." (Logic, 
cc. iv. V.) 

(3) Ethics, {a) The law of causality applies also to 
human actions. Will, the " active phenom., is an off-shoot 
of desire, the passive sensibility " (Util. c. iv.) ; it is deter- 
mined by desires, etc. (Ex. c. xxix.) ; we are not consc. of 
ability to act against our strongest preference. 

{b) The morality of actions depends on their conse- 
quences, (cf. J as. Mill and Bentham) ; the good or evil of 
these consequences is measured by pleasure or pain ; for 
pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desired 
as ends, and this therefore is the standard (relative) of 
morals. In pleasures, however, we must consider both 
quality and quantity, (Epicurus). Ethics an induct, science. 

if) Moral feelings are not innate, but acquired capaci- 
ties ; yet they are natural as based " on social instincts ;" 
they are developed by ext. sanctions, /. e., hope of favor, 
expectation of reward, popular opinions, institutions. 

justice (Util, c. v.) is based on the natural feelings of 
resentment and sympathy (sentiment = animal desire 
widened) ; its morality is from enlarged human sympathy 
and intelligent self-interest ; hence the desire to punish a 
person who has done harm. " Legal constraints " from 
this sentiment generate the idea of justice. Like veracity, 
it is " of artificial origin." (Ess. on Nature.) 

{c) In politics, M. rejects the theory of natural rights ; 



SPECULATIVE EMPIRICISM IN ENGLAND.- 283 

for '' general good " is determined by induction from ex- 
pediency ; political rights are relative to the state of 
society. 

{d) Reason finds in the appearance of design in nature 
probable evidence for the existence of a Creator, not of 
matter or force, but of the present order, a Being of lim- 
ited power. (See remarkable Essay on Theism, 1870). 

(D.) Herbert Spencer, (i) (b. 1 820) published Social Statics 
(1850) ; in i860, undertook a " System of Phil. ;" {a) First 
principles, (i860, rev. 1867); (p) Biology, (1866) ; (<:) 
Psychology, (1872, rev. of 1855); {d) "Principles of Soci- 
ology," to finish the scheme. 

(2) S.'s primary doctrine is evolution, both in psych- 
ical and physical phenom., a change from " an indefinite 
incoherent homogeneity to a def. coherent heterogeneity." 
This princ. is an induction from exp. of which no further 
account can be given, for the absolute in any form is un- 
thinkable, although there is an ultimate reality {x) in which 
subject and object coincide; yet our concept of the Abs. 
is positive though indefinite. 

Truth is perfect agreement, throughout the range of 
our exp., of all represent, of things (Princ. § 40), and the 
test of truth is inconceivableness of the contradictory ; 
but the " nee. truths " are the result of countless experi- 
ences of ancestors transmitting a tendency in the nervous 
system, the store-house of impressions. 

(3) Neither matter nor mind can be known in them- 
selves, but only phenom. in their relations of sequence 
and co-existence ; time and space are abstracts of these ; 
body adds concept of existence from exp. of force, the un- 
known cause. Psychical states are included in its trans- 
formations ; heat, light, etc., are transformable into 



284 ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM. 

emotions, thoughts (Psych. § 71) ; materialism = spiritu- 
alism, (so. phenomenalism). 

(4) Psychology is a branch of biology (life a contin- 
ual adjustment of int. to ext. relations), and " considers 
the connection between the organism and its environ- 
ments." The term mind represents a " circumscribed 
aggregate of activities ;" these are evolved by outward con- 
ditions which produce states of ever-increasing energy, a 
tendency to renewal, eventually a permanent condition of 
the nervous system. Memory is an incomplete automatism, 
partial instinct. Reason arises out of instinct when the 
environments are very complex. Volition is " imperfect 
connection between the ext. impressions and the conse- 
quent action ; " " cessation of automatic action = dawn of 
volition." (Psych. § 218.) 

3. French Ideology and Positivism. 

At the end of the Rev., French Phil, was almost purely 
sensualistic. Either physiology was the only ground of 
psych. (Cabanis ; sens, an affection of the nerves, the brain 
secreting thought), or else, (subjectively) sensuahsm took 
the form of " ideology," while Volney's catechism presented 
" self-preservation " as the end and criterion of morals. 

(A.) Destutt de Tracy, (i 754-1 836, A.D.), produced, 
in 1804, his "Elements d' Ideologic," distinguishing four 
sorts of feelings ideas), (i) actual sensations, (2) feelings 
of past sens., (3) feelings of relations, (judgment, etc.,) (4) 
feelings of want, danger, etc. 

(B.) Laromigiiiere, ^1756-1837, A.D.^ Prof, of Phil., 
Acad, de P., pubHshed in 181 5 "Lemons de Phil." or 
*^ Essais sur les Facultes de L'Ame." (See Cousin's rev. in 
Fragm. Phil, v.) 



FRENCH IDEOLOGY AND POSITIVISM. 2o$ 

Following Condillac, and aiming at the same unity of 
system, L. finds that analysis gives attention as the funda- 
mental faculty of the mind, (reaction from sensualism.) 
The . development of faculties is, (i) attention, (2) com- 
parison, attention to two impressions, (3) judgment, etc., 
from (2) ; memory, etc., products of sens. ; (i), (2), (3 
united, constitute the understanding ; add the sens, of need 
and there arise (i) desire ; from this (2) preference, (3) 
liberty ; (i), (2), (3) united constitute will. Materials of 
knowledge are supplied by sensibility (includes reflection, 
judgment of relations, and moral sense.) 

A spiritualist and religious reaction followed the Restoration in 
France, (vid. inf.) until Positivism, as the negation of all Phil., 
claimed the prominent place which it now holds there. 

(C.) AiigiLstits Comte. (See Mill's Comte (West. Rev. 
1865), H. Martineau's (abridged,) trans, of "Phil. Positive," 
1853), Lewes.) Metaphysics, the search for first or final 
causes, must be abandoned for " positive " science. 

Nothing but phenom. can be known, and the phenom. 
of consc. must be relegated to biology, as a part of physi- 
ology ; phrenology, scientifically evolved, is the organon 
for the study of mental functions. 

Consequently all knowledge is relative ; as the mind is 
evolved, so also knowledge. The only province of true 
phil. is the study and classification of phenomenal iaws, 
i. e,, the sequences and resemblances of phenom. 

The Classific. and co-ord. of sciences correspond to the 
principles of C, and are ingenious and thorough. 

Begin with the simplest and lowest order of phenom., 
and so advance to the more complex ; (i) Math., (2) As- 
tronomy, (adding new facts), (3) Physics, (4) Chemistry, 
5) Biology, (6) Sociology. 



286 . ENGLISH AND FRENCH EMPIRICISM. 

In history, trace the evolution of mind througli three 
stages, (i) theological, {a) fetichism, (as in brutes). (^), 
polytheism, {c) monotheism ; (2) metaphysical (abstrac- 
tions viewed as real entities) ; (3) positive. 

(Note Comte's later career of " Positive ReligionJ' 
with its cultus of the "Grand Etre.") 

Positivism has its later representatives in Taine, Littre, 
etc. (See Harrison, Cont. Rev., 1876.) 



PHYSCHOLOGICAL SPIRITUALISM. 28^ 



CHAPTER XVII. 

ENGLISH AND FRENCH PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
SPIRITUALISTIC SCHOOL OF THE NINE- 
TEENTH CENTURY. 

I. Psychological Spiritualism in England and the 
United States. 2. French Eclecticism. 

I. Psychological Spiritualism in England and the 
United States. 

The marked re-action towards spiritualism in phil.,lit, 
arts, etc. (See Wordsworth's Exc, B. ii.), which may be 
dated from the year 181 5, contains, both in Eng. and Fr., 
three special elements : 

(i) German phil. in {a) idealism, {b) criticism (" phil. 
of the cond.," "relativity of knowledge,") the former of 
which in Eng. exerted a remarkable influence through the 
(fragmentary) writings and the conversations of Coleridge; 
(cf. also Cousin ; see also Carlyle, Misc. Ess. v. i.); 

(2) Psychological method, and the prominence of 



288 SPIRITUALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 

psych., almost to the exclusion of ontology; (so also Scotch 
phil.) ; 

(3) A mystical and theosophic element, more or less 
based on Jacobi and Schelling, sometimes taking the form 
of pantheism (see Shelley's Adonais, 41 seq.) 

(A) Saimiel Taylor Coleridge, {i) (i 772-1834, A. D.) 
ed. at Christ's Hospital and Cambridge; Unitarian 
preacher, radical, spent a year in Germany (1798), pub. in 
18 1 7 his " Biog. Lit." under influence of Kant and Schel- 
ling, '' The Friend, " (1809-18 18), "Aids to Reflection," 
(1825), etc. Though his published work is unsystematic 
and fragmentary, yet its depth and thoughtfulness, and 
still more, the power of his conversation, gave him an ex- 
traordinary influence in aid of the spiritualist reaction, 
throughout Eng. and the U. S. His special office, 
like that of Socrates, to awaken thought. (J. S. Mill, 
Disc. V. 2. ) 

(2) Adopting some essential princ. from Kant, for 
a time largely influenced by Schelling, (the Friend, Biog. 
Lit. xii.), at a later period, he more nearly approached to 
Jacobi's standpoint. Of special note among his princ, 

ia) Reason, distinguished from understanding, is in- 
tuition of univ. and nee. truths, self-evident, supersensual 
princ. ( Friend, Introd. Ess. xv. ad fin.; Aids, etc., Sp. Rel. 
Aph. viii. App.) ; understanding = discursive reason, 
is the regulative power, which generalizes sense-perc. 
and proceeds by inference from them. (cf. Par. Lost. v. 

483-) 

ib) Conscience, practical reason, adds free will, directly 
attests the reality of an immortal freely acting soul, of an 
absolute good, of God. 

C. earnestly and effectively opposed Paley's moral- 



PSYCHOLOGICAL SPIRITUALISM. 289 

ity of expediency. (Friend, § i. Ess. xv. ) Only the 
moral being, the spirit and the religion of man, can fill up 
the gap between the absolute and the phenomenal. 

Faith is the synthesis of reason and will ; an inward 
light of reason, a direct beholding of eternal truth. 

(C) Coleridge has had a remarkable influence upon the 
phil. of the beaiUifuL Disting. fancy, the representative 
faculty, from imag. which analyzes and re-creates, idealizes, 
unifies. (Biog. Lit. iii., ad fin.) 

(B) William Wkewell, ( 1795-1866, A. D. ) ed. Trin. 
Coll., Camb., fellow, Prof. Moral Phil. (1838), Master Trin. 
Coll. (1841), pub. " Hist. Ind. Sc."(i837) ; " Phil. Ind. Sc." 
(1840-1858); " EL Morality," (1845); Hist. Moral Phil., 
(1852) etc. 

W. adopts the phih of Kant, and applies it with great 
logical skill to the phil. of physics. " Ideas" are forms under 
which sens, are viewed by the mind : ground forms are 
"fundamental ideas," a priori truths of intuition implied 
in Gram., Arithm., (space, time,) in Mech. Sc, (cause, the 
fund, idea of force, matter,) etc., superimposed on sense- 
perc. by the mind ; the idea of substance is an irresistible 
conviction of a substrate to phenom. 

Secondary ideas are " ideal conceptions ; " e. g., number 
is a necessary concept, based on sense of succession, (cf. 
Mill's Logic.) 

In ethics W., though indebted to Kant, fails to give a 
consistent and systematic form. (cf. Mill's rev., Disc. v. 
iii.) Will is the mind's internal act, stimulated by "springs 
of action, " viz. appetites, affections, desires, "moral senti- 
ments," (approb. and disapprob.), reflex sentiments; he adds 
also rules or laws ; practical reason guides in applying 
them. Conscience is desires, aff., etc., cultured through rules 



290 SPIRITUALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 

of duty. Duties are based on rights, obligations, moral 
*' ideas," sc. benevolence, justice, truth, purity, order; these 
latter are forms of action given to man by God, and express 
the supreme law, the will of God. They are the five car- 
dinal virtues. Virtue is a disposition to acts conformed to 
law, (cf. Scotus) ; this is the right, and reason's rule is to 
do what is right because it is right. 

Happiness and duty are identical ; the former is the 
rational object of man's aim ; the latter, the obligatory law 
of action ; reconciliation of these is the aim of ethics. 

Rights are based on man's nature as a social animal, 
and defined by positive laws. The idea of order implies a 
State, a government, as necessary to the existence of 
rights and freedom. The patriarchal theory and the 
" social compact " each view one side only of the complex 
reality. 

Among the latest Eng. exponents of spiritualism, and 
opponents of empiricism, or of materialism, need be 
named only — 

yames McCosh, Prof. Logic and Met., Belfast, Irel., 
Pres. Coll. N. J. (1869), ^-s an able opponent of both pure 
idealism and of sensualism ; " Methods of Div. Gov. ;" 
" Typical Forms, etc.;" "Intuit, of the Mind, etc. ;" "Ex. 
of J. S. Mill's Phil," etc., and yas. Mmtineatc, whose 
phil. essays have been collected and pub. (See Cont. 
Rev., 1876.) 

(C.) American Philosophy has taken a practical direc- 
tion from Eng. thought, and been chiefly devoted to 
psych. Five impulses from abroad or from within may be 
noticed : 

{a^ The Calviitistic thought of N, E., raising espe- 
cially questions connected with human will and Div. Gov.; 



FRENCH ECLECTICISM. 29I 

e. g. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758, A. D.), "Treatise on 
the Will." (1754.) 

{b) French liberal spec, in its applications to the sc. 
of Gov. at the Rev. (cf. Federalist and Thos. Jeff.) 

(^.) Coleridge, (Prof. Marsh's Ed. and Preface, 1829, 
Dr. McVickar's Ed. and Pref., 1839), ^^^ Cousin. (Prof. 
Henry's (1834) and Wright's trans.) 

id) German Idealism. (Boston Unit, school, Journal 
Spec. Phil., St. Louis). 

(^.) Empi7'ical School, evolution. (Draper, Fiske, " Cosmic 
Phil.," aiming at scient. arrangement of H. Spencer's princ. 
of cosmology.) 

This last has, as yet (1876), but little hold on Am. 
thought, and numerous writers, of whom Dr. Porter (b. 
1811, Prof. Moral Phil., Yale Coll., 1846, Pres. 1871), may 
be taken as a distinguished representative — ("The Human 
Intellect" (1868), etc., admirable for precision, clearness 
and scientific breadth. See, especially, Pt. IV., cc. v., viii., 
Causation, the Absolute) — have developed psychology 
on a spiritualistic basis, recognizing intuitive princ. 
of reason having objective validity, and the essential 
freedom of man's higher life from the nee. which rules 
nature. 

2. French Eclecticism. 

In France the reaction against materialism took a form 
which may be called psychological, largely based on 
Scotch Phil. ; at a later period Cousin, under influences 
derived from Germany, founded a school to which he 
gave the name of " Eclectic." 

(A.) Royei^-Collard (i) (i 763-1845, A. D.), whose life 



292 SPIRITUALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 

was chiefly political, was Dean of the Fac. of Let., Normal 
School, Paris (18 10). Fragments of his lectures were ed. 
by Jouffroy, app. to his trans, of Reid ; the founder of the 
new psychol. school. (See Sir Wm. Hamilton's Reid, 
app. note D). 

(2.) In sense-perc. we learn by nat. induction (ne- 
cessary) external objects, their reality and their proper- 
ties ; sc. externality, extension, substance, duration, caus- 
ality : by the same nat. induction we pass also to the 
knowledge of unlimited space. 

Substance, space, etc., then, are a pr. ideas; so also 
are right and wrong. 

Mind may act unconsciously. (See Hamilton's Met 
Lect. xvii.) 

In R-C. and his associates we find the Scotch phil. 
with little variation, (the same "fund, laws of belief,") but 
with improved analysis and system. 

(B.) Maine De Biran, (i) (1766-1824, A. D.) Deputy 
and cons. d'Etat after the Restoration, at first a disciple of 
Cabanis and DeTracy, in 1805 was already abandoning 
them, and soon followed, with great phil. skill and precision 
of thought, the rising Scotch School. Cousin ed. four 
vols, of his works, (1840);" three more appeared in 1859. 

(2.) {a.) As early as 1803 M. dist. with great clear- 
ness between sens, as a passive affection, and perc. as a 
result of voluntary activity, of the mind ; habit " weakens 
sens, and strengthens perc." 

(b) He findsj then, an active element in the will, the 
personality of the ego^ given in " imm. int. apperception ; " 
the ego knows itself in causal action with an effect, for 
muscular effort of will is known as producing muse, sens, 
Thus to will is known as to cause ; personality, will, cause. 



FRENCH ECLECTICISM. 293 

are here identical. In continuity of effort is direct apperc. 
of the unity and identity of the ego. 

(r.) This is our first knowledge of cause. By " nat. 
induction " we transfer the idea to outward obj. ; thus the 
idea of substance is reduced to that of cause, (Leibnitz) ; 
(see Porter's Hum. Int. § 596.) 

(C.) Jouffroy, (1796-1842, A. D.) Prof. Moral Phil., 
Normal School at Paris, trans, and ed. Dugald Stewart 
and Reid ; pub. "Melanges Philos." (1833); his " Cours 
d'Esthetique " appeared in 1843 ; "Cours de Droit Nat.," 
in 1845. J. is the principal moralist of the Eel. school. 
Distinguish in man the personal life, free will, from the 
impersonal, in which he belongs to nature. 

Good and evil exist ; their ground, in each creature, is 
what aids or prevents ,the fulfilment of its destiny. 

(D.) Victor Cozisiit, (i), (i 792-1 867, A. D.) a pupil of 
Laromiguiere (18 11), then a disciple of Royer-Collard and 
Maine De Biran, Prof. Phil, Normal School (1815) ;ini820 
was compelled to retire, reinstated (1828), in 1840 was 
made Min. Pub. Instr. ; his brilliant eloquence gave him 
vast influence in France, and, indirectly, in Eng. and the 
U. S. 

He pub. his course of Lectures, (1815-20 and 1828- 
1830); " Fragm. Philos.," etc.; of special value his rev. 
of Locke (trans. Prof. Henry), and Lect. on "The True, 
the Beautiful and the Good," (trans. O. W. Wight). 

(2.) Hrs method is analysis and induction applied 
to the facts of consc. (psycho] . method) ; this is the fund, 
princ. of all knowledge, of intell. life ; in it we apprehend 
ourselves, through it the external world, the Absolute == 
God. Analyze the facts of cons, but stop at them. 

(3.) C. calls his phil. eclectic ; no phil. is absolutely 



294 SPIRITUALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 

false, but many are incomplete, one sided ; (see the three 
Pref. to Fragm. Phil.) Let us consider and analyze all 
the facts of consc. 

They are of three orders, sens., will, reason. 

(4.) Reason develops itself in two ways, {a) spon- 
taneous, (F) reflective; error is in reflective thought, 
giving contingent truths, general principles : (ji) discerns 
in particular, determined facts, even when first presented, 
the univ. and nee. principles in which the Abs. appears to 
it. In thinking the finite, the imperfect, reason sponta- 
neously proceeds to the Inf., the perfect, the Abs. ; herein 
reason is impersonal. 

(5) Thus we may pass from psych, to ont. The prim- 
itive facts of consc. are — 

{a) affection, volition, determinate modifications of the 
ego ; relation of these to the ego ; ego ; 

{b) successive affections, etc. ; relation ; identity of 
ego ; 

(jc) determinate effects willed ; relation ; power of ego ; 

id) intention, det. means to det. end ; relation ; end. 
Eliminating the conditioned, the finite element, reason's 
spontaneity possesses as its prim, princ. — 
{a) attribute and subject ; 
{U) plurality and unity ; 
(^) cause and effect ; 
{d) relations of means to end. 

The finite, the conditioned, plurality, is only conceiva- 
ble in and with the Inf. Unity, the Abs., so. God, essential 
activity, first Cause, Creator, the True, the Beautiful, the 
Good. Because the Abs. falls under the consc. of a finite 
being, God does not become relative, determined. 

Cognitions of reason are not relative, but absolute. 



FRENCH ECLECTICISM. 295 

(6) In Ethics, the method and results are the same. 
Dist. the contingent, sentiments, emotions, instincts, from 
the nee. princ. of spontaneous reason, imposing univ. obH- 
gation. This impUes free will, for duty supposes power. 
Dist. will from desire ; the one, aiming at morality, the other 
at happiness : true ethics will harmonize these, the antece- 
dent and the consequent: thus God is found to be holy, 
as the creator of a moral being. From princ. of merit and 
demerit derive (necessarily) the immortality of the soul. 

(7) Of Esthetics, Cousin treats with the same bril- 
liant eloquence as of ethics. Following the psychol. method 
we shall disengage ideal beauty from the real which are 
blended in the spont. prim, synthesis. Unity and variety 
are general marks of beauty ; physical, intellectual, moral, 
its three chief forms. The true and absolute ideal is God 
Himself. Art is the free reproduction of the beautiful, 
aiming to reach the soul through the senses, to express the 
ideal, the inf., in material forms. 

In Cousin's second period (1828) was a marked in- 
fluence of Germ, thought ; in his " Lect. on the True, etc." 
(re-ed. in 1853), he returns to the Scotch phil. of " Com- 
mon Sense " and psych. 

{E) A thoughtful school of religious sceptics, in despair 
of human reason, sought, in the first half of the nineteenth 
cent, to substitute a traditional revelation as the princ. of 
all true knowledge ; chief is De Bonald (i 754-1 840, A.D.), 
" Recherches philos." (18 18). Comit Joseph de Maistre 
(1753-1821, A.D.), produced in his " Soirees de St. Peters- 
burg," a thoughtful and sometimes eloquent theodicea, 
with mystical tendency. More remarkable for eloquence 
and personal influence is \}iiQ Abbe de Lamennais (1782- 
1854, A.D.), who, in his " Essai sur L' Indifference en 



296 SPIRITUALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 

matiere de Religion" (1817-1827), gave a wide impulse 
to the religious reaction in France, while exposing the fal- 
lacies in every source of Individ, knowledge. But univ. 
consent does not err. His " Paroles d'un Croyant," basing 
pure democracy on the N. T., being condemned by the Pa- 
pal chair, he entered on a new career, producing (1841- 
1846), his ''Esquisse d'une Philosophic," an all-embracing 
ontology, which had no lasting effect. 



INDEX. 



Ab^lard, 108 
Academy, 58 
^nesidemus, 75 
Agrippa, 76 

Agrippa, Cornelius, 145 
Atbertus, M., 115 
Alcuin, 104 
Alfarabi, iii 
Anaxagoras, 22 
Anaxlmander, 22 
Anaximenes, 19 
Anselm, 106 
Antisthenes, 57 
Antoninus, M. Aur., 64 
Apologists, Christian, 88 
Aquinas, 116 
Arabian Phil., no 
Arcesilaas, 58 
Arianism, 87 
Aristippus, 57 
Aristotle, 42 
Athanasius, 90 
Augustine, 92 
Averroes, 112 
Avicenna, in 
Bacon, F., 156 
Bacon, R., 131 
Bain, 279 
Basalides, 85 
Bayle, 202 
Beattie, 230 
Beck, 252 
Beneke, 273 
Bentham. 277 
Berkeley, 197 
Bernard, 109 
Biran, M. de, 292 
Boehme, 145 
Boethius, loi 
Bonaventura, 130 
Bouterwek, 268 
Brown, 233 
Bruno, 150 
Buddhism, 12 
Buridan, 135 
Butler, 196 
Campbell, 230 
Campanella, 149 
Cameades, 59 
Carpocrates, 86 



Cassiodorus, 101 
Cerinthus, 85 
Ca£salpinus, 147 
Chrysippus, 62 
Cicero, 62 
Charron, 153 
Clarke, 196 
Cleanthes, 61 
Clement, Alex., 88 
Coleridge, 288 
Collins, 204 
Comte, 285 
Condillac, 215 
Condbrcet, 221 
Cousin, 293 
Cudworth, 195 
Cumberland, 206 
D'Alembert, 220 
Darwin, 206 
Deraocritus, 18 
Descartes, 172 
D'Holbach, 221 
Diderot, 220 
Diogenes, of Ap., 19 
Diogenes, of S., 57 
Dionysius, Areop., gi 
Dodwell, 203 
Duns Scotus, 130 
Eckhart, 136 
El^atic School, 25 
Empedocles, 23 
Epictetus, 63 
Epicurus, 70 
Erigena, 104 
Euclid, of M., 56 
Pension, 213 
Ferguson, 230 
Ferrier, 239' 
Fichte, 252 
Ficinus, 143 
Fries, 268 
Gassendi, 151 
Gerson, 139 
Geulincx, 179 
Glanville, 203 
Gnosticism, 85 
Gorgias, 28 
Gotama, 14 
Grotius, 152 
Hamilton, 235 



Hartley, 204 
Hegel, 261 
Helmont, 149 
Helvetius, 219 
Heraclitus, 19 
Herbart, 271 
Herbert, 195 
Hobbes, 159 
Hugo of St. v., 109 
Hume, 207 
Hutcheson, 223 
Ionian School, 18 . 
Jacobi, 267 
Jouffroy, 293 
Kames, 223 
Kandda, 14 
Kant, 241 
Kapila, n 
Kdrikd, II 
Lactantius, 90 
Lamennais, 295 
Laromiguiere, 284 
Leibnitz, 189 
Locke, 165 
Machiavelli, 151 
Mackintosh, 235 
Maimonides, 114 
Maiebranche, 180 
Mandeville, 204 
Manicheism, 86 
Mansel, 239 
Marcion, 86 
Menu, Laws of, 9 
Mill, Jas., 278 
Mill, J. S., 280 
Mirandola, Pico de, 144 
Montaigne, 152. 
Montesquieu, 214 
More, H., 212 
More, T., 151 
Mysticism j 136/ 
Neo-Platonism, 77 
Nominalism, 103, 135 
Occam, 133 
Origen, 89 
Paley, 276 
Panaetius, 62 
Paracelsus, 149 
Parm.enides, 26 
Pascal, 201 

297 



298 



INDEX. 



Pantandjali, 12 

Paul of Samosata, 87 

Philo Judasus, 78 • 

Peripatetic School, 60, 146 

Plato, 33 

Petrarch, 139 

Plotinus, 80 

Poiret, 213 

PorphjTy, 82 

Pomponatius, 146 

Posidoniiis, 62 

Praxeas, 87 

Priestley, 205 

Probabilism, 59 

Proclus, 83 

Protagoras, 29 

Pyrrho, 74 

Pythagoras, 24 

Ramus, 147 

Raymond of S., 139 

Realism, 103, 135 



Reid, 224 
Reinhold, 252 
Reuchlin, 144 
Roscellin, 105 
Rousseau, 214 
Royer-Collard, 291 
SabelUus, 87 
Sanchez, 153 
Sankhya, n 
Saturninus, 85 
Seneca, 63 

Sextus Empiricus, 76 
Schelling, 255 
Schleiermacher, 268 
Scholasticism, 102, 109 
Schopenhauer, 270 
Shaftesbury, 206 
Smith, Ad., 223 
Socratee, 31 
Sophists, 28 
Spencer, H., 283 
Spinoza, 18 1 



Stewart, 230 

Stilpo, 56 

St. Lambert, 221 

St. Martin, 213 

Swedenborg, 213 

Stoicism, 65 

Tauler, 138 

Telesio, 148 

Thales, 19 

Timon, 74 

Tracy, D. de, 284 

ValentinuB, 86 

Vanini, 150 

Voltaire, 202 

Whewell, 289 

William of Auvergne, 113 

William of Champeaux, 106 

Wolff, 194 

Xenophanes, 26 

Zeno of Elea, 27 

Zeno the Stoic, 61 



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